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Abstract 
This study tackles the relationship between dividend policy and market value of 
companies in the UK through three empirical models. 
 
The aim of the first model was to test the validity of the Irrelevant Theory 
empirically by exploring the relationship between dividend type (cash dividend, 
share dividend and share repurchase), earnings (EPS) and investment policy 
(retained earnings per share) with the market value of a company. This is achieved 
through the use of annual and semi-annual data for 362 companies in different UK 
sectors by adopting Panel Data for the period extending from 1998 to 2007 
(twenty periods), where  the fixed-effect (within) regression model was used to 
examine this sample . 
 
The second model examines if companies favour the investment policy dividend 
policy by investigating whether or not companies follow a residual dividends 
policy. This has been identified by following the methodology of Baker and Smith 
(2006), based on the calculation of Standardized Free Cash Flow (SFCF) for 590 
UK companies in different sectors for the period from 1998 to 2007 by using 
annual data. 
 
The third model seeks to explore managerial preferences regarding dividend type 
and the most important factors affecting the company management when setting 
dividends policy. In this respect, the importance of the following factors has been 
tested: the company‘s market value; the financing decision; the investment 
decision; signaling theory; agency theory; and shareholder structure. The 
 x 
 
questionnaire methodology used for this model where it was distributed to 1319 
UK companies in different sectors. The number of responses was 208 responses is 
equivalent to 15.77% of the total distributed). 
 
The study arrived at a number of important results that can be summarized as 
follows: 1) The invalidity of the Irrelevant Theory, as the results show that there is 
a relationship between dividend policy and market value of a company; 2) There 
is a relationship between earnings, investment policy and the market value, which 
indicates that the dividends policy, announced earnings and investment policy 
work together in affecting the market value of a company; 3) UK companies, on 
the whole, do not adopt a residual dividends policy, implying no preference for 
investment policy over dividend policy, except for the two sectors banking and 
insurance companies where the results showed that they follow the residuals 
dividends policy 4) Most UK companies‘ managements prefer cash dividends to 
other venues choices because of its easy implementation; and 5) The most 
important factor affecting UK companies‘ managements when they set their 
dividends policy is shareholder structure while the least factor listed in importance 
is agency theory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xi 
 
Declaration 
No portion of the work referred to in this thesis has been submitted in support of 
an application for another degree of qualification of this or other university or 
other institute. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xii 
 
Statement of copyright 
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation it should be 
published without their prior written consent and information derived from it 
should be acknowledged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 xiii 
 
Acknowledgement 
Praise is upon almighty ALLAH who has created me and given me the ability to 
complete this thesis. 
 
I would like to thank Professor Rob Dixon and Dr. Riham Rizk my supervisors 
for their invaluable guidance, support and encouragement throughout the 
preparation of this thesis.  
 
Thanks are particularly to my parents whose support and continuous 
encouragement were crucial to the success of my life. 
 
I am extremely thankful to my dear wife who is sacrifices allowed me to complete 
my thesis. I am especially thankful to my dearest kids, Karrar (koko) , Zahra‘a 
(zozo), Murtada (keka) and Amir (jojo) , who are an abundant source of my 
encouragement.  
 
Also, I deeply thank my brothers and sisters for their unending love and support. 
 
My gratitude is due to Ms. Anne Woodhead, Dr. Amir Michael and Dr. Murya 
Habbash for their support and comments. I would also like to thank my fellow 
PhD Student, especially Mr. Akram Zoubi, Mr. Abdelah Al Mutawa, Mr. Salaem 
Al Ghamdi, Mr. Mohamed Al Shuredah and Mr. Hadi Al Abrow. I am also 
appreciative for Mr. Hashem K. Lazem for his support during my study.  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank the student and staff of the Durham 
Business School for their help and support during my study in Durham.   
 
 
 
 
 
 xiv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dedication 
To my parents, my wife, my brothers and sisters, and my kids 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Research Introduction  
 
1.1  Introduction 
1.2     Research problem and motivation  
1.3  Research objectives 
1.4  Research hypotheses  
1.5  Research importance  
1.6  Contributions of the study 
1.7  Research methodology  
1.8 Structure of the study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
2 
 
1-1 Introduction 
Social sciences in general and administrative and finance sciences in particular are 
distinguished in that they have multiple views on a particular subject or a certain 
point. This applies to many policies and management procedures, as those 
judgments and perceptions vary on a particular subject depending on the 
circumstances and facts surrounding the topic concerned. 
 
Maximizing the owners‘ wealth is one of the most important objectives that a 
management tries to achieve by adopting specific administrative and finance 
policies. (Ward, 1993) has added another dimension to the differences in 
implementing these financial and management policies. This naturally applies to 
the dividends policy as one of these financial policies that are applied in a 
company, no matter the type they represent or what activities they undertake. 
 
It has thus become necessary to study the impact of the dividends policy on the 
market value of a company, and the probable relationship between the two 
variables. Many studies have been conducted on this relationship, the most 
notable of which is Miller and Modigliani‘s study (1961) which has set up the 
foundation for what is known as the Irrelevant Theory. According to this theory, 
under efficient market conditions there is no relationship between dividends 
policy and the market value of a company. However, this theory finds that there is 
a relationship between investment policy and market value. Accordingly, the 
dividends policy is not that important as it has no effect on either the value of the 
company or the owners‘ wealth. 
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A lot of arguments have revolved around the Irrelevant Theory and, consequently, 
intensive research has been conducted since then to test this theory. While a 
number of researchers such as Black and Scholes (1974), Merton and Rock (1985) 
and Peter (1996) tended to support this theory,(Black and Scholes, 1974, Merton 
and Rock, 1985, Peter, 1996) others oppose it (Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 
1979, Blume, 1980, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982, Ang and Peterson, 
1985, Dyl and Weigand, 1998, Koch and Shenoy, 1999). These conflicting views 
have led to ambiguity and a need for clarity based on specific results. 
 
The relationship between dividends policy and other polices such as investment 
and financing overlaps and is complicated. Therefore, selecting the type of policy 
often depends on management preferences despite the fact that the Irrelevant 
Theory has indicated that management should follow investment policy in order 
to maximize future earnings. 
 
1-2 Research problem and motivation 
The main motivation of this study is to examine the Irrelevant Theory in the UK 
by analysing the problems and weaknesses which are noticed in previous studies 
regarding the relationship between dividends policy and a company‘s market 
value. 
 
Most previous studies have dealt with the dividends policy concept but most of 
them have dealt with one type of dividend (the cash dividend) (Miller and 
Modigliani, 1961, Horne and McDonald, 1971, Partington, 1985, Holder et al., 
1998) and do not make a clear distinction between the dividends policy concept 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
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and dividend types. The dividends policy concept consists of three types of 
dividends (cash, share and repurchase) (Moyer et al., 1995). A number of studies 
deals with either share dividend (Barker, 1958, Grinblatt et al., 1984, Bali, 2003) 
or share repurchase (Ikenberry et al., 1995).  
 
The company may distribute profits in the form of either regular cash dividends or 
it may distribute profits in the form of shares dividends to shareholders. However, 
both forms may be distributed at the same time. On the other hand, shareholders 
can also obtain profits (as a capital gains) when the company repurchases its 
shares, and considers the regular cash dividend as something quite common 
(Broyles, 2003). Therefore, there is lack of studies covering all three types of 
dividends together at the same time. 
 
Besides that, the methodologies of previous studies which discussed the effect of 
dividend policy on company market value exclude companies which do not 
making dividends or their dividend intermittently (Lobo et al., 1986, Doron and 
Ziv, 2001), which posing questions about their sample impartiality. The excluding 
companies which do not make dividends or their dividend is intermittent, the 
sample size for these studies is small and their results could not reliable. The 
important point here is that the zero dividends is still a dividend. Therefore, the 
sample of this study covers all companies, even those with no dividends or their 
dividend is not intermittent.   
 
In addition, the relationship between dividends policy and investment policy is 
complicated and overlapping which could possibly confuse the management 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
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preferences for one of these policies. When company management prefers 
investment policy to dividends policy, this means that a company follows a 
Residual Dividends Policy and vice versa. In this context, only one empirical 
study has been made in the USA on the Residual Dividends Policy (Baker and 
Smith, 2006). The current study is the first one to be applied to the UK. It 
investigates whether companies in the UK follow a Residual Dividends Policy or 
not. Furthermore, this study tries to provide an idea about the importance of 
factors that affect management when they set their dividends policy and therefore 
which will contributes to completing the dividends policy picture in UK.  
 
Added to that, some of the previous studies have dealt with a specific sector in the 
market (Horne and McDonald, 1971, Brook et al., 1998, Ooi, 2001). They did not 
examine the relationship between dividends policy and market value for the whole 
market and for each sector at the same time. Accordingly, they did find the 
significant differences among these sectors.  
 
The research problem can therefore be summarized by the following questions: 
1. Is the Irrelevant Theory is valid (empirically) in the UK? Does the 
dividends policy affect a company‘s market value? Does the dividends 
policy affect a company‘s market value according to different industrial 
sectors?  
2. Is there any relationship between dividends policy and investment policy 
in the UK? Do companies follow a Residual Dividend Policy in the UK? 
What is the impact of industrial sector on a residual dividends policy?  
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3. What factors affect management decisions when dividend policy is set in 
the UK?  
 
1-3 Research objectives  
This study aims to test the relationship between the dividends policy and the 
market value of tested companies in the UK. This relationship is analyzed in three 
stages. The objective of the first stage is to assess the Irrelevant Theory by testing 
the direct relationship between dividends policy (cash dividend, share dividend 
and share buyback), earnings and retained earnings with a company‘s market 
value in the UK. The second stage aims at having another assessment to the 
Irrelevant Theory concept in UK by verifying whether companies in the UK favor 
investment policy to dividends policy or not, through investigating if these 
companies adopt a residuals dividends policy or not. The third stage attempts at 
providing a vision and a perspective on the factors that are taken into 
consideration by management when preparing a dividends policy.  
 
These stages can be achieved through the following objectives: 
1. Testing if there is a relationship between dividends policy (cash dividend, 
share dividend and share buyback), earnings and retained earnings and 
market value of companies in the UK in order to judge the validity of the 
Irrelevant Theory in the UK market. 
2. Examining whether the UK companies follow up the residual dividends 
policy or not, in order to determine the relationship between dividends 
policy and investment policy. 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
7 
 
3. Exploring the importance of the factors that companies take into account 
when preparing their dividends policy in order to provide a clear picture of 
those considerations for investors to make use of them when they take 
their investment decision. 
 
1-4 Research hypotheses  
To achieve the research objectives, the following main null hypotheses
1
 are tested: 
1. There is no significant statistical relationship between dividends policy 
and market value of the sample companies in the UK. 
2. The companies in the UK follow a residual dividends policy. 
3. There are no statistically significant differences between finance 
managers‘ responses about factors that are taken into account when they 
set their dividends policy.  
 
1-5 Research importance 
The importance of this study stems from its coverage as it sought to assessment of 
the Irrelevant Theory in the UK by studying the possible relationship between 
dividends policy (cash dividend, share dividend and share buyback) and market 
value. It determines the importance of investment policy compared with dividends 
policy in the UK by defining how companies adopt a Residual Dividends Policy 
                                                          
1  Talib (2007) argues in his example about a black swan in Australia, that proving a fact is difficult 
(alternative hypothesis), but it is easy to prove a denial for these facts (null hypothesis). In line with this, the 
researcher believes that the existence of a relationship between dividend policy and market value is fact (the 
alternative hypothesis), and the lack of this relationship is the null hypothesis. This belief comes is based 
Irrelevant Theory which is dependent mainly on the assumption of efficient market, which is not fully present 
in any financial market.  In statistics, the only way of supporting the hypothesis is to refute the null 
hypothesis. Rather than trying to prove the idea (the alternative hypothesis) the null hypothesis has to be 
proved wrong—– the null hypothesis has to be ‗refuted‘ or ‗nullified‘. Unfortunately, the alternative 
hypothesis has to be assumed to be wrong evidence is found to the contrary (Berenson et al., 2009)  
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and identifies the key factors that UK company management take into 
consideration when preparing a dividends policy. 
 
Besides that, the prior knowledge of dividends policy in the UK in general and in 
various economic sectors in particular help investors in the UK draw their 
investment policy more clearly through the identification of investment tools that 
suit their investment objectives.  
 
1-6 Contributions of the study 
This study provides a number of significant contributions to Irrelevant Theory 
literature in the UK. First, in examining the validity of the Irrelevant Theory, it 
employs the general concept of dividends policy, which consists of all types of 
dividends (cash dividend, share dividend and share buyback) at the same time. 
Second, all the previous studies exclude companies which do not make dividends 
or those whose dividends are intermittent; this study, however, uses all companies 
that follow any type of dividends or even without dividends since a zero dividend 
is still a dividend. Third, this study is the first study in the UK that seeks to 
investigate whether companies follow a Residual Dividend Policy which helps to 
explore the relationship between dividends policy and investment policy and give 
indication about management preference for any of these policies. Fourth, this 
study also attempts to provide a comprehensive picture about dividends policy in 
the UK by added to the above contributions, the exploration of the importance of 
factors that affect management when they set their dividends policy. Moreover, 
this study tries to explain if there is any affect on the nature of business by testing 
each research model by complete market and by sector. Finally, this study 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
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employs a large sample size for the period 1998-2007. The sample size consists of 
7,240 firm year observations for a sample of 362 UK firms over a 10-year period 
(1998-2007) in the first model; 35,400 firm year observations for a sample of 590 
UK firms over a 10-year period (1998-2007) in the second model; and 208 
respondents for the management questionnaire in the third model. The sample size 
in most previous studies has been smaller, thus limiting the ability of making 
generalizations about any conclusions.     
 
1-7 Research methodology 
This research investigates three main issues in the UK context: 1) the impact of 
dividends policy on market value; 2) the extent to which companies follow a 
Residual Dividends Policy; and 3) the main factors that have to be taken into 
account when financial managers/directors set a company‘s dividends policy. 
 
This section explains the methodology employed and describes the test 
instruments used in the empirical analyses (Chapters Three, Four and Five). 
 
1-7-1 Research philosophy 
Research philosophy aims to promote understanding of the way in a specific area 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Typically, there are three main ways of thinking about 
research philosophy, namely epistemology, ontology and axiology.  
 
1-7-1-1 Epistemology 
Epistemology can be defined as a philosophy of knowledge. In other words, 
epistemology is concerned about how the researcher comes to know (Bryman, 
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2008). Hopper and Powell (1985) state that epistemology is concerned with the 
nature of knowledge in terms of what form it can take and how it can be acquired 
and transferred. There are two epistemological aspects: positivism and 
interpretivism.   
 
1-7-1-1-1 Positivism 
Positivism is defined by Bryman as ―an epistemological position that advocates 
the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the study of social reality 
and beyond‖ (2008: 13). According to this point of view, the essential objective of 
the theory is to generate hypotheses that can be tested. Therefore, the role of 
research is to examine theories and thereafter develop them (Bryman and Bell, 
2003). Due to this, the researcher would use an extremely structured methodology 
to facilitate replication (Gill and Johnson, 2002) .   
 
1-7-1-1-2 Interpretivism 
Bryman defines interpretivism as follows (2008:16): 
[It] usually denotes an alternative to the positivist orthodoxy that has held sway 
for decades. It is predicated upon the view that a strategy is required that respects 
the differences between people and the objects of the natural sciences and 
therefore requires the social scientist to grasp the subjective meaning of social 
action. 
 
Therefore, interpretivism is necessary for the researcher to understand the 
differences between humans in their roles as social actors (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Interpretivism is more inclined towards qualitative research as this requires that 
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researchers need to use their intuition to feel and understand the assumed 
relationships between the social actors (Saunders et al., 2007). Some researchers 
use post-positivism as a substitute to interpretivism. They believe that natural 
science cannot understand the social world (Blumberg et al., 2005). 
 
1-7-1-2 Ontology 
Ontology is a theory of the nature of social entities reality (Bryman, 2008). Thus, 
ontology deals with the nature of reality and is concerned with the researchers‘ 
underlying assumptions about how the world functions (Saunders et al., 2007). 
Research ontology can be divided into two types: objectivism and subjectivism. 
 
1-7-1-2-1 Objectivism 
Objectivism assumes that social phenomena confront us with external facts that 
are beyond our research or influences (Bryman, 2008). According to objectivism, 
organization is a tangible object consisting of rules and regulations (Bryman, 
2008). This research uses objectivism ontology to underlie the existence of the 
effect of dividends policy on reality. 
 
1-7-1-2-2 Subjectivism 
According to the Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary (p.1529), subjectivism is 
―the theory that all knowledge and moral values are subjective to rather than based 
on truth that actually exists in the real world‖. Some authors have seen 
subjectivism as an ontological position that emphasizes that entities are created 
from the insight and consequent action of those social actors responsible for their 
creation (Saunders et al., 2007, Bryman, 2008). The researchers seek to 
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understand the world in which they live and try to develop subjective meanings of 
their experiences. These meanings change and therefore researchers should look 
for the complexity of views rather than narrowing meanings of the phenomenon 
(Creswell, 2003) .   
 
1-7-1-3 Axiology  
Axiology is ―a branch of philosophy that studies judgments about values‖ 
(Saunders et al., 2007). Axiology is a crucial point in research methodology 
because of the impact of the researchers‘ values on their decisions during research 
and therefore on the credibility of their outcomes. 
 
1-7-2 Research approach 
Typically, researchers can answer their research questions and generate theories 
by deduction, induction or a mix of the two (Zikmund, 2000). The deductive 
approach is used to arrive at a logical conclusion through logical generalization of 
a known fact (Sekaran, 2003). There are seven steps of the hypothetico-deductive 
method of research (Sekaran, 2003): 
1. Observation 
2. Preliminary information gathering 
3. Theory information 
4. Hypothesizing  
5. Further scientific data collection 
6. Data analysis 
7. Deduction 
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On the other hand, the inductive approach is used to arrive at the conclusion by 
observing certain phenomena (Sekaran, 2003). There are seven steps of the 
hypothetico-inductive method of research (Zikmund, 2000): 
1. Assessment of relevant existing knowledge 
2. Formulation of concepts and propositions 
3. Statement of hypotheses 
4. Designing the research to test the hypotheses 
5. Acquisition of meaningful empirical data 
6. Analysis and evaluation of data 
7. Providing explanation and stating new problems raised by the research 
 
This research is based on the Irrelevant Theory. It aims to understand the 
relationship between dividends policy and market value for UK companies by 
using three approaches to investigate this relationship. The first approach adopts 
the regression model for panel data to investigate the relationship between 
dividends policy (cash, share and repurchases), investment policy and earnings 
announcement with company market value. The second approach tries to find if 
companies in the UK follow a Residual Dividend Policy or not, while the third 
approach explores the main factors that affect management when they set their 
dividends policy.   
 
According to the above discussion, the objectivist ontological and the positivism 
epistemological positions have been adopted. A hypothetico-deductive 
methodological approach has been used to formulate hypotheses and to examine 
them empirically. Departing from an objectivist ontological position, multiple 
Chapter One: Research Introduction 
14 
 
sources secondary data has been used to conduct the research. A longitudinal 
(panel-data) approach was used to investigate the relationship between dividends 
policy (cash, share and repurchases), investment policy (REPS) and earnings 
announcement (EPS) with company market value (Chapter Three). According to 
Bryman and Bell, ―[a] longitudinal design allows some insight into the time order 
of variables and therefore may be more able to allow causal references to be 
made‖ (Bryman and Bell, 2003). The secondary data was also used to find if 
companies in the UK follow a Residual Dividend Policy or not (see Chapter 
Four).  
 
Furthermore, a questionnaire survey was used to gather information from the UK 
companies financial managers / directors to investigate the importance of the main 
factors that affect them when they set their dividends policy (see Chapter Five). 
The research approach is depicted in figure 1.1 as follows: 
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Figure 1-1 Research Philosophy and Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-8 Structure of the study  
The remainder of the thesis is divided into five chapters. 
 
Chapter Two: Theoretical structure of the dividends policy 
The second chapter discusses the theories and studies connected with the 
dividends policy. Dividends policy is dealt with in general, with emphasis on cash 
dividends policy and factors which influence it. It also covers the theories that 
affect dividends policy, together with the theories that affect the relationship 
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between dividends policy and market value, the irrelevant theory, the bird in hand 
theory, the taxation effect theory, the client theory, the signaling theory and the 
agency theory. Additionally, shares dividends policy and shares repurchasing 
policy are tackled. The last section of this chapter is concerned with investment 
policy and dividends policy. 
 
Chapter Three: The dividends effects on the market value 
The third chapter focuses on the Irrelevant Theory by following the methodology 
of the Panel Data to examine the relationship between dividends policy (cash 
dividends, shares dividends and shares repurchase), earnings and investment 
policy with market value of companies in the UK. To achieve this objective, the 
annual and semi-annual financial reports and data stream of 362 companies listed 
on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for the period 1998-2007 were gathered.  
 
Chapter Four: The residual dividends Policy 
The fourth chapter attempts to explore the relationship between investment policy 
and dividends policy by verifying whether or not companies in the UK follow a 
Residual Dividends Policy by calculating the standardized free cash flow (SFCF) 
for UK companies. The annual data taken from the data stream of 580 UK 
companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) for ten years for the 
period from 1998 to 2007 using the SPSS has been made use of. 
 
Chapter Five: The perspective of management about the dividends policy Chapter 
Five focuses on the importance of the factors that management takes into account 
when making their dividends decisions. For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent 
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to1319 finance managers/ directors of UK companies. The response rate was 
15.77% (208 responses). The questionnaire was designed with two sections. The 
first section includes information on the economic sector in which the company 
operates and the directors‘ beliefs as to the importance of each type of dividend to 
shareholders; managers‘ preferences for the dividends types; and the reasons for 
such a preference as well as inquiring if management has studies of the 
shareholders preferences regarding dividends. The second section includes 18 
questions on Likert scale about the importance of the following factors: market 
value of the company; financing decisions; investment decisions; agency theory; 
signal theory; and structure of the shareholders. 
 
Chapter Six: Summary of results, limits and recommendations 
The sixth chapter provides a summary of the results of the study, limits and 
recommendations for future studies. 
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2-1 Introduction 
Dividend policy has drawn attention from a number of researchers. One of the 
most famous studies in this respect is Miller and Modigliani‘s (1961), whose 
hypothesis asserts that the cash dividend policy is not important because it has no 
affect on a company‘s value and thus does not affect a company owner‘s wealth. 
This is due to the fact that companies follow a Residual Dividend Policy which is 
based on reinvestment of corporate profits in the available investment 
opportunities with a positive net present value (Saxena, 1999, Baker, 2009, Chen 
and Dhiensiri, 2009) and then the distribution of the surplus cash as a cash 
dividend to shareholders. 
 
Miller and Modigliani‘s hypothesis aroused controversy among researchers. An 
important study opposing Miller and Modigliani is that of Partington (1985) 
which claims that in practice companies do not follow the residual dividend policy 
as dividend decisions are taken independently from the investment policy. 
However, even today controversies continue without arriving at any decisive 
results. 
 
This chapter will review the literature on public dividend policy to shareholders, 
which is considered to be one of the most important financial decisions, in view of 
its direct relationship to shareholders, along with financing and investment 
decisions in the company. The chapter will also review the literature on 
alternatives to be addressed consisting of general dividend policy and theories that 
link cash dividend policy with company market value, and therefore the company 
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owners‘ wealth, in addition to share dividend policy and buy back policy, besides 
the cash dividend policy and its relationship with the investment policy.  
 
2-2 General Dividend Policy 
The board of directors suggests the dividends to shareholders at an annual meeting 
(Pike and Neale, 2009). The main aim is to suggest acceptance and secure a fair 
dividend for shareholders consistent with the rate of dividend decided by the 
company‘s management. Therefore, in preparing dividend distribution, managers 
not only look at the current year profit but also at expected future earnings and 
hence the ability of the company to maintain a stable rate of dividend, taking into 
consideration the systematic growth of this ratio. On their part, investors are 
aware of this truth, and they look for a profit increase in a positive vision 
expecting throughout a stability of future dividends. If a company achieves high 
profits for a particular year and do not expect the same level of profit in the 
following years, they will make a normal dividend and give an additional 
dividend so as not to disappoint the investors‘ hopes in the future. The profits are 
then divided into two dividends, a normal and an incremental dividend, to notify 
investors that this type of dividend is unexpected and would not continue in the 
future (DeAngelo et al., 1996).  
 
There are several alternative for the profits dividend may be distributed. The 
company may distribute profits in the form of either regular cash dividends or it 
may distribute profits in the form of shares dividends to shareholders. However, 
both forms may be distributed at the same time. Moreover, shareholders can also 
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obtain profits when the company repurchases its shares, and considers the regular 
cash dividend as something quite common (Broyles, 2003). 
 
The percentage of the profits distributed by a company is governed by several 
considerations. In addition to the law which prohibits distribution of profits unless 
the company achieves a profit after deducting reserves, the contracts of the bonds, 
in cases where the company issues bonds, often prevents companies from 
increasing the proportion of cash dividend beyond a certain level in order to 
secure the rights of bondholders (Black and Cox, 1976). 
 
Thus, the general dividend policy may be seen as the basis of differentiating 
between cash dividends and shares dividend through the capitalization of profits, 
or through buying back the company‘s shares. This is due to the fact that the 
investment policy is fixed. The company will thus detain profits in order to 
finance capital spending on growth and expansion or debt repayment, or 
extinguish the bonds if any, and distribute the remaining cash as a cash dividend, 
and also to finance any deficit in capital spending by issuing new shares or 
through outside borrowing. The company could detain the necessary funds to 
finance capital expenditure and buy back shares issued and distribute the 
remaining as a cash dividend. 
 
These alternatives will not affect the company's value, and therefore the wealth of 
shareholders, if the company is operating in market characterized by ideal, 
efficiency and deep (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, Black and Scholes, 1974, Peter, 
1996). In case such characteristics are absent of the market, one can expect 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review for Dividend Policy 
22 
 
arguments about the impact of dividend policy, particularly cash, on the value of a 
company and therefore the wealth of shareholders. Other critics (Gordon, 1959, 
Blume, 1980, Dyl and Weigand, 1998, Koch and Shenoy, 1999) believe that 
increasing the percentage of cash dividends would increase a company‘s value, 
thus increasing the shareholders‘ wealth. Another group of critics (Litzenberger 
and Ramaswamy, 1979, Blume, 1980, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982, Ang 
and Peterson, 1985) believe that increasing the percentage of cash dividend will 
lead to a decline in the value of a company, thereby reducing the wealth of 
shareholders. These groups together with their theories will be discussed when 
dealing with the policy of cash dividends is discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Profits are transferred to a retained earnings account, which is used for purposes 
determined by the board and approved by the General Assembly of the company. 
This account is usually used to maintain a stable amount of cash dividends (a 
systematic dividend policy). During the years where a company cannot meet the 
amount of normal dividend, they will tend to the return earnings account to insure 
any shortfall. The General Assembly of the company has full authority to use this 
account for normal or abnormal cash dividend in whole or in part. It can also be 
used for company repurchase of shares or for capitalization this account and 
distribution of share dividends to shareholders. On their part, shareholders can 
obtain their profits through a set of policies that can be combined in a single year, 
but it often takes one of the following alternatives (Broyles, 2003, Pike and Neale, 
2009)  :  
 Cash dividend policy; 
 Shares dividend policy; 
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 Buy back shares policy. 
 
2-3 Cash Dividend Policy  
The impact of cash dividend policy on the current prices of company shares is 
considered to be very important, not only for policy makers, but also for investors, 
portfolio managers, and economists interested in the performance of capital 
markets (Okpara, 2010). The questions raised here are: Can managers maximize 
the wealth of the owners of the company through a particular dividend policy? 
Are the companies with high dividend sold with premium? Should the shares of 
companies that retain their profits or distribute a percentage of its profits, be sold 
at a lower price? Such questions have been the subject of a number of studies and 
there seems to be no consensus on the answers to these questions. This may be 
due to the presence of other relevant factors that affect the market value of the 
shares that do not enable us to measure the impact of dividend policy on profits 
alone.  
 
The arguments among researchers about dividend policy focus on the part of the 
cash dividend to be distributed to shareholders and its impact on the company‘s 
value and therefore the wealth of the owners of the company. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) believe that the cash dividend does not affect the value of the 
company as the company‘s value will not be affected by how earned profits are 
divided; but rather affected by the ability to achieve profits. Thus, instead of 
deciding how to divide profits between dividends and retained earnings, , while 
thinking must be directed towards maximizing these profits through the optimal 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review for Dividend Policy 
24 
 
investment policy as the way by which the cookie is divided will not lead to 
increase its size . 
 
However, in the opinion of others (see:  Olson and McCann, 1994, Lipson et al., 
1998), the manner in which profits are divided between dividends and retained 
earnings affect the company‘s value through an increase or decrease in the 
demand for the company shares, as the investors with high incomes usually prefer 
companies without cash dividend if the value of taxes on cash dividend exceeds 
the taxes on capital gains, while investors who do not pay taxes or have a low tax 
bracket typically prefer companies that cash high dividends. Also, investors in 
growing companies may not ask the company to distribute high levels of cash 
dividends but instead accept low cash dividends. This is because the internal 
return rate in these companies is usually greater than the costs of obtaining funds 
from sources other than retained earnings, and thus maximizes the wealth of 
shareholders through the retention of all or most of the profits in order to use them 
to finance projects which have a positive present value. Meanwhile, investors in 
non-growth companies, on their part, look for high dividends (see, Walter, 1963).  
 
From the above discussion, it is viewed by many scholars believe that the 
relationship between cash dividend policy with investor wishes will affect the 
market value, due to any increase or decrease for the company shares, which is 
reflected in the price of its shares. 
 
The decision of cash dividend policy, particularly its cash portion, is one of the 
challenges facing company managers, because the distribution decision defines 
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the funds to be given company‘s shareholders, and therefore the funds to remain 
for managers in the company to reinvest (Lumby and Jones, 1999). 
 
The cash dividend policy can be considered as an action plan for a company to 
follow when it needs to make a decision regarding cash dividends. The plan can 
provide several options from which the company can choose to reach the desired 
result. When such a plan is laid out, the following two main goals are taken into 
account: maximizing the wealth of shareholders and meeting the company needs 
to finance its investments (Smith and Watts, 1992).  
 
There are several factors affecting the decision to choose the most appropriate 
alternative among the most suitable alternative to follow. These factors are: legal, 
contractual, internal shareholders and market considerations, and will be 
considered in more detail later. These considerations reduce the available 
alternatives for the company in order to achieve its aims through a cash dividend 
policy practice. Such alternatives include the range of cash dividend policies the 
company could follow (Moyer et al., 1995, Ross et al., 1999) . These include: 
 Fixed dividend policy rate; 
 Regular dividend policy; 
 Regular low fixed dividend with special or added dividend; 
 Remaining cash dividend policy. 
 
Each of these policies will now be discussed in detail. 
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Fixed Dividend Policy Rate 
The fixed dividend policy rate is determined by apportioning the dividends on 
profits earned. A percentage distribution of 80% of net profits derived means that 
a company will distribute 80% of its profits and reserve 20% for retained 
earnings. Since corporate annual profits are not fixed, adopting this policy will 
lead to a fluctuation in the amount of dividends because the stability of the 
dividends rate from non-fixed profit leads to a difference in the amount of the 
annual dividends. This is the main criticism of this policy. Since fluctuations in 
the level of dividends is one of the benchmarks that measure the risks of the 
company and because the non-fluctuation of profits is usually seen as something 
positive for current and future performance of the company, the prices of 
company shares that follow such a policy may be adversely affected by this 
policy. 
 
Regular Dividend Policy 
According to this policy, the company pays a fixed rate of dividend each year. For 
example, it may pay US$0.20 per share each year, which will be fixed over the 
next few years. This policy gives a positive indicator about the company because 
of the stability of the level of dividends, leading to reduced risks of uncertainty. 
Companies that follow such a policy tend to increase the dividends rate whenever 
they feel that the increase in profits is steady and continuing in the future. 
 
Low regular fixed policy with special or added dividend  
Some companies follow a policy of systematic low dividends with additional 
dividends when the company‘s profits are unstable and highly volatile. It is 
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therefore difficult to maintain a regular high-level profits distribution policy. The 
company, therefore, seeks to pay consistent low dividends and then pay other 
additional dividends in the years when it achieves high profits. The company is 
thus able to achieve consistency and continuity in the level of dividends, which is 
an indicator of great importance on the part of investors who consider this 
necessary for building confidence with the company. 
 
Remaining cash dividend policy 
The optimal cash dividend rate for any company is best determined by the 
differentiation between a numbers of factors (Baker, 2009): 
1. Shareholders‘ preference for cash dividend or capital gains; 
2. Investment opportunities available to the company; 
3. Optimal structure mix for the company‘s capital (funding sources); 
4. External financing costs. 
 
The last three factors combined affect the remaining dividend policy. It is based 
on distributing cash dividends that exceed the company‘s ability to finance all the 
company‘s investment opportunities that have a positive present value. 
 
The company should take the following three steps when applying the remaining 
cash dividend policy (Baker, 2009): 
1. Identify all the available investment opportunities which have positive 
present value and in which the company wishes to invest; 
2. Determine the optimal structure mix of capital that achieves the lowest 
cost; 
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3. Use profits to finance new projects with a positive present value because 
of their low cost in comparison to raising new share issues in case they 
represent the best combination of capital. 
 
Based on this concept, as long as the money needed by the company to reach the 
optimal mix of the capital structure is the equity fund, and not money borrowed, 
and as long as the need for funds exceeds the company‘s achieved profits and 
retained earnings, the company will not make any dividends distribution to 
shareholders. However, where required funds are less than retained earnings, the 
company will take its cash needs and distribute any excess money as a cash 
dividend for shareholders (Saxena, 1999, Baker, 2009) .  
 
Moreover, if the optimal capital structure mix does not make it incumbent upon 
the company for financing or allowing to borrowing without leading to the level 
of damage risks of the company, the company then may distribute profits to 
shareholders because of lack of need and also because these profits are considered 
as surplus (Chen and Dhiensiri, 2009). 
 
2-3-1 Factors Affecting Cash Dividend Policy 
A combination of factors affects the cash dividend policy and puts pressure on 
management when a dividends proposal is submitted to the General Assembly. 
The most important of these factors are: legal, contractual, internal, growth and 
the expected expansion, shareholders‘ preferences for cash dividend or capital 
gains, and capital market considerations. These factors are explained below in 
detail. 
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Legal restrictions 
Cash dividends should not exceed the total of retained earnings plus net profits for 
the current year. This is known as the Impairment of Capital Rule (Ballantine and 
Hills, 1935). If a company‘s net profits equal to US$500,000 and it retained 
earnings of US$2 million, then it should not distribute profits of more than 
US$2.5 million. However, if it had a retained loss within equity amounting to 
US$200,000, then it should not distribute more than US$300,000.  
 
Contractual restrictions 
Usually borrowing contracts restrict the amount of profits, allowing the company 
to distribute to shareholders to ensure the rights of the lenders. When a company 
issues borrowing bonds (Black and Cox, 1976), the contracts usually include both 
permissions and restrictions from date of issuance of bonds until repayment of the 
bonds. The bonds contract often will not allow the company to distribute cash 
dividends unless they exceed the amount earned in a certain amount. The contract 
might also prevent the company from increasing the percentage distribution of 
normal profits or may determine the profits that could be distributed by the 
company‘s net profits for distribution. The company accepts such conditions on 
themselves to reduce the risks of borrowing from the viewpoint of the lender, thus 
reducing borrowing costs. There are also restrictions on cash dividends imposed 
upon issuance of the preferable shares of the company. In this respect, it is natural 
to restrict the distribution of any dividends to ordinary shareholders unless they 
pay all preferable share profits. 
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Internal constraints 
A company‘s ability to pay cash dividends is affected by the quantity of liquid 
funds available, not only by profits and return earnings (Kato et al., 2002). 
Although a company could resort to borrowing in order to finance the cash 
dividend or issue new shares to finance the dividend process, companies do not 
usually do so because of the high costs for this decision. A company can use it in 
urgent cases to stabilize the level of dividends, since fluctuations in the value of 
dividends may convey a cost that could be higher than the distribution finance 
costs. Thus, a company‘s ability to pay cash dividends or its desire to distribute is 
often constrained by the liquid funds available. 
 
Company expected growth and expansion 
The volume of capital expenditure required for financing expansion and growth 
significantly affects the cash dividend policy adopted by a company (Smith and 
Watts, 1992). If a company is in continuous expansion and development using 
modern technology, then it will need all the funds available to finance operations. 
On the other hand, the companies that have reached the stage of maturity are more 
able to distribute cash dividends than companies in growth. 
 
Shareholders’ preference for cash dividends or capital gains 
One of the management functions is to maximize the company owners‘ wealth. 
Therefore, owners‘ interests need to be taken into account when preparing the 
cash dividend policy. A company‘s ability to distribute cash profits and its desire 
to do so are often constrained by several important factors affecting the interests 
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of company owners (see: Brudney, 1980, Moyer et al., 1995, Pike and Neale, 
2009) : 
1. Tax status of a company‘s owners: If the company‘s owners are affluent 
and are in high tax brackets, the company will resort to a dividend policy 
whereby it can reduce the impact of taxes on the shareholders‘ profits. 
2. Investment opportunities available for company owners: If shareholders 
can obtain returns for re-investing their profits exceeding the company‘s 
returns, the company must distribute a greater proportion of profits to 
enable shareholders to maximize their wealth by reinvesting these profits. 
However, if the company‘s returns are more than shareholders‘ returns, 
then the company must transfer the maximum part of their profit to retain 
earnings for reinvestment in order to maximize shareholders‘ wealth. 
3. The steady control of former shareholders: If a company tends to distribute 
all or most of the profits achieved over the years, it will be forced to issue 
new shares to finance expansion and development projects. This would 
first lead to minimizing the control of the company‘s former owners of the 
company; and reducing then the profits to be gained due to the issuance of 
new shares because of the increasing number of company owners. This 
situation could be remedied through the allocation of shares, for example, 
by allowing old shareholders to subscribe to new shares according to 
his/her contribution and giving them priority in this respect. Alternatively, 
the company could reduce the proportion of cash dividends if they want to 
retain full control over old shareholders and show no inclination towards 
increasing the number of shareholders. 
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4. A stable and clear dividend policy: Investors give special importance to 
the stable and clear dividend policy. Also, they give special importance for 
the continuity of these dividends because they believe that the stability, 
increase and continuity of dividends would surely lead to reduced risks 
from the standpoint of investors. Therefore, investors tend to disregard the 
returns of companies whose policies of distribution are characterized by 
stability, increase and continuity at a discount rate. This means that they 
value highly these companies; in other words, they ask for a lower rate of 
return, thereby reducing the company‘s capital costs. 
5. Profit information content: Investors are interested in the informational 
content of profits. Through these profits, they can read the management 
forecasts for company future profits. As the managers have more precise 
information about company investors, they give special attention to the 
informational content of profits. 
 
2-3-2 Theoretical Framework for Dividend Policy and its Impact 
on Market Value  
We can clarify the theoretical framework for the relationship between dividend 
policies (cash, shares and repurchase) and market value of the company through 
the Irrelevant Theory introduced by Miller and Modigliani in 1961. They suggest 
that there was no relationship between dividend policy and market value. While 
many researchers support this theory, others have suspicions about it. The 
advocate‘s researchers believe that companies should follow residuals dividend 
policy while the opponents‘ researchers‘ are divided into two camps. One believes 
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that there is a positive relationship between dividend policy and company market 
value, while the other thinks that this relationship is negative. 
 
The relationship between dividend policy and company market value is also 
affected by other dimensions which have created a number of other theories., 
where we find that the uncertainty created a Bird in the Hand Theory; the 
presence of taxes helped to  creates a Tax Effect Theory; and shareholders‘ loyalty 
creates a Clientele Effect Theory. If management try to send some information 
through the dividend policy, this is covered by the Signaling Effect Theory while 
the separation of management and owners (shareholders) has creates the Agency 
Cost Theory. Therefore, we can draw the theoretical framework for the study 
through the following form: 
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Figure 2-1 Dividend Policy Theoretical Framework 
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2-3-2-1 Irrelevance proposition 
Many finance and economics specialists believe that cash dividend policy is 
unimportant because it is not relevant and does not affect the owners‘ wealth. The 
source of this belief is a study conducted by Miller and Modigliani (1961). This 
study concludes that dividend policy has no effect on a company‘s value, and 
therefore managers will not be able to maximize owners‘ wealth through a 
dividend policy. 
 
The irrelevance proposition concept for dividend policy on the owners‘ wealth 
stems from the fundamental idea that companies which distribute continuous high 
cash dividends to shareholders therefore secure a higher share price (Lumby and 
Jones, 1999). As a result, investors‘ capital gains are very limited in such a 
company as they receive the same returns as other investors holding another 
company‘s shares with low dividends while its prices become high because of the 
retained earnings. These investors obtain high capital gains which compensates 
the limited cash dividends. In both cases, the shareholder‘s wealth is the profits 
obtained by cash dividend plus capital gains realized from rising share prices. In 
case there are no taxes or where taxes on capital gains are equal to dividends 
taxes, the investor will not be affected, whether or not the company has paid cash 
dividends or kept the profit in retained earnings and the investor has obtained 
capital gains when selling his/her shares as a result of the rise in the price of the 
company‘s shares through undistributed profits and with no change in the other 
effective factors. 
 
This theory is based on the following assumptions (Miller and Modigliani, 1961): 
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 There are no taxes, or the tax rate on cash dividends and tax rate on capital 
gains are equal; 
 There is no transactions cost for the process of selling or buying shares so if 
the investor needs cash, he/she will be able to sell his/her shares without 
losing commissions and fees instead of cash dividends;  
 The investor is absolutely rational in his/her decisions;  
 There are no agency costs. This means that company managers who distribute 
low cash dividends do not use company profits to achieve personal goals that 
may harm the company (Jensen, 1986);  
 The company operates under a full and efficient market. That is to say, which 
means that the information is available and accessible to all at the same time 
without any costs, and the stock prices reflect this information and is 
influenced by it at the moment provided;  
 There is no information gap and the company operates in a full and efficient 
market. The future outlook on the performance of the company is 
homogeneous among all investors, including information and expectations 
among managers and investors. 
 
According to the irrelevance proposition, dividend policy affects only the level of 
external financing required to finance future projects with a positive net present 
value. This means that each dollar distributed to shareholders represents a capital 
loss of a dollar. According to this hypothesis, the only constraint on the 
company‘s market value is the company‘s investment policy, not which dividend 
policy the company follows. This is because the investment policy is responsible 
for future profits (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Accordingly, the company‘s 
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decision on the distribution of cash or non-profit distribution would not affect the 
market value of the company and therefore would not affect the owners‘ wealth. 
This hypothesis recommends that managers should give greater importance to the 
investment policy and let the dividend policy follow the investment policy; which 
is known the Residual Dividend Policy. 
 
The advocates of the irrelevance proposition hypothesis (Black and Scholes, 1974, 
Miller and Scholes, 1978, Merton and Myron, 1982, Merton, 1986, Peter, 1996) 
adopt the idea that an investor can build his/her own cash dividend policy 
regardless of the company‘s dividend policy. This is known as the Homemade 
Dividend (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) where investors can obtain income 
through selling part of his/her shares equal to the value of cash profits that could 
have been distributed by the company if the company does not have cash 
dividends and the investor himself wishes to receive cash dividends to meet his 
consumer needs. The investor may wish also to reinvest cash dividends distributed 
by the company if he/she shows no desire for cash dividends. By following this 
method, the investor will not be affected by the company‘s dividend policy, and 
therefore would not be compelled to abandon the stocks of companies following a 
dividend policy which is not consistent with his/her wishes. 
 
One of the criticisms of the irrelevance proposition hypothesis is that it cannot be 
practically acceptable. The theory of building a dividend policy for each investor 
based on an efficient market, with no transaction costs for buying and selling, is 
not practical (Dempsey and Laber, 1992). In addition, the investor will pay taxes 
on cash dividends or capital gains, making the adoption of a specific dividend 
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policy for each investor a costly process. In addition, investment in companies 
whose cash dividend policy is consistent with investors‘ needs is less expensive 
than building a special dividend policy. Irrelevance proposition hypothesis is built 
on the basis that the investor is rational when taking his/her decisions. However, 
psychological tests prove that human beings are not one hundred per cent rational 
with regard to decision-making. Shefrin and Statman (1984) in their study argue 
that investors have an unreasonable preference regarding profit dividends; this is 
not consistent with irrelevance proposition hypothesis. Irrelevance proposition 
hypothesis is also criticised for assuming equality between cash dividends and 
capital gains. The two are not equal as a cash dividend is cash in the hand without 
any uncertainty risk, while a capital gain is cash in the future with considerable 
risk. So, how can they be equal? 
 
The irrelevance proposition hypothesis has been built on a set of assumptions that 
have already been indicated. It is understood here that any change in these 
assumptions would naturally lead to a change in the basic hypothesis and 
therefore to a change in the results. Accordingly, and in practical terms, financial 
markets in general do not agree with these assumptions. 
 
2-3-2-2 Bird in the Hand theory 
The aim sought by the proponents of the irrelevance proposition hypothesis 
argues that cash dividend policy has no effect on the company value or the capital 
cost. Consequently, cash dividend policy will not affect the returns on capital 
required. Many other theorists (Lintner, 1962, Gordon, 1963) believe that the 
returns on capital required rise when the cash dividends ratio decreases because 
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investors are less sure of their resulting capital gains than the return earnings and 
rising stock prices from obtaining these cash dividends. These theorists think that 
investors evaluate the dollar, which they received from cash dividends more than 
the dollar they receive from capital gains. The reason is that the dollar received 
from cash dividends today is less risky than the future dollar received from capital 
gains. It is known that investors evaluate share prices through a predictable future 
cash flow per share and then discount it at a rate reflecting the risks. This discount 
rate has a positive relation with risks, therefore the discount rate which is used to 
determine share price with future capital gains will be greater. As a result, the 
company‘s share price which has a low cash dividend and high return earnings for 
future capital gains will be less than the share price which has high cash 
dividends. Therefore, the share price will drop when retained earnings increase for 
future capital gains.  
 
A preliminary reading of the bird in the hand theory shows that it seems 
acceptable on the basis that shares with high cash dividend are less risky. With the 
stability of other factors affecting share price, less risky stocks are more 
expensive. The question to be raised here is: Has the dividend policy affected the 
company‘s risk level? Or do the risks affect the dividend policy? 
 
In his study on how companies with high risk distribute low cash dividends, 
Rozeff (1982) proposed that managers are aware that these companies‘ profits 
have uncertainty risks. Thus, managers prefer low cash dividends because they do 
not want to find themselves forced in the coming years, with uncertain profits, to 
reduce cash dividends rate which is familiar for shareholders because they are 
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evaluate the consistency in the cash dividend level more than cash dividend itself 
(Gombola and Feng-Ving, 1993). This means that high risk for a company leads 
to a reduction in cash dividends rate distribution. Also, the decrease in cash 
dividends is a result of the company‘s high risks and not vice versa. 
 
To sum up, the bird in hand theory proposes that capital gains are more risky than 
cash dividends and investors prefer companies that distribute cash dividends to 
companies that hold profits to convert them into capital gains. Due to this 
preference, investors pay higher prices for a company‘s shares with cash 
dividends compared to a company that holds their profits when other factors are 
fixed. In other words, this theory indicates that if the company wants to maximize 
their share price, then they should adopt a high dividend ratio (Baker and Powell, 
1999).  
 
However, according to one of their assumptions, Miller and Modigliani (1961) do 
not accept this concept and say it is a Bird in the Hand Fallacy. Bhatacharya 
(1979) says that the future cash flow risk for any project determines its risk; 
therefore, any incremental increase in cash dividend now will decrease shares 
price after the cash dividend is paid and sill also the decrease in future cash flow 
risk which will not increase a company‘s value.  
 
An accurate reading of the bird in the hand theory, as stated by Gordon (1959), 
shows that this theory tends to consider investment policy rather than cash 
dividend policy as it seems from an initial reading. The conclusion that can be 
drawn from this theory is that companies that distribute low cash dividends are 
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often high risk investment companies. Due to high investment risks, investors 
would discount future cash flows of low cash dividends at a higher discount rate 
when they evaluate these companies‘ shares prices. Therefore, they are willing to 
pay a lower price for shares of companies that have the stability of other factors. 
In other words, the discount rate used to determine these companies‘ shares price 
depends solely on the risk level, regardless of the dividend policy followed by 
these companies. Thus, the cash dividend policy is the inevitable result of the 
company‘s risk level, and not the reason for it. 
 
2-3-2-3 Tax Effect theory  
In brief this theory assumes that if there is no tax for capital gains, or if the capital 
gains tax is less than the cash dividend tax, investors prefer companies that do not 
distribute cash dividends and retain profits in the form of undistributed profits. 
Whenever the cash dividends percentage decreases at the expense of undistributed 
profits, the owners‘ wealth will maximize with other factors being constant. 
Therefore, investors will ask companies that distribute high cash dividends for a 
greater return, in comparison to the returns of companies that have no cash 
dividends in order to cover the taxes they will pay for cash dividends (Brennan, 
1970, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1982). In other words, investors accept 
returns prior to taxation which are lower in cases of companies that provide 
capital gains instead of cash dividends. The investors, on the other hand, would 
pay a higher price for the company‘s shares that provide returns in the form of 
capital gains instead of distributing them as cash dividends if other factors 
affecting the share price are fixed. This is where the role of dividend policy and its 
impact on a company‘s value and shareholders‘ wealth comes into play. Through 
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the retention of profits and converting them into capital gains, the company‘s 
value and the shareholders‘ wealth can be affected positively. 
 
Tax effect on dividend policy differs depending on the tax system. In the USA for 
example, cash dividends are subjected to double taxation. After the company pays 
taxes on its profits, the cash dividends received by shareholders are considered to 
be part of the taxable income at the individual level (Litzenberger and Van Horne, 
1978). In other countries such as Australia, company profits are subject to taxation 
at a specified rate decided by law (Cannavan et al., 2004). After the distribution of 
cash dividends to shareholders, these dividends are subject to the personal tax 
rate, applicable to every investor taking into account the taxes paid by the 
company; therefore, these dividends are not subject to double taxation. If the 
company‘s tax rate is 30% and the personal tax rate for shareholders is 38%, then 
the shareholder will pay 8% for their cash dividends. If the shareholder‘s personal 
tax rate is 25% then he/she will get tax refunds of 5%. This is known as an 
Imputation Tax System. 
 
Similarly, in the UK the tax system aims to eliminate some of the tax 
consequences of dividend policy by operating an Imputation Tax System (Ashton, 
1991). The companies pay a tax (at the basic rate) on the grossed up to dividend to 
the Inland Revenue (higher rate taxpayers pay an additional tax on the dividend). 
However, the government treats this withholding tax as part of the company‘s 
corporation tax. Therefore, from the perspective of the basic rate taxpayer, there 
are only two taxes on corporate income: corporation tax and capital gains tax.   
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Tax Effect theory supporters—in the countries where taxes on cash dividends are 
greater than the capital gains tax rate—believe that cash dividends cause damage 
to the investor who receives them because it is subject to a tax rate higher than the 
taxes applicable to the other alternatives for cash dividends. Therefore, cash 
dividends lead to a decrease in the company‘s value and reduce the owner‘s 
wealth (Brennan, 1970). As a result, shareholders would be in a better position if 
the company retained their profits and transferred them to capital gains rather than 
repurchasing their shares.   
 
We can determine the positive or negative impact of cash dividends on 
shareholders' wealth because of the tax difference between cash dividends and 
capital gains as follows (Levy and Sarnat, 1994): 
 If the decline in the share price after the share has become dividends free 
is equal to the value of the cash dividends, the investor will not be affected 
regardless of whether the return takes the form of cash dividends or capital 
gains, and there is no tax effect on the shareholders‘ wealth.  
 If the decline in the share price after the share has become without 
dividends is less than the cash dividends, then the tax rate on cash 
dividend will be greater than the tax rate on capital gains, and the investor 
will be in the best position if the return takes the form of capital gains. 
 If the decline in the share price after the share has become without 
dividends is greater than the cash dividends, then the tax rate on capital 
gains will be greater than taxes on cash dividends, and the investor will be 
in the best position if the return takes the form of cash dividends. 
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This example is related to taxes on cash dividends and capital gains, but what 
would be the case if the company tended to retain profits and reinvested them 
instead of distributing them to shareholders? Would this lead to a maximizing 
shareholders‘ wealth?  
 
The maximized wealth shareholders‘ through a company dividend policy that 
have a surplus of funds depends on the personal tax rate level of individual 
shareholders, and the tax rate imposed on the company‘s profits. It is presumed 
here that both the company and the shareholders can reinvest the profits at the 
same return rate. However, if the personal tax rate for shareholders is less than the 
company‘s tax rate, the shareholders will be in a better position if the company 
seeks to distribute cash dividends, and shareholders reinvest their dividends by 
themselves. However, if the company‘s tax rate is less than the shareholders‘ tax 
rate, then the shareholders would be in a better position if the company retains the 
profits, reinvests them, and then distributes the dividends with the returns to 
shareholders, assuming that risks and returns on investment are equal in both 
cases. 
 
The important question to be asked here is: Does the above concept mean that 
investors in high tax brackets will not buy shares in companies with a cash 
dividend? Despite the tax effect, many researchers (Miller and Scholes, 1978, 
Auerbach, 1979, Feldstein and Green, 1983) have found that investors in high tax 
brackets still buy shares even if the company pays a cash dividend.  
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In countries where tax rates on cash dividends is higher than tax rates on capital 
gains resulting from the purchase and sale of shares, tax effect theory considers 
that the cash dividend inflicts damage on the shareholders‘ wealth in cases where 
there is another alternative known as capital gains. In their study, Miller and 
Scholes (1978) found that the negative impact of cash dividends tax could be 
avoided by two steps. First, the investor could invest in stocks with high cash 
dividends by borrowing so that the amount of cash dividends is equal to the 
amount of loan interest. Since interest payments are considered to be a reduction 
in income for tax purposes, while cash dividends are exposed to taxes, the taxes 
would cancel each other out. As a result, the investor would not pay taxes on cash 
dividends, but the portfolio risk as a result will be high because of the borrowing. 
In the second step, the investor invests a sum of funds equal to the loan value in a 
tax-deferred account to reduce borrowing risks. The result is the investor would 
not suffer from the negative impact of taxes even though he/she had already 
invested in high-cash dividends shares. 
 
However, the researcher believes that Miller and Scholes (1978) did not give 
treatment to the negative impact of the cash dividend on the wealth of 
shareholders since the capital gains alternative is available. It offers a solution for 
owning shares with a cash dividend without paying tax for these cash dividend 
regardless of the impact on final net cash flow. For the investor using Miller and 
Scholes‘s solution, the final net cash flow would be equal to what he/she gets 
from the tax-deferred account because the share return will be used to pay the 
interest. Moreover, it is known that the returns on these investments are less than 
the returns on share investments; therefore, the researcher believes that the 
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investor would be better if he/she invested his/her money in stocks distributed 
cash dividends with tax effect rather than following Miller and Scholes. 
  
Also, tax effect theory supporters believe that investors who will purchase 
company shares without cash dividends or depressed cash dividends in order to 
reduce the high tax impact of cash dividends. In case the investor‘s desire to 
obtain continuous cash dividends fails to covers his/her requirements, he/she can 
sell part of his/her shares equal to the value of cash dividends obtained if the 
company tended to distribute the cash dividends, thereby avoiding high taxes. 
This is known as homemade dividends (see, Ross et al., 1999, Pike and Neale, 
2009)  .  
 
The researcher believes that such a proposition is practically not correct as it does 
not maximize the shareholders‘ wealth as continuing and repeated sales processes 
are expensive due to the transaction costs associated with them. If the capital 
gains tax is added to these costs, it is possible to come to the conclusion that cash 
dividends are the cheapest way to obtain the necessary cash flow for the 
shareholder to meet his/her needs rather than by capital gains. 
 
In addition, the researcher is not in favour of the view that cash dividends 
contribute to damaging shareholders‘ wealth as the tax rate on cash dividends is 
higher than the tax rate on capital gains. This is because there are shareholders 
who buy shares of companies that make cash dividends. Connected with this, the 
researcher believes that there should be greater benefits than damages that 
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stimulate investors to buy those shares, the most important of which is represented 
by the low risks associated with cash dividends; sometimes the risks become nil. 
 
2-3-2-4 Clientele Effect Theory 
In their study, Black and Scholes (1974) found that each investor has his/her own 
implicit calculations regarding preference between high cash dividends benefits or 
their retention according to the circumstances he/she is experiencing such as the 
tax category into which he/she falls. As a result, some investors prefer companies 
with high cash dividends, whereas others prefer companies with low cash 
dividends or without any cash dividends and retention of profits for investment. In 
other words, investors will invest only in companies which have dividend policy 
consistent with their special desires, requirements and conditions. This is known 
as the Clientele Effect. 
 
Pettit in his study which analyzed 914 investment portfolios (Pettit, 1977), it has 
been found that older investors and lower-income investors tend to acquire 
company shares with high cash dividends more than younger investors with more 
income. The elderly and lower-income investors are exposed to a low tax category 
or they enjoy tax exemptions. The cash dividends may represent an important 
source of income for them to cover their cash flow requirements or they may want 
to enjoy their wealth before they die; therefore, they tend to invest in high cash 
dividends companies when compared with those younger and more affluent 
investors who fall in a high tax category. In their attempts to avoid paying taxes 
on these dividends, the latter tend to invest in companies with low or without cash 
dividends, especially if we know that young people have not yet reached the 
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retirement age. Therefore, the cash dividends often do not constitute a source of 
funding immediate consumer needs; in addition, they are more susceptible to 
endure the uncertainty risks of capital gains and their aspirations and long-term 
projects such as educating children and owning housing, etc. 
 
Through a proper understanding of the Clientele Effect theory according to Black 
and Scholes (1974), which stipulates that investors will invest their money in 
companies which follow cash dividend policy consistent with their wishes with no 
effect on the company‘s value, companies that do not distribute cash dividends or 
distribute only low cash dividends would not face a negative effect on their shares 
because they attract investors who only desire this. Similarly, companies that 
distribute high cash dividends should not suffer reduced shares value in the 
market due to negative tax impact because they attract investors who show a 
desire for high cash dividends. 
 
An important question to be raised is: Is the impact of the Clientele Effect so 
strong as to cancel the cash dividends effect on the company‘s value? If the 
influence is strong enough to the extent that it cancels the relationship between 
cash dividend policy and the company‘s value, then the share return will not be 
affected by cash dividend policy. 
 
Black and Scholes (1974) attempted to answer this question in a study that 
covered a period of 35 years (from 1931 to 1966). They created 25 investment 
portfolios from companies listed in the New York Index and classified them into 
five groups according to the cash dividend policy they followed. Then they 
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divided each group into five categories according to risk (beta coefficient). 
Examining the investment portfolios returns compared with the cash dividends 
(cash dividends distribution policy in place), they did not find any statistically 
significant relationship between the cash dividends and the total portfolio return.  
 
Litzenberger and Ramaswamy conducted a study in 1979 to determine whether 
the total portfolio return in the ex-dividend month of distribution has any 
relationship with cash dividends. They found that there is a strong direct 
correlation between the portfolio total return and cash dividends. This supports the 
theory that investors do not prefer cash dividends because of the negative impact 
of taxes on these dividends. They also found that the impact of the tax rate 
difference on cash dividends and capital gains reaches up to 23%. This means that 
investors pay less for the company shares that distribute cash dividends or demand 
greater returns on these shares to offset the negative impact of the different tax 
rate between cash dividends and capital gains. This means that the clients‘ effect 
was not strong enough to force the cancellation of the cash dividend policy effect 
on the company‘s value. 
 
Miller and Scholes‘s study (1982) accused Litzenberger and Ramaswamy‘s 
(1979) study of being distorted in that it is affected by cash dividend increases or 
a lack of information. In Miller and Scholes‘s study, they excluded all companies 
that announced their profits and distributed them in the same month in order to 
mitigate the impact of the dividend declaration. They came to the conclusion that 
portfolio total revenue is in direct proportion to the cash dividends, but that the 
impact of the difference between the tax percentage on cash dividends and capital 
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gains is not 23%, but only 4%. This influence in terms of statistical significance 
does not differ from the impact of zero, which means there is no effect regarding 
the difference of tax rate on cash dividends and capital gains. However, the direct 
relationship between the total portfolio returns and cash dividends could reflect 
the share price increase due to an unexpected increase in cash dividends and not 
the negative impact of the taxes. This means that the clientele effect is a force 
strong enough to neutralize the impact of the cash dividend policy on the 
company‘s value. 
 
The clientele effect theory involves two important concepts: 
1. The company tends to choose clients (investors) through a cash dividend 
policy consistent with their aspirations. Therefore, investors would not 
punish the company, or work to reduce the company‘s shares price 
because of that policy as it harmonizes with their wishes. On that basis, the 
investment process is performed in that company. 
2. Since the company chooses its customers through the cash dividend 
policy. Also, the company can transform from a dividend policy to another 
without impacting the company‘s value (if the change in the dividends rate 
does not result in future financial difficulties). If the company reduces the 
cash dividends rate, investors who want a higher dividend rate will sell 
their shares and turn to another company. On the other hand, investors 
who prefer low dividends percentage will take their place. 
 
This implied meaning of the Clientele Effect theory might be acceptable in theory. 
However, from a practical perspective, it might encounter some problems. The 
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company‘s ability to choose clients without affecting the company‘s value is 
presumably based on the assumption that the market is deep and the company will 
find enough clients to cover their shares offers to keep the share price balanced. 
But what would happen if the percentage of companies that distribute high cash 
dividends constitutes 10% of the total shares on offer, while companies that 
distribute low cash dividends is 90% of market size? Likewise, what could be the 
case if the percentage of investors who prefer high cash dividend is 70% of the 
total volume of investors, while the percentage of investors who prefer low cash 
dividend is 30% of the total volume of demand for equities? The answer is that 
the shares of companies that offer low dividends will be greater than the demand 
for these shares. This will naturally lead to a decline in the price of these shares in 
order to become more acceptable to investor. To be sure, the market will be 
balanced at that lower price. Offers of shares distributed by companies with high 
cash dividends are less than their demand. The result is that the shares prices of 
these companies would rise to become less attractive from the investors‘ points of 
view, and therefore the demand would decrease while the market would be 
balanced at that relatively high price. On the other hand, the company‘s ability to 
change the cash dividend policy without affecting the company‘s value and 
shareholders‘ wealth is also based on the assumption of the market's depth and 
efficiency. If the company changes the cash dividend policy, all or most investors 
will abandon the company‘s shares and will tend to invest in shares of other 
companies that have cash dividends policies consistent with their desires. The 
resulting process of large selling is liable to increase the supply of these stocks 
significantly, leading to a drop in prices. If the market is deep, the decline will be 
only temporary, but if the market is shallow, where there is a lack of investors 
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who favour the new policy, then the provisional decline in equity prices of these 
companies may turn into a permanent decline, which would be reflected 
negatively on the company‘s value and shareholders‘ wealth. It may also expose 
investors to transaction costs when they buy and sell, in addition to the possibility 
of being subjected to capital gains taxes, which will be reflected negatively on 
shareholders‘ wealth. 
 
2-3-2-5 Signaling Effect Theory 
According to the Signaling Effect theory, managers use the change in cash 
dividends distributed rates as a means to deliver information to investors about the 
company (Denis et al., 1994). Supporters of this theory  believe that the increase 
in the cash dividends rate is an effective means of delivering information to 
investors because competitors cannot follow the company‘s policy unless they 
have the same capacity to achieve future profit (see: Charest, 1978, Asquith and 
Mullins Jr, 1983, Kalay and Loewenstein, 1986, Impson, 1997, Doron and Ziv, 
2001) . 
 
When (Miller and Modigliani, 1961) introduced their hypothesis about the 
Irrelevance Proposition about the effect of a company‘s cash dividend policy on 
the company‘s market value, one of their assumptions is that all investors have the 
same information and ability to understand and analyze the available information. 
Therefore, all investors have the same outlook concerning the company. Also, 
investors and managers have the same information and therefore they have the 
same expectations for the company. In practice, however, because of what is 
known as asymmetric information (Dewenter and Warther, 1998), investors have 
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different expectations and information with respect to the company's future profits 
and risks. Furthermore, by virtue of their position within the company and the 
nature of their work and career interests and duties, the managers have better and 
more accurate information and expectations than external investors regarding the 
company‘s profits and performance. As managers have information that may not 
be available to external investors, they can use the change in the cash distributed 
dividends rate as a way to deliver such information to investors to reduce the 
information gap between managers and investors with the aim of creating a 
greater demand for the company‘s shares, thereby influencing the company‘s 
market value and shareholders‘ wealth. 
 
Among the findings of Aharony and Swary‘s study (1980), a company‘s shares 
price usually rises when the company suddenly or unexpectedly increases cash 
dividends. Similarly, these prices are reduced when the company suddenly or 
unexpectedly reduces the cash dividends. Also Kwan in his study in 1981 came to 
the same results, adding that companies usually do not increase their cash 
dividends unless they expect an increase in future profits on an ongoing basis 
sufficient to cover any cash dividends increase and continue on the same good 
level in the coming years without being compelled to reduce the cash dividends 
rate in the coming years. Ross and others (Ross et al., 1999) find that it is not 
expected that companies that do not expect future profits to increase the cash 
dividends rate because the costs of this process are too high and have future 
negative effects that exceed the temporary positive effects expected from increase 
cash dividends for companies that do not expect future additional profits. As such, 
the future increase in the cash dividends is a positive indicator of the company‘s 
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future performance. If a company increases its cash dividends, it will generate 
positive conclusions for investors about the company‘s future profits, leading to 
an increasing demand on the part of investors on these shares, which leads to a 
rise in their prices. 
 
The supporters of the Signaling Effect theory believe that a cash dividend is the 
ideal means to deliver specific information about the company to investors. 
However, many others argue that cash dividends are not the best way to 
communicate such information to investors. Born and Rimbey (1993) find that 
change in the cash dividends rate may give incomprehensible and misleading 
signals unless the market finds itself able to distinguish between growing 
companies that tend to retain their profits for investment and growth and 
companies that have exhausted all available investment opportunities and 
therefore seek to distribute their profits via dividends. When Florida Power & 
Light Company announced a reduction in their first quarter dividend in 1994 by 
32%, the market‘s reaction was to reduce the share price by 20%. After it became 
clear that the reduction in cash dividends was not a result of the expected future 
financial difficulties, but was due to a strategic decision to improve the company‘s 
financial flexibility and growth opportunities, the share price witnessed a gradual 
rise. This example gives evidence that cash dividend distributions sometimes may 
be a misleading indicator. Sending a positive signal, the increase in cash dividends 
may involve negative repercussions for the company if these are misunderstood. 
For example, if a company is growing and accomplishing noticeable improvement 
and high returns on investment yet did not distribute any dividends during the 
previous period, the dividends distribution might be looked at by shareholders as a 
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negative indicator. This change can be explained by the company‘s inability to 
find new investment opportunities or that the investment opportunities available to 
the company are no longer profitable as is the case before. Such an understanding 
of cash dividends increase would lead to a decline in the company‘s shares value. 
 
Through a proper understanding of the Signaling Effect theory, it is clear that the 
positive or negative expectation of investors on a company‘s future performance 
leads to an increase or decline in the company‘s share price, and not an increase or 
decrease in the cash dividends rate. The change in the ratio is only a means by 
which investors can anticipate the company‘s future performance. The study by 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961) asserts that investors‘ reaction to a change in cash 
dividend policy does not necessarily mean that investors prefer cash dividends to 
capital gains as they are proof of the importance of the information content of the 
cash dividend policy. 
 
Empirical studies (such as :Kwan, 1981, Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Kalay and 
Loewenstein, 1986, Denis et al., 1994, Amihud and Murgia, 1997, Brook et al., 
1998, Grullon and Michaely, 2004) examining the information content of 
dividend policy, or the Signaling Effect theory, have, in many cases, produced 
inconsistent results as is the case with all theories of dividend policy. However, all 
studies agree on the existence of an information content for the dividend policy 
leading to an increase in stock prices if the company tends to increase the cash 
dividends ratio unexpectedly, and a reduction in the price of shares in case the 
company seeks to reduce the cash dividends. However, studies differ on the 
reasons for the increase or decrease in stock prices between the information 
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content reasons alone or the information content effect along with investors‘ 
wishes for cash dividends and their preference for companies that distribute cash 
dividends. 
 
At this point, a basic question should be raised: Does the change in the distributed 
cash dividends rate represent the most efficient means available for the company 
to deliver information to investors, with the aim of influencing the market‘s 
value? The answer for this question with regard to small companies that do not 
have sufficient means to communicate information to investors might be yes, in 
that the cash dividends could be the most efficient means of communicating 
information in such companies. With respect to large companies, which are 
supposed to possess sufficient means of communicating information to multiple 
investors with a view to narrowing the information gap between what investors 
know and what the company wants investors to know, the change in the cash 
dividends may not be the least costly or the most efficient way of delivering such 
information. For example, analytical reports published by the company may have 
the same change effect in proportion to cash dividends. 
 
2-3-2-6 Agency Costs Theory 
No agency costs was one of the Irrelevance Proposition hypothesis assumptions 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961) which asserts that managers are full agents for 
shareholders without any flaws. However, decisions taken by managers are not 
always in the interest of shareholders, as many of them focus on achieving 
personal interests they are seeking to achieve. Since shareholders are aware of this 
fact, they may develop means of controlling managers‘ behaviours (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976, Fama and Jensen, 1983, Jensen, 1986, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). 
 
The most common agency costs are the costs of monitoring managers. The duties 
undertaken by managers are numerous and often are a specialized quality based 
on resolutions that may not be understood by normal shareholders. Therefore, it is 
extremely difficult for them to control managers‘ performance. As such, the 
presence of an efficient and specialized outsider for monitoring managers‘ 
performance on behalf of shareholders would be more effective. One of the means 
by which shareholders may resort to an external party is external financing by 
increasing the cash dividends rate (Rozeff, 1982a, Dempsey and Laber, 1992, 
Schooley and Barney Jr, 1994) to avoid keeping large liquidity in the company. 
This would lead managers to resort to external financing, and thus keep the 
company under the control of external financing. 
 
The points that contribute to making high cash dividend policy a tool for 
monitoring and controlling managers‘ performance are summed up as follows: 
1. This policy puts considerable pressure on managers to secure sufficient 
profits to be distributed for shareholders. In this respect, the managers do 
not wish to reduce the distributed cash dividends rate, as the unexpected 
and sudden reduction gives negative signals about the managers‘ 
performance, and therefore the company‘s future performance (Dempsey 
and Laber, 1992, Schooley and Barney Jr, 1994). The high cash dividend 
policy followed must lead managers to increase efforts to achieve the 
required cash dividends ratio to be distributed to shareholders. 
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2. This policy reduces the amount of cash in the managers‘ hands. This, in 
turn, would force them to resort to borrowing to finance the company‘s 
projects, something which shareholders prefer because it puts the company 
under the additional control of external financiers (Rozeff, 1982b). 
3. High cash dividends lead to a reduction in the free cash available to 
managers which could potentially be misused if there were free cash in 
large quantities (Easterbrook, 1984). This is liable to lure managers to 
spend this money on projects that may not have been studied properly. The 
existence of large amounts of free cash, after the company has exhausted 
all projects with a positive net present value, pushes managers to choose 
one of two alternatives: the distribution of these funds to shareholders or 
investing them in any way just to get rid of them. The latter scenario is 
given in the following examples: 
 To invest in projects with a negative present value, although this policy 
is a violation of generally accepted principles of investment. Jensen‘s 
study (Jensen, 1986) confirms that many managers resort to choose 
projects with a negative present value rather than distribute cash 
dividends to shareholders. This policy is common in oil and tobacco 
companies. Moreover, managers can resort to this policy to reduce 
their company‘s attractiveness to takeovers by other companies. 
 Purchase other companies: Mergers are usually made at prices higher 
than market value. As mergers entail high costs, many researchers 
believe that mergers may not be profitable for the company even when 
the process of integration is carried out to achieve correct objectives 
(Roll, 1986). Thus, companies tend to merge or purchase another 
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company rather than distribute dividends to shareholders with the aim 
of satisfying the managers‘ desires to increase the size and scope of 
their empires and the scope of their control. Such a tendency is not 
prone to succeed and therefore constitutes agency costs. The high cash 
dividend policy is considered as a means to reduce the managers‘ 
willingness for over-investment (Michael et al., 1995). 
 Purchasing of financial assets: For companies that have surplus cash 
for positive present value (Easterbrook, 1984), the reinvestment 
strategy of these funds in financial assets depends on the shareholders‘ 
personal tax rates and the cash dividends tax rate. If the personal tax 
rate is lower than the cash dividends tax rate, then to maximize the 
shareholders‘ wealth requires distributing dividends in order for the 
shareholders to reinvest them themselves. If the managers retain profits 
and reinvest them, then this would be considered one of the agency 
costs that shareholders must undertake. 
 
In brief, the separation of management from ownership leads to a conflict of 
interest between managers and shareholders. Such a conflict can expose 
shareholders to additional costs called agency costs which take several forms 
including managers control costs in order to ensure their behaviour and 
performance or the costs of directors‘ expansion (or over-investment) in order to 
maximize their assets through investment in some projects such as merging with 
other companies, the acquisition of other companies or some form of investment 
in projects with a negative present value to make the company less attractive to 
investors who want to take it over. The cash dividend policy can serve as a way of 
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monitoring and controlling managers‘ performance with the aim of reducing the 
agency costs. Through increasing cash dividends, the company can be kept in the 
need of external funding. Such a move is liable to keep managers under the 
control of external financiers. In addition, the increasing cash dividends would 
lead to withdrawing cash from the control of managers, which reduces the 
likelihood of the misuse of the funds. The pattern of cash dividends among 
companies can in effect be justified by the trade-offs between the costs of external 
financing and the benefits of increasing cash dividends and the resulting reduction 
in agency costs. This can result in an optimal dividend policy even if we ignore 
tax considerations (Rozeff, 1982a). 
 
2-4 Stock Dividend Policy 
This policy consists of dividends distribution to existing shareholders in the form 
of shares instead of cash (Ross et al., 1999). A company usually resorts to this 
policy when it is in a rapid growth phase or restructure, so that these stages 
require a large capital expenditure motivating the company to maintain all 
possible liquidity to achieve this aim (Pike and Neale, 2009). 
 
In the accounting process, share dividend policy is the transfer of funds between 
equity accounts (Levy and Sarnat, 1994). It does not include any outside cash 
flows; therefore, the shareholders do not receive anything in fact (Broyles, 2003). 
This is due to the fact that the market value per share, after the share dividend 
announcement, will go down. However, the total shareholders‘ wealth will not be 
affected because the number of shares owned will be increased to cover the 
decline in market value per share (Moyer et al., 1995, Pike and Neale, 2009). 
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Also, the volume of the company's shareholders control would not be affected, 
because the percentage of equity held will not be affected since the share 
dividends are in the same percentages of as proportion to the existing old equity 
(Ross et al., 1999). As long as the rate of a company‘s returns is fixed, the rate of 
return per share will decline due to an increase in the number of shares with the 
stability of the overall rate of return. The total shareholders‘ revenue, however, 
will not be affected owing to the increase of the number of shares owned by 
shareholders to compensate for the decline in dividends per share. In addition, it is 
not expected that the share dividend policy would have any impact on the 
company‘s value as long as the investors understand that the replacement of cash 
dividends by shares is for the sake of reinvesting this money and not because of 
financial difficulties or to meet outstanding payments (Ross et al., 1999). 
 
Usually, the share dividend policy is looked upon as part of the general dividend 
policy (Broyles, 2003). However, in reality, it is no more than a small split, as the 
share dividends leads to an increase in the number of shares issued without 
affecting the company‘s risks, revenues or cash flows. 
 
There are several studies on the share dividend policy impact on a company‘s 
market value and consequently on shareholders‘ wealth. These studies come to the 
following conclusions (see: Barker, 1958, Fama et al., 1969, Chottiner and 
Young, 1971, Woolridge, 1983, Grinblatt et al., 1984, Lakonishok and Lev, 1987)  
 Usually a company‘s shares prices rise immediately after they announce the 
shares dividend. 
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 The shares dividends process has an information content understood by 
investors in a certain way. The reason shares prices of companies that 
announce these dividends increase is not due to the shareholders‘ preference 
of shares to cash. It is that the information content of the shares dividends 
gives a positive signal about the level of future profits expected by the 
managers of these companies. In addition, companies‘ managers who believe 
that future profits will be better than current profits are the only companies 
that distribute the shares. On their part, investors are aware of this fact; 
therefore, they ask for these shares not just for additional shares which do not 
affect the company's value, but also because the content of information 
engendered by such a process. 
 If the companies that have announced shares dividends do not increase cash 
dividends in the short period following the share dividend announcement, 
their share prices will go down to reach the level prior to the shares dividends 
announcement. 
 The shares dividends process leads to increased costs associated with sales 
and purchases (Ross et al., 1999), as fees and commissions are charged by 
broker on the absolute amounts if the values attributed to the original buyer or 
sales are higher when the original price decreases. In addition, the margin 
between the selling and purchasing prices as a proportion of the sale or 
purchase assets price is higher whenever the assets price decreases. This 
means that dealing in low price shares is more costly than dealing with high 
price shares, if the fees and commissions amounts are absolute. As the shares 
dividend policy leads to a decline in stock market value per share, this may 
lead to low liquidity of these shares because of the relatively high cost. 
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However, a low share price increases the number of investors who have the 
ability to buy these shares, more than could lead to increasee liquidity. 
 
Grinblatt and others (1984) give two reasons for an increase in the share price of 
companies that use shares dividends: 
1. There is an ideal price for a company‘s share prices, which most 
companies believe is between US$20 and US$50. Companies believe that 
investors look for stocks with a price less than US$20 as being at risk 
which causes concern. At the same time, they look for stocks with a price 
greater than US$50 as being a high price. Therefore, companies try to keep 
the prices of their shares within that range through a share dividend policy 
seeking to reduce the market‘s value per share. 
2. The importance of information content to the shares dividend process to 
shareholders. Although the nature of the information issued by the shares 
dividends is not entirely clear, the study also states that the distribution 
process aims at raising questions about the company on the part of 
financial analysts, leading to the discovery of information that the 
management always tries to deliver to investors. 
 
Brennan and Copeland (1988) gave an interpretation of the information content 
contained in the shares dividends as follows: Assuming that managers have more 
precise information on the company‘s future status more than the investors, and 
assuming the existence of two companies (a) and (b) similar in everything except 
in the manager‘s expectations for future performance of the company which is 
managed by the director of company (a). He knows that the company‘s 
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performance in the future will be better than the expected performance, while the 
current director of company (b) thinks that the company‘s performance in the 
future will be the same as the current performance. According to the study, the 
two directors know if they would decide to distribute the shares, the shareholders 
will bear the additional costs associated with the distribution of shares. The 
company‘s director (a) knows that the company is on the verge of a better future 
compared with the current situation. Therefore, he may tend to distribute shares to 
shareholders on condition that profits should cover the additional future costs 
associated with this process. The director of company (b) knows that the future 
performance will remain within the current situation, and thus the process of 
shares distribution will lead to increase costs without a return to cover these 
additional costs. Accordingly, the distribution of shares dividends of company (a) 
to shareholders makes them look into this procedure as additional future profits to 
cover the additional costs resulting from the shares dividends. This practically 
leads them to request the purchase of shares of those firms and result in increased 
demand for its share with the survival of the stable supply, leading to increasing 
prices and hence the company‘s market value 
 
The reason for the price increase, as shown by (Brennan and Copeland, 1988), 
was not the desire of shareholders for stock dividends, but rather the meanings 
behind this process which investors understand to be that the company expects to 
perform better in the future than the current performance. It is unreasonable that 
company (a) would charge additional costs due to shares distributions if they are 
not aware that future returns will be greater than the current ones so as to 
compensate these costs. 
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2-5 Shares Repurchase Policy 
A company‘s shares repurchase to become treasury shares is one of the most well-
known alternatives to profit dividends. The most common methods used by 
companies to buy back shares are (Copeland et al., 2005): 
1. Repurchase Tender Offer 
2. Open Market Purchases 
3. Repurchase by Negotiated Basis 
 
1- Repurchase Tender Offer 
There are many empirical studies that deal with stock repurchases by tender offer 
(see: Masulis, 1980, Dann, 1981, Vermaelen, 1981, Vermaelen, 1984, Dann et al., 
1991, Chhachhi and Davidson, 1997). In stock repurchase by tender offer, a 
company announces its desire to purchase a number of shares at a fixed price 
during a specified period of time. If there is no enough number of shares available 
during the specified period, the company might resort to extending the period or 
cancelling the offer. This method is used when the company wants to purchase a 
large quantity of shares. 
 
2. Open Market Purchases 
Other empirical studies deal with stock repurchase by open market (see: McNally, 
1999, Baker et al., 2003, Liano et al., 2003). In open market stock repurchases, a 
company tends to repurchase its shares through the Stock Exchange at the market 
prices. This method enables the company to choose both the prices and the 
appropriate times to buy back shares as it gives the company greater flexibility in 
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selecting the appropriate times, numbers, and price. Furthermore, this method is 
used for the repurchasing of small quantities of shares. 
 
3. Repurchase by Negotiated Basis 
The company here individually negotiates with certain shareholders to achieve 
certain prices through which the company can purchase those shareholders‘ 
shares. Although this method is not commonly observed, it is used to control and 
get rid of shareholders who cause trouble to the management. 
 
Recently, the shares repurchase policy increased as an alternative to the cash 
dividend policy primarily due to its characteristics in comparison with the cash 
dividend policy (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). The following are some of these 
characteristics (Copeland et al., 2005): 
 The cash dividends distributed to shareholders constitute a burden on a 
company and its management where the management finds itself bound by 
continuing to have to pay this level on an annual basis. Any reduction in 
that percentage leads to a negative impact on the company‘s value because 
of the information content inherent in cash dividends. However, 
repurchasing shares is looked upon as an alternative to cash dividends and 
also as a non-recurring cash outlay. Companies that do not expect to 
continue to make profits at the same level prefer the repurchasing method 
instead of distributing cash dividends to shareholders so as not to commit 
themselves to follow the same level in the coming years. 
 The existence of a large offer of a company‘s shares in a market with low 
demand reduces the price of the company‘s shares keeping them low. The 
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company‘s repurchasing stock policy leads to an alternative to the cash 
dividends to get rid of the extra shares offer so that there will be no 
shareholders in the company but those whose shares willing to retain its 
shares. Such a process leads to a rise in the shares prices due to the 
reduced offer, thus positively affecting the company‘s market value and 
shareholders‘ wealth. 
 When a company wants within a short period of time to change the capital 
structure to reach the optimal mix with the aim of reducing its financing 
costs, the buyback policy serves as an effective means to achieve this aim. 
When the equity fund in the capital structure increases beyond the 
optimum ratio, it leads to an increase in the financial costs; therefore the 
repurchasing policy operates to reduce equity funds in the mix by reducing 
the number of shares issued and arriving at the optimal mix and thus to 
reduce financial costs. 
 The buy back stock policy as an alternative for cash dividends protects 
shareholders from wealth damage because of exposure to taxes imposed 
on dividends (Copeland et al., 2005). Since the taxes imposed on cash 
dividends in most countries of the world are higher than taxes on capital 
gains, the buy back shares policy seeks to mitigate the impact of taxes on 
shareholders‘ wealth through the conversion of cash dividends to capital 
gains. This occurs only if shareholders sell their shares and secure capital 
profits. 
 There is a positive information content associated with the shares 
repurchasing policy when the company wishes to buy shares (see: Dann, 
1981, Vermaelen, 1981, Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Ofer and Thakor, 
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1987, Constantinides and Grundy, 1989, Grullon and Michaely, 2004). In 
response to this, the investors understand that the company‘s share price is 
undervalued. The management, which is fully aware of this, tends to buy 
these shares. Such an understanding of the buy back shares announcement 
leads to increase the investors‘ demand for the company shares, which 
raises the market value. In their study, Ikenberry and others (Ikenberry et 
al., 1995) tested the information content of the buy back stock policy and 
concluded that the shares prices of companies that have repurchased their 
shares were better than the shares prices of similar companies that did not 
repurchase their shares. 
 The buy back stock policy focuses on controlling the company by 
reducing the number of shareholders in the company (Copeland et al., 
2005). This means that the shareholders who do not sell their shares will 
have a greater part of the company after each process of buying back 
shares. 
 The buy back stock policy works to strengthen the prices of the company‘s 
shares. After the US financial market collapse in 1987, companies sought 
to buy their shares to reduce price deterioration by creating a demand for 
shares and sending positive signals about the company. A number of 
empirical studies (Dann, 1981, Vermaelen, 1981, Comment and Jarrell, 
1995, Ikenberry et al., 1995) find evidence that managers repurchase 
shares when they believe that their firms share price is undervalued. 
 
Due to the characteristics of the buying back shares policy, until a short time ago 
finance and economy writers believed that the buy back stock policy was 
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preferred as an alternative to cash dividend policy, whether these dividends are 
regular or extraordinary additional dividends (Scholes, 1972, Kolodny and Suhler, 
1985, Asquith and Mullins, 1986, Masulis and Korwar, 1986, Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986). This is because this policy is flexible for a company and protects 
shareholders from paying taxes on cash dividends. However, when examining the 
signals emanating from the buy back stock policy might be misunderstood by 
investors. In this respect, companies that buy back shares as an alternative to cash 
dividends may give the impression that they are uncertain about future cash flows. 
Therefore, they do not wish to maintain the level of cash dividends, and so may 
find it difficult to maintain in future. This reading of the signals emanating from 
the buying back stock policy leads to a negative impact on the company‘s market 
value, even if it were not correct. 
 
Studies such as (see, Gustavo and David, 2000, Fama and French, 2001) were 
conducted on the buyback company shares policy as an alternative to cash 
dividends to shareholders. They conclude that the benefits of tax avoidance and 
positive information content, flexibility and lack of commitment on the part of the 
company to pursue the buy back shares policy exceeded the damage caused by 
any signals issued by these policies and which may be understood by shareholders 
in a non-valid manner. 
 
The buy back shares policy depends on the philosophy of reducing the number of 
issued shares, thus reducing the number of claimants‘ profits (Copeland et al., 
2005). This means increasing the profits realized per share if the company used 
the profits earned or retained for financing buying back shares without recourse to 
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borrowing. If the company, on the other hand, tends to finance the shares buy 
back process through borrowing funds, the profits realized per share will increase 
because the borrowing costs are less than shares bought. The company, however, 
should take into account the tax shield of the interest paid on the borrowed 
money, so that the increase in the profits realized per share is equal to the 
difference between the profits per share for repurchased shares and the cost of 
borrowed funds to finance the repurchase process taking into account the tax 
shield divided by the number of remaining shares following the repurchase. If the 
cost of borrowing is more than the profitable shares purchased, taking into 
account the tax shield, the profits realized per share will be less after buying back 
the shares. 
 
However, there are a number of criticisms that can be directed to the buy back 
stock policy (Copeland et al., 2005): 
1. There may be negative information content for the buy back stock policy. 
This policy might suggest that the company is unwilling to commit to a 
certain level of profits, as the management cannot be certain of its ability 
to achieve this level of profits continuously. 
2. There are a number of investors who cannot be neglected or 
underestimated, namely those who would prefer cash dividends rather than 
capital gains, because they rely on it as a source for meeting their 
consumer and investment needs. Therefore, a company‘s adoption of the 
buy back stock policy may push those investors to abandon their shares 
3. When a company announces its desire to repurchase shares, the 
shareholders who wish to sell their shares may request a higher price for 
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the shares. Also, a company‘s request for purchasing a large number of 
shares at one time would lead to higher demand for the shares, thus 
leading to higher prices. This indicates that the company will pay a higher 
value than the real value of the shares, resulting in damaging the 
remaining shareholders‘ wealth. 
 
2-6 Investment Policy and A Residual Dividend Policy 
The relationship between investment and cash dividend policy was established 
through the differing priorities of the use of available funds (Lumby and Jones, 
1999). In this respect, management is trying to achieve high returns through the 
use of funds available to them through various types of projects and investment 
opportunities available in case these opportunities are attractive from an economic 
perspective; in other words, if these investment opportunities engender positive 
future cash flows. Shareholders, on their part, do not oppose this approach 
provided that it has no effect on revenues derived from cash dividends. 
 
The management always tries to follow the so-called residual dividend policy 
(West and Bierman, 1968) by giving priority to investments over cash dividends 
and distributing any surplus cash on investment. Many studies have supported this 
trend; the most important of which is (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). 
 
However, other studies, for example, Partington (1985), state that companies in 
practice separate dividend policy from investment policy, because management 
will finance their investment projects from a cash dividends surplus fund — the 
priority of cash dividend — and thus financing the deficit from equity or 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review for Dividend Policy 
72 
 
borrowing funds. Other writers such as (Ross, 1977) mention that other 
companies may not adopt this policy mainly because of the existence of motives 
for distributing cash dividend from surplus reduced funds available, the most 
important of which is to send positive signals about the future financial position of 
the company. 
 
2-7 Conclusions  
There are three basic policies for general dividends policies: 
1. Cash dividend policy 
2. Share dividend policy 
3. Buy back stock policy 
 
Moreover, there are six theories related to cash dividend policy: 
 Irrelevance Proposition: The supporters of this theory think that cash 
dividends are not related to the company market value because the 
investor can make his/her own dividend policy, regardless of the policy 
adopted in the company. 
 Bird in the Hand Theory: The supporters of this theory believe that the 
company market value will improve if the company increases cash 
dividends because investors consider cash dividends as a ‗bird in hand‘, 
while the capital gains are ‗a sparrow in the tree‘. 
 Tax Effect Theory: The supporters of this theory understand that cash 
dividends are exposed to a higher tax rate than the capital gains tax rate, so 
investors prefer companies that retain profits and provide them to investors 
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as capital gains. These supporters believe retention of the company‘s cash 
dividends will maximize market value. 
 Signaling Effect Theory: Investors look to cash dividends as a positive 
indicator of managers‘ expectations for both performance and the 
company‘s future profits. Therefore, investors prefer to invest in 
companies that distribute high cash dividends; the company can maximize 
its market value by increasing the cash dividends rate. 
 Clientele Effect Theory: The supporters of this theory argue that the 
company seeks to attract investors who see that the company‘s policy of 
cash dividends agrees with their consumer and investment needs and also 
their tax position. As a consequence, the cash dividend policy will not 
affect the company‘s value because investors chose a company motivated 
by the specific dividend policy it adopts. 
 Agency Cost Theory: The supporters of this theory think that cash 
dividend policy is an ideal means for reducing costs arising from interest 
conflicts because of separating management from ownership. In so doing, 
the company can maximize the market value by reducing agency costs 
through increasing the cash dividends percentage. 
 
From studying these theories one could easily notes that they provide conflicting 
and contradictory advice for managers which affect their duties to increase the 
company‘s value and thereby maximizing the company owners‘ wealth. The 
question to be raised here is: Which one of these theories should be followed to 
positively influence a company‘s value? Several experimental studies have been 
conducted to test these theories and to ascertain their practicality. The results of 
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these studies, however, did not clearly prefer any one of these theories. This can 
be attributed to the following reasons: 
1. Statistically, these studies assume stability of other factors affecting the 
company‘s value. This means the companies studied were similar in 
everything except the dividend policy. This assumption is unrealistic in 
practice. 
2. The absence of a mechanism for determining, measuring and forecasting 
ownership cost accurately: as the existence of identical companies in all 
factors that affect the company‘s value and different only in the cash 
dividend policy is something impossible, and due to the difficulty of 
determining ownership accurately, it is hard to determine the relationship 
between the cash dividend policy and ownership costs, and therefore 
understand the impact of dividend policy on the company‘s value. 
3. The absence of a unanimous agreement among investors on one cash 
dividend policy preference: there is a group of investors who strongly 
prefer high cash dividends and also prefer profits as cash dividends. At the 
same time, there is another group of equally-important investors who 
strongly prefer low cash dividends and prefer profits as capital gains. 
These different investors‘ preferences explain the difficulty of determining 
an optimal cash dividend policy and hence favouring a specific theory. 
Despite difference in the results of these studies on investors‘ preferences 
and therefore determining the policy through which the company‘s value 
can be maximized, the studies unanimously agree that investors prefer any 
dividend policy that is stable and clear, which makes it easy for investors 
to predict, regardless of the policy followed itself. 
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Thus, it can be said that according to the agreed points among these theories, cash 
dividend policy is a trade-off between (a) the damage caused to its profits as a 
cash outflow and the benefits of giving signals, and (b) the security of cash 
dividends and the negative impact of taxation. 
 
From a purely accounting point of view, share dividend policy is in fact no more 
than a fund transfer between equity accounts without affecting total wealth. 
However, share dividend policy may well be looked at from another perspective 
as it is a means of low-cost delivery of positive information to investors about the 
company‘s future performance, and also a means to keep the shares price within a 
range suitable for a larger number of investors through a reduction in the market 
value per share due to an increase in the number of shares, leading to an increase 
in the liquidity of shares. 
 
The buyback policy can be used as an alternative to the cash dividend policy as it 
is flexible for the company and protective to shareholders from damages caused 
by taxes on cash dividends and also it has positive information content. 
 
Furthermore, there is a connection between cash dividend policy and investment 
policy as some companies tend to distribute the excess funds available after 
exhausting all investment opportunities when it adopts the residual dividend 
policy. Others do not follow this policy because they argue there is no link 
between the two policies. 
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3-1 Introduction 
Management in general and financial management in particular try to realize their 
targets by applying a number of procedures and policies. The maximization of the 
owner‘s wealth is considered to be one of the main targets the management must 
try to realize through the application of such procedures and policies (Ward, 
1993).  
 
Although owners‘ wealth maximization comes as a result of profit realization, the 
concepts of financial management prove that the maximization does not mean 
attaining top profits so much as maximizing the market value of the project 
owners or shareholders (Ward, 1993).  
 
Due to the complexity of the business world and the huge variety of investment 
opportunities, there are many different paths management may follow in order to 
fulfil their policies and procedures. These policies and procedures, however, 
develop and diversify according to the circumstances of each management. 
 
Dividend policy is one of the most important financial policies used by financial 
management to achieve the main target described above (Baker, 2009). Such 
importance is intensified if we take into account the circumstances surrounding 
the companies, as well as investment opportunities in the business world which 
can constitute alternatives to a dividend policy. Although cash dividends are one 
of the most important types of dividend, particular circumstances may motivate 
management to use other types of dividend such as share dividends or buy back 
stock (Broyles, 2003), or to use them simultaneously with cash dividend. 
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Dividend policy has been studied extensively by researchers to measure the 
financial impact on a company‘s share market value and consequently the extent 
of its contribution to achieve a management‘s target, namely maximizing the 
market value of the shares and thus maximizing the owner‘s wealth.  
 
One of the most important studies is that of Miller and Modigliani (1961) which 
examines the relationship between dividend policy and the market‘s value of the 
company. It developed the so-called "Irrelevant Theory", which argues there is no 
relationship or link between dividend policy and market value of a company in 
efficient market conditions. This is because information available to management 
is also available to investors and this is reflected in the share price, thus dividend 
policy is the result of that information. Therefore, dividend policy does not have 
any effect on the share price of a company; rather it is affected by investment 
policy. In other words, there is no change in the market value of a company‘s 
stock, regardless of whether or not a company distributes dividends. 
 
Researchers in the field of finance disagree over Irrelevant Theory. While a 
number support the theory, for example Black and Scholes (1974), Higgins 
(1974), Miller and Scholes (1978 & 1982), Merton and Rock (1985) and Peter 
(1996), many other critics oppose it, for example Koch (1999) and Dyl and 
Weigand (1998) provide evidence of a statistically strong relationship between 
dividend policy and the market value of a company. 
 
The dividend and earnings announcement process at a same or a close time is add 
another difficulty for empirical studies wishing to highlight the impact of dividend 
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policy on the market value of shares. This is because the market reaction 
addresses two new pieces of information: the earnings announcement and the 
dividend. Therefore, finance researchers use a number of tools to isolate the 
impact of dividend policy from the earnings announcement. Pittit (1972), for 
example, uses a methodology in order to discover the influence of dividend policy 
on earnings. To achieve this goal, he divided his sample into several portfolios 
according to the degree and direction of change for both the dividend and 
earnings. In their study, Aharoni and Swairi (1980) test a sample where the 
dividend and earnings were declared on different dates in order to isolate the 
impact of dividend from the impact of earnings.  
 
On the other hand, it is found that other studies such as those of Brown, Finn and 
Hancock (1977) and Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) examine the market reaction to 
simultaneous dividend and earnings announcements. 
 
It is noted here that most previous studies exclude companies accused of 
preventing dividends (see Lobo et al., 1986; Doron and Ziv, 2001). They rely 
mainly on one type of dividend (often cash) (see: Miller and Modigliani, 1961, 
Horne and McDonald, 1971, Partington, 1985, Holder et al., 1998). Furthermore, 
the sample size is not sufficient to be generalized (see: Marsh and Power, 1999), 
with no discrimination regarding the nature of activity of the companies. 
 
This study attempts to overcome these problems as it examines the relationship 
between dividend policy and market value of companies in UK through the 
adoption of dividend policy as a general concept for three distinct types (cash 
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dividend, share dividend and share repurchase). It includes companies that did not 
issue dividends based on the concept that no dividend is a dividend as well. The 
study uses the Panel Data of a ten year (twenty periods) time series, where the 
fixed-effect (within) regression model is used to examine the hypothesis, which 
takes the dividend policy through three types of dividend as well as the retained 
earnings, which is an indicator of the investment policy and profits as an indicator 
of the current year earnings. In addition, a total asset as proxies for size is used as 
control variables. 
 
The data collection process was undertaken in several stages. The first stage 
sought to identify the companies for which data are available on the 
announcement of the dividend date (as they determine the dependent variable: 
share price as a proxy for market value). The number of companies is 423. The 
second stage was to collect data related to those companies. First, annual data 
(collected through the DataStream) and semi-annual data (collected through the 
websites) of the companies identified. This was done by direct contact with the 
companies to obtain the data. The researcher was able to obtain complete data for 
362 of the companies across various sectors of the economy. 
 
The data was analysed using the STATA program for the full UK market, as well 
as for each economic sector. A positive significant relationship was found 
between cash dividend, stock buyback, earnings per share (EPS) and retained 
earnings per share (REPS) with market value for the full UK market; however, 
this result was different when based on individual economic sectors.  
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This chapter is organized as follows: section 3-2 is a review of previous studies 
and is followed by section 3-3 which is dedicated to methodology and variables. 
The details of the statistical sample are included in section 3-4. The presentation 
and discussion of the results are given in sections 3-5 and 3-6, while the last 
section, section 3-7, is devoted to the conclusions together with a summary 
section. 
 
3-2 Prior studies  
The relationship between dividend policy and market value has drawn the 
attention of a number of researchers. One of the most famous studies in this 
respect is Miller and Modigliani‘s hypothesis (1961), which asserts that the cash 
dividend policy is not important because it has no effect on a company‘s value, 
and as such it does not affect shareholder wealth. Therefore, managers cannot 
maximize shareholder wealth through dividend policy. This is called the 
Irrelevant Theory. 
 
Irrelevant Theory indicates that in light of market efficiency conditions, 
companies that distribute consistently high cash dividends will reduce their share 
capital gains as a result of higher share price in a low percentage. Another 
shareholder, however, gets little dividend while his share prices rise sharply as a 
result of retained earnings; thus he could gain high capital gains that would 
compensate him for the high dividend due to the rising share price. Consequently, 
the two investors gain the same yield as their fortune is represented in the cash 
dividend received and capital gains resulting from a high share price. Meanwhile, 
Irrelevant Theory argues, in cases where there is an impact by dividend policy on 
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market value this is a result of asymmetric information. This effect is due to the 
information conveyed by the dividend policy about future earnings. 
 
Watts‘ (1973) empirical study on the information contained in the dividend tested 
the relationship between unexpected dividend changes, future earnings and 
abnormal returns on shares in companies that announce unexpected changes in 
dividend. In his sample he used 310 firms over a 23 year period from June 1945 to 
June 1968 based on information in COMPUSTAT tapes.  
 
Watts (1973) found that the unexpected change in dividend provides little 
information about future earnings and there is no abnormal return around dividend 
announcements month. 
 
In their study, Black and Scholes (1974) attempted to find the impact of dividend 
policy on stock prices by creating 25 investment portfolios from companies listed 
in the New York Index and then classified the companies into five groups 
according to the cash dividend policy they followed. Each group was then further 
divided into five categories according to risk (beta coefficient). The study covered 
a period of 35 years from 1931 to 1966.  
 
Black and Scholes (1974) found that companies that increase their dividend can 
expect that such an increase would not affect the share price. They also found that 
prices may change temporarily in response to a change in the dividend because 
the market might think that this change suggests something about future earnings. 
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When the picture becomes clear that the dividend change was not due to estimates 
of future earnings, then the temporary change in the price will go away. 
 
Miller and Scholes (1978 and 1982) in their research on dividend and taxes 
confirm the validity of Irrelevant Theory and the absence of any effect of dividend 
policy on the market value of a company. Instead, the effect comes from the 
investment and finance policies. Merton and Rock‘s (1985) study concludes that 
the dividend is a mechanism for conveying missing information on earnings to the 
markets. Therefore, the impact of the dividend is in fact a response from the 
markets to unexpected earnings rather than the dividend per share. Furthermore, 
the earnings information implicit in the dividend gives the dividend an 
expectation about future earnings. 
 
Peter‘s (1996) analysis suggests that dividend yields have no particular 
significance as a stock market forecasting device. He used Ibbotson large-cap total 
return series and dividend yields on the S&P 500. 
 
Peter (1996) concludes that the dividend is not important, and that if companies 
do not pay any dividend for a long time, there would be either no impact on 
shareholders‘ wealth or the impact would be very limited. 
 
Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000) studied the pricing effects of simultaneous 
earnings and dividend announcement in the Japanese market. Their sample was 
3,890 observations for the period 1988 to 1993.  
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Conroy, Eades and Harris (2000) they found that there is a control of the impact 
of earnings on the impact of dividend in their explanation of market reaction. Also 
they find that earnings announcements can provide sufficient information to the 
markets making dividends sound like an additional mechanism for signals. 
Moreover, their findings indicate that the expectations of dividend provide 
additional information to that contained in the current earnings announcement or 
future earnings expectations. 
 
Chen, Firth and Gao‘s (2002) study, conducted in China, concerns the 
announcement and contains information about earnings, cash dividend and share 
dividend. They used 1,232 announcements of listed companies for the period 
1994-1997.  
 
Chen, Firth and Gao (2002) study concludes that movements in stock prices is 
closely associated with unexpected earnings and that cash dividends play only a 
limited role regarding this signal, while share dividends are used to promote or 
modify signals of previous profits. 
 
In spite of the results of the above studies, the researcher believes that Irrelevant 
Theory is unrealistic. This is mainly because of its assumption of and reliance on 
financial market efficiency. The theory is based on symmetrical information 
between management and investors, no taxes, no transaction costs and investors 
are correctly advised when taking their investment decisions. The researcher 
believes that there is no financial market that is 100% efficient and, consequently, 
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this theory is inapplicable. This, however, explain why many empirical studies 
prove that dividend policy has an effect on market value. 
 
Gordon‘s study (1959) is one of the most important of the empirical studies. He 
hypothesised that there are three reasons why investors buy shares, namely: 1) 
dividend and earnings; 2) dividend; and (3) earnings. He evaluated the three 
hypotheses by deriving the relationship between variables that follow each theory. 
He tests the above hypotheses by using data from four industries over two years 
(1951-1954). There are eight samples and the number of corporations in each 
industry is as follows: Chemicals: 32; Food: 52; Steel: 34; and Machine Tools: 46. 
 
Gordon tested his sample by using cross section, price data, dividend and earnings 
of the companies at a point in time that was used to measure the relationship. He 
found that it was difficult to infer the existence of a logic in the pricing of 
common stocks for the first hypothesis (dividend and earnings) but the second 
hypothesis (dividend) gave the interpretation that if growth is valued highly, an 
increase in the dividend with a corresponding reduction in retained earnings will 
not increase the value of a share as much as when a low value is placed on 
growth. In addition, the change in price with dividend can be predicted with much 
greater accuracy when retained earnings are held constant than when the increase 
comes out of retained earnings.  
 
According to the third hypothesis (earnings), the investor obtains income per 
share when he acquires a share of stock and he can receive the cash dividend and 
gets the retained earnings if he sells the share because it is in share value. 
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However, the different tax treatment of dividend and capital gains creates a 
stockholder‘s preference for retained earnings. 
  
The paper specifies that the dividend hypothesis is correct regardless of whether 
or not the earnings hypothesis is correct. Further, it is concluded that a dividend 
increase will lead to an increase in the market value of a company and a reduction 
in the cost of equity. 
 
In addition to the above study, Gordon (1962 & 1963) also asserts that the 
Irrelevant Theory is not correct. He found that the dividend policy and investment 
policy are interconnected and that investment policy cannot alone and in isolation 
from dividend policy affect the market value of a company. Linter (1962) stresses 
that the value of one dollar received by shareholders as dividend is more than the 
value of one dollar in retained earnings; therefore dividend policy is relevant and 
has an impact on shareholders‘ value. 
 
Pettit (1972) tried to provide evidence for the hypothesis that changes in dividend 
levels convey important information to market participants. He collected the 
announcement dates of all dividend changes for a set of 625 New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) firms for the period January 1964-June 1968. There were 
around 1,000 dividend changes announcements by these firms during this period.  
He divided his sample into several portfolios according to the degree of dividend 
change and trends of earnings change. He tested the abnormal return around the 
dividend announcement date for 14 portfolios of multiple aspects of dividend and 
earnings.  
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Pettit found that the market reacts primarily to significant increases or decreases 
in dividends announcement. He showed that the current prices in efficient markets 
reflect all the information published. This means that the expected returns on 
shares at a given time is independent of all the available information from earlier 
periods because it has already been reflected in the share price. Thus, the 
announcement of a change in the dividend would be quickly reflected in the share 
price, either increasing or decreasing according to the change in dividend. 
 
Brown, Finn and Hancock (1977) examined the relationship between dividend, 
earnings and abnormal returns by testing sample from Australia for the period 
1963-1972. They used an event study to test abnormal returns around the dividend 
announcements by applying regression analysis. Due to the fact that dividend and 
earnings announcements are simultaneous in Australia, the study compared the 
dividend and earnings as one group.   
 
Brown, Finn and Hancock‘s findings indicate that although a change in both 
dividend and earnings have a positive relationship with abnormal returns, only the 
impact of dividend is statistically significant. 
 
In his study, Blume (1980) examines the relationship between dividend policy and 
total returns on a risk-adjusted basis by using cross-sectional regressions. 
 
He finds that over 41 years to 1976, the risk-adjusted returns on dividend-paying 
stock increased in anticipation of the dividend yield, while the average return on 
all dividend-paying issues was about the same as on non-dividend paying issues. 
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Moreover, Blume finds that the total returns on non-dividend paying stocks 
tended to exceed the returns on most dividend paying stocks. 
 
Aharony and Swary (1980) tried to ascertain if quarterly dividend changes 
provide information beyond that already provided by quarterly earnings 
announcements. They tried to assess the sole impact of dividends by controlling 
the impact of earnings through testing a sample in which earnings and dividends 
were announced on different dates. 
  
In order to isolate the impact of dividend from the impact of earnings, they 
distinguished samples in which the earnings announcement preceded the dividend 
announcement from those where earnings announcement followed the dividend 
announcement. 
 
Aharony and Swary found that the market‘s reaction to a dividend increase is 
positive, and negative for dividend decrease. In addition, the market‘s response to 
a decrease in the dividend is greater than its response to a dividend increase. 
Furthermore, their findings did not indicate any difference in the market reaction 
in the case of earnings announcement before the dividend announcement and the 
earnings announcement after the dividend announcement. 
 
Agreeing with the findings of Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Mullins 
(1983) tested the initial  dividend where they find that the market‘s reaction to 
initial dividend appears smaller when the earnings announcement within ten days 
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from the dividend announcement. They find that the information provided by both 
the dividend and earnings are partly reciprocal. 
 
Kane, Lee and Marcus (1984) studied the market‘s reaction to earnings and 
dividend announcements advertised within ten days of each other. They used a 
sample consisting of 352 observations of quarterly dividend and earnings 
announcements between fourth quarter, 1979 and second quarter, 1981. 
 
Kane, Lee and Marcus arrived at important results as they find that changes in 
dividends and earnings have a significant positive relationship with the 
cumulative abnormal return around the announcements. They also find that the 
market tends to evaluate both the dividend and earnings announcements jointly. 
Furthermore, the impact of the interaction can be perceived in both dividend and 
earnings announcement. 
 
Another study by Ang and Peterson (1985) investigates the relationship between 
stock returns and yield in the context of ex-ante data by examining the role of 
dividend as a proxy for risk. They used a long-run expectation data on return and 
yield from The Value Line Investment Survey for the companies from 1973 to 
1983.  
 
Ang and Peterson find that the return for companies that distribute high cash 
dividends will be high, which means that its shares price will be less than the 
company‘s shares price that achieves the same profit level its cash dividend is less 
with the stability of other factors. 
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Baskin‘s (1989) study used both cross section and time series analysis to measure 
the effect of dividend policy on the volatility of common stocks in the US for the 
period 1967-1986. Baskin‘s data is for all 2,344 firms on the 1986 COMPUSTAT 
tapes in six industries which represent a very broad and diverse cross-section of 
US public corporate.    
 
Baskin (1989) found out that there is a strong and robust inverse relationship 
between dividend yields and stock price volatility.  
 
Marsh and Power (1999) investigate the relationship between stock prices and 
dividend for a panel sample of 56 large UK companies over the period January 
1968-December 1996. Their results indicate that there is a significant co-
integrating relationship between share prices and share dividend.  
 
In their study on UK simultaneous announcements, Lonie and Abeyratna (1996) 
examine capital market reactions to a variety of combination of simultaneous 
dividend and earnings announcement. They separated the impact of dividend and 
earnings by dividing the sample into six portfolios according to changes in 
earnings and dividend: 1) dividends and earnings increase; 2) dividends increase 
and earnings decrease; 3) dividends decrease and earnings increase; 4) dividends 
and earnings decrease; 5) dividends no change and earnings increase; and 6) 
dividends no change and earnings decrease. 
    
Lonie and Abeyratna (1996) conclude that a company‘s announcements on 
increases in both earnings and dividends earned the largest abnormal returns, 
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while its announcements on the decline in earnings and dividends earned the 
largest negative abnormal returns. 
 
By adopting regression analysis, Amihud and Murgia (1997) studied the impact of 
dividend and earnings announcement in the German market to test if price 
movements were linked to the dividend and earnings, based on a sample of 200 
companies during the period 1988-1992. 
 
They found unexpected dividends and earnings have an interpretation power on 
share prices movement. Even though earnings announcement precedes dividend 
announcement in Germany, Amihud and Murgia‘s results imply that the dividend 
announcement is a greater signal about current earnings than the early earnings 
announcement. 
 
Dyl and Weigand (1998) investigate the changes in a company‘s risks which 
follow the cash dividend payment. Their study stems from the information 
implied in a cash dividend because managers will only increase the dividend when 
they think that corporate profits level will grow continuously. Dyl and Weigand‘s 
hypothesis about the initiation of cash dividend indicates that a firm‘s earnings 
and cash flow have become fundamentally less risky and decrease in risk comes 
from a reduction in earnings volatility and earnings surprises. They selected firms 
that paid no dividend for at least four years preceding the announcement of the 
initial dividend, whose returns data were available for at least one year before and 
after the announcement date and had quarterly earnings data available for 12 
quarters preceding and following the quarter in which the initial dividend was 
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announced. They used regression analysis to show that the excess return observed 
around the announcement is related to the observed future changes in risk for their 
sample of 240 firms for the period January 1972-December 1993. 
 
Dyl and Weigand (1998) provided evidence that the cash dividend indicates that 
corporate profits and cash flow will be less risky, meaning that there is a 
statistically strong significant relationship between dividend policy and a 
company‘s market value. 
 
Azhagaiah and Priya (2008) examine the relationship between dividend policy 
and shareholders‘ wealth in the Indian chemical sector by analyzing the impact of 
variation in dividend policy on shareholders wealth of dividend paying and non-
paying companies and the impact of retained earnings and past performance in the 
presence of dividend policy on shareholders wealth.  
 
They used regression analysis for their sample of 21 companies from the National 
Stock Exchange and 28 companies from the Bombay Stock Exchange for the 
period 1997-2006. Azhagaiah and Priya (2008) find that in the long-run, the 
wealth of shareholders of dividend paying chemical companies increased 
significantly when compared to that of their dividend non-paying counterparts, 
and the initiation of dividend payments had a significant positive impact on the 
shareholders‘ wealth during the study period. 
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3-3 Model and hypotheses 
Dividend and retained earnings are two alternative options available to a firm to 
dispose of its earned profit. Profit may be either paid as a dividend to shareholders 
or held in retained earnings for future growth. While the payment of a dividend 
gives an immediate return on shareholders‘ investments, retained earnings do not 
give shareholders immediate and certain returns. Instead, it is an increase in the 
firm‘s capital which can lead to an increase in the firm‘s share price. Thus, 
shareholders have two options: an increase in dividend which assures them of a 
regular present income; or retained earnings which may appreciate their capital in 
the future but with a degree of uncertainty. 
 
A number of the studies described above (for example, Gordon, 1959, Kane et al., 
1984, Amihud and Murgia, 1997, Dyl and Weigand, 1998, Conroy et al., 2000, 
Chen et al., 2002) predominantly deal with event study methodology. Event study 
methodology is relevant for the short-run impact of dividend policy on stock 
returns. It both calculates abnormal returns in the post-dividend announcement 
period and checks the impact of dividend prior to the ex-dividend period. Event 
study methodology is extensively used to analyze the impact of dividend on stock 
price.  
 
However, Baskin (1989) takes a different approach and examines the influence of 
dividend policy on stock price volatility against the returns by using simple cross-
section regression for the analysis. He suggests the following control variables in 
testing the significance of the relationship between dividend yield and price 
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volatility: operating earnings; size of the firm; level of debt financing; payout 
ratio; and level of growth.  
 
3-3-1 Derived Model: 
When testing the relationship between dividend policy and share price, it should 
be studied from two perspectives: that of management and that of shareholders. 
Management requires sufficient profit retention to satisfy the firm‘s long-term 
needs such as investment demand and liquidity needs. This places a focus on the 
firm‘s preference for dividend-retention configuration against dividend only. Such 
a configuration varies across companies depending on circumstances surrounding 
its activities.  
 
On the other side, shareholders‘ preferences depend mainly on their income level 
which is affected by many factors such as tax effect, as discussed in previous 
chapter. Therefore shareholders tend to invest in firms whose dividend policies 
match their preferences.   
 
The differences between management and shareholders‘ preferences create 
different scenarios regarding dividend policy and preferences for management and 
shareholders which affect market value.  
 
Let us assume typical company has a full vision about shareholders‘ preferences 
scenarios in relation to dividends policy. Each scenario shown below indicates the 
level of utility that comes from alternative dividend-retention configuration. 
Therefore, the dividend policy preferences function can be represented as:  
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                          U = f (D, R)                                 (1)  
Where D and R are the dividend policy and retention net of all taxes at all levels.  
 
The utility level can be seen as related to the preferences of the management with 
respect to the shareholders‘ preference. This utility is the result of a process of 
accounting for their relative performances and the factors influencing such 
preferences as well.  
 
The next step is to represent the hypothesis that dividend policy affects share 
prices or market value of the firm. The utility function can be represented as the 
function for optimizing the market value of the firm. The market value of the firm 
can be represented as:  
 
Market value of the firm =  earningstainedDividendsprofitNetf Re,,            (2) 
 
The market value of the company here is represented on the basis of accounting 
earning analysis. The net profit is derived from the current investment of the 
company. The higher the net profit, the higher will be the share price. In addition, 
the market value of the company also depends upon the dividend paid to 
shareholders representing the dividend policy and the retained earnings 
representing the investment policy which will contribute to future profit.  
 
The changes in the market value of the company are guided by the preferences of 
the shareholders for dividend or retained earnings. If majority of the shareholders 
of a company prefer dividend but the policy of the company changes in favour of 
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retained earnings, then one can expect the market value to fall. On the other, if the 
majority shareholders of the same company expect higher retained earnings and 
the company policy moves towards more retained earnings, then the market value 
is likely to go up. So the market value of the company can be represented as 
follows:  
 
Vt = f(Dt, Yt, Rt)      (3) 
Where:  
V t  = market value of the firm, 
D t  = dividend policy 
Y t  = net profit of the firm, and  
R t  = retention earning  
 
With a view to normalizing we divide throughout by par: 
 
Vt/Vo = f ( Dt/Vo, Yt/Vo, Rt/Vo ) 
Where Vt/V0 is share price of the firm, Dt/V0 is the rate of dividend (dividend per 
share), Yt/V0 is the rate of the profit (earning per share) and Rt/V0 is the rate of 
retained earnings (retained earnings per share). In other word, the equation can be 
represented as:  
 
Pt = f ( dt, yt, rt )            (4) 
Which reiterates the fact that the share price index ( tP ) depends upon the rate of 
profit ( ty ), the dividend rate ( td ) and the retention earning ( tr ). We have assumed 
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the above function in equation (4) for the stock (A) which can be represented as 
the following:  
 
u
tttt erydAP )(
321                       (5) 
 
Alternatively, equation (5) can be expressed as:  
 
urydAP tttt  321                                            (6) 
 
Since we are using a cross-section and time-series data, we can write the above 
equation as:  
 
ititititt urydAP  321                                  (7) 
Where:  
A =   
i = 1… N 
t = 1 … T 
 
And because there are many types of dividend policy (cash, shares, repurchase) 
with different effect on company market value, the firm management can use one 
or more of them in the same time. Therefore, equation (7) can be represented as:  
tiutirtiytirepdtisdticdAtiP  54321        (8) 
Where: 
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cd = cash dividend  
sd = share dividend  
repd= share re purchasing  
 
3-3-2 Control Factors 
In keeping with previous studies (Baskin, 1989), the following control factors will 
be applied in this study:  
 Size: There is a link between size and market value. Small companies are 
less diversified in their activities and there is less scrutiny into the 
company by investors. Information on the stocks of smaller companies 
could be less informed and illiquid in nature. As small companies are 
subject to bigger price change as a result of the above factors, there is a 
need to introduce a size control variable. 
 Liquidity: There is a link between liquidity with dividend policy and 
market value. Companies with less liquidity are expected to be less able to 
increase their activities by new investment and less able to continue their 
dividend, leading to less scrutiny by investors into the firm. Such 
companies are subject to bigger price change as a result of the above posed 
factors, thus there is a need to introduce a liquidity control variable. 
 
3-3-3 Use of Panel Models: 
We will attempt to study the impact of dividend yield on stock price through panel 
data estimation as this allows us to observe company effect and time effect 
through the sample period. The company effect refers to factors affecting the 
behaviour of an individual company if constant over time. The time effect refers 
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to the economic condition at a particular time point; it varies over time. So now 
equation (8) can be stated as:  
ittiutiLtiZtirtiytirepdtisdticdAtiP   7654321
 
Where: 
Z = Company Size 
L= Liquidity  
i Firm specific component 
it Disturbance term 
 
Why Panel Data Models? 
Panel data, which is called longitudinal data or cross-sectional time series data 
(Hsiao, 2003, Davidson and Mackinnon, 2004, Gujarati and Porter, 2009), where 
multiple cases (countries, companies, people, etc) are observed at two or more 
time periods. In other words Panel data consist of observations on the same cross-
sectional, or individual, unites over several time periods (Gujarati, 2003).  
 
Baltagi (2008) states the following advantages achieved using panel data: 
1- It considers heterogeneity explicitly by taking into account individual-
specific variables; 
2- It gives more information, more variability, and less collinearity between 
variables by combining both time series and cross-section observations; 
3- It is more suitable for studying the dynamics of change, as well as 
studying more complicated behavioural models; 
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4- It is better able to measure and identify effects that are simply not 
detectable in pure cross-section or pure time series data; 
5- It enables more complicated behavioural models to be studied; 
6- It minimizes the bias that may occur if firms are aggregated into broad 
aggregates. 
 
The panel data can be short or long panel data. In short panel data the number of 
cross-sectional data are greater than the number of time periods, while the number 
of time periods are greater than cross-sectional data in long panel (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009).  
 
There are two possibilities for the estimating techniques that can be used, 
regardless whether or not we have short or long panel data (Gujarati and Porter, 
2009): 
1- The least squares dummy variable (fixed effect) approach which assumes 
that the individual constant is a group specific constant term in the 
regression model; and  
2- The generalized least squares (random effect) approach which assumes 
that the individual constant is a group specific disturbance similar to the 
error term, except for each group. 
 
However, the question is: which one is better, fixed effect or random effect?  
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3-3-4 Fixed Effect or Random Effect? 
The main advantage of the fixed effect estimator is that it assumes the time effect 
is independent for each entity that is possibly correlated with the regression. This 
is because the fixed effect soaks up much of the explanatory power of the 
relatively time-invariant explanatory variables (Buddelmeyer et al., 2008).  
 
However, it is common practice in economic research to choose between fixed 
effect or random effect according to the Hausman (1978) specification test. This 
test facilitates the differentiation between random and fixed effects models by 
testing for correlation between the x variables and the individual random effects 
εi. The Hausman test checks for strict exogeneity. If no correlation is found, 
random effects should be employed but if correlation exists, fixed effects should 
be employed.  
 
In this study, the Hausman (1978) test is used to check this assumption and to test 
the appropriateness of using the fixed effect estimation or the random effects 
estimation.  
 
3-3-5 Variables Definitions 
We will use the following variable definitions for the variables in the model 
derived in section 3-3-1. 
 
3-3-5-1 Dependent Variable 
 Market value: The share price on earnings and dividend announcement 
day is used as a proxy for market value (Azhagaiah and Priya, 2008). 
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 3-3-5-2 Independent Variables 
 Profit: the year net earnings per share (EPS) is used as a proxy for the 
profit.  
 Dividend policy: three types of dividend (cash, share and repurchase) per 
share are used as a proxy for dividend policy as the following proxy: 
o The amount of cash dividend per share as a proxy for cash 
dividend. 
o The percentage of share dividend per share as a proxy of share 
dividend. 
o The percentage of the cost of shares repurchase to the outstanding 
share as a proxy for share repurchase. 
 Investment policy: Return Earnings per Share (REPS) is used as a proxy 
for the investment policy. 
 Size: the company‘s total assets are used as a proxy for size.  
 Liquidity: the company‘s debt to equity ratio is used as a proxy for 
company liquidity. 
 
3-3-6 The Hypotheses 
The main null hypothesis for this chapter is: 
There is no significant statistical relationship between dividend policy and 
market value of the sample companies in the UK. 
 
A sub-hypothesis for each economic sector in the UK is used to test if there is any 
effect of the company‘s sector on the relationship between dividend policy and 
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market value. In the London Stock Exchange (LSE) there are 14 sectors, so we 
will have 14 sub-hypotheses for the following sectors: 
1- Banking sector 
2- Basic Materials sector 
3- Consumer Goods sector 
4- Consumer Services sector 
5- Health Care sector 
6- Industrials sector 
7- Insurance sector 
8- Oil and Gas sector 
9- Technology sector 
10- Telecommunications sector 
11- Utilities sector 
12- Real Estate Investment and Service sector 
13- Real Estate Investment Trusts sector 
14- Financial Services sector. 
 
3-4 Data and Sample Selection 
3-4-1 Data 
There are many weaknesses in previous studies regarding sample size, 
characteristics and timeframe. Therefore, this study seeks to tackle these 
weaknesses by obtaining the strongest possible sample to represent the study 
components as adequately as possible over the longest possible period of time. 
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Previous studies excluded from their sample companies that did not distribute 
dividend during the period covered by the study (see: Lobo et al., 1986, Doron 
and Ziv, 2001). This means that the selected sample could not be looked upon as 
neutral; in other words, the sample was addressed in only one direction. On the 
other hand, the short periods of time covered by these studies (see: Gordon, 1959, 
Pettit, 1972, Grinblatt et al., 1984, Kalay and Loewenstein, 1986) do not make it 
possible to generalize the results because these periods may be affected by any 
emergency during that short period of time. 
 
The researcher relied on the fact that the decision taken not to distribute dividend 
in any of the years covered by the study is an outcome decision of the dividend 
policy. In another words, zero dividend is still a policy. Therefore, the researcher 
found it prudent not to exclude these companies from the sample which includes 
equity companies in the UK pound for the period 1998-2007. The year 2008 is 
excluded from the sample period because it has been affected, in its later months, 
by the global financial crisis. It has been found that the number of companies that 
meet the above criteria is 691 across 15 sectors. 
 
3-4-2 Selected Sample 
There were several stages of data collection. The first stage was collecting the 
sample through the following criteria:  active equity companies in the UK pound 
whose base date goes back to 1/1/1998 (in order to obtain ten years of data from 
1998 to 2007). 2008 was excluded from the sample period because of the impact 
of the global financial crisis, which had the potential to distort the results. The 
number of companies that met the above criteria was 691 across various sectors. 
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The second stage in data collocation was identifying the companies for which data 
are available on the dividend announcement date (as this determines the 
dependent variable—share price as a proxy for market value). It was found that 
the number of these companies was 423. The next phase was to collect data 
related to those companies. The collection comprised annual and semi-annual data 
through DataStream (for annual data) and corporate websites (for semi-annual 
data). As some semi-annual data were not available on the websites, the 
researcher made direct contact with the companies concerned in order to obtain it . 
Complete data for 362 companies across various sectors of the economy was 
obtained.  
 
All data was collected according to each firm‘s financial year. Most sample firms 
start their financial years on January 1 and end in December 31. But many also 
have different financial years, for example beginning in April. Combining data 
from different financial years into our sample was done in the following manner: 
first data was collected for each company according to its own financial year, and 
then placed into calendar years. That would correspond most to the firm‘s own 
financial year. The data collected is presented in the Table 3-1. 
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Table 3- 1 The Sample by Economic Sectors 
This table presents the sample data (annual and semi-annual) obtained from (DataStream 
and companies website) of the UK companies covering the period 1997 to 2008.  
 
Sector Sample Available Percentage 
1 Banks 7 4 57.14% 
2 Basic Materials 33 17 51.52% 
3 Consumer Goods 76 42 55.26% 
4 Consumer Services 121 67 55.37% 
5 Health Care 31 11 35.48% 
6 Industrials  200 116 58.00% 
7 Insurance 14 11 78.57% 
8 Oil & Gas 25 13 52.00% 
9 Technology 56 27 48.21% 
10 Telecommunications 4 3 75.00% 
11 Unclassified 19 0 0.00% 
12 Utilities 12 5 41.67% 
13 Real Estate Investment & Service 34 13 38.24% 
14 Real Estate Investment Trusts 15 11 73.33% 
15 Financial Services  44 22 50.00% 
Total 691 362 52.39% 
 
By reviewing the sample‘s characteristics, it was found that the cash dividend is 
the most widely used type of dividend. Only a small percentage of companies did 
not pay any cash dividend, while no companies used a share dividend or share 
buyback regularly throughout the study period. Accordingly it can be concluded 
that the cash dividend is more important than other types of dividend (see Table  
3-2).  
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Table 3- 2 The Sample Dividend Frequency by Sectors  
This table presents the frequency of payment (full period, intermittent, and no dividend) for each type of dividend (cash, share and buy back) by 
economic sector for the sample of 362 UK companies from 1997 to 2008.  
No. sector 
No of Cash Dividend Share Dividend Buyback 
companies 
Full 
Period 
Intermittently 
No 
Dividend 
Full 
Period 
Intermittently 
No 
Dividend 
Full 
Period 
Intermittently 
No 
Dividend 
1 Banks 4 4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 4 
2 Basic Materials 17 10 5 2 0 17 0 0 13 4 
3 Consumer Goods 42 30 12 0 0 38 4 0 29 13 
4 Consumer Services 67 57 8 2 0 63 4 0 43 24 
5 Health Care 11 1 9 1 0 8 3 0 7 4 
6 Industrials 116 88 24 4 0 116 0 0 74 42 
7 Insurance 11 8 2 1 0 7 4 0 3 8 
8 Oil & Gas 13 11 2 0 0 13 0 0 7 6 
9 Technology 27 19 2 6 0 27 0 0 23 4 
10 Telecommunications 3 2 0 1 0 2 1 0 0 3 
11 Utilities 5 4 1 0 0 2 3 0 1 4 
12 
Real Estate Investment & 
Service 
13 5 2 6 0 13 0 0 10 3 
13 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 
11 9 2 0 0 11 0 0 11 0 
14 Financial Services 22 20 2 0 0 22 0 0 21 1 
Total 362 268 71 23 0 343 19 0 242 120 
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3-5 Empirical Results 
3-5-1 Model Test 
Before analyzing the regression model, the reliability of the model was tested 
through stepwise regression, regression assumption and the Hausman test.  
 
3-5-1-1 Stepwise Regression test 
In deciding on the ‗best‘ set of explanatory variables for a regression model, 
researchers often follow the method of stepwise regression in order to help find 
the best regression model (Berenson et al., 2009). There are two methods 
available for stepwise regression: either by introducing the X variables one at a 
time (stepwise forward regression) or by including all the possible X variables in 
one multiple regression and rejecting them one at time (stepwise backward 
regression) (Gujarati and Porter, 2009) .  
 
In this study, the stepwise forward regression is used to determine the best model 
by comparing R
2
 value for the possible model as shown in the table no. 3-3 below: 
Table 3- 3 Stepwise regression 
This table presents the stepwise regression for all independent variables (cash dividend, 
share dividend, share buy back, EPS, REPS, total assets and D/E ratio) which will help in 
determine the best model for the sample of 362 UK companies from 1997 to 2008. 
Cash Share  Share  
EPS REPS 
Total D/E 
R
2
 
Dividend Dividend Buy Back Assets Ratio 
-0.00187   0.00% 
-0.00190 -52.8027   0.00% 
-0.00174 -37.9292 947.641   0.81% 
-0.00233 -17.8037 826.703 108.222   3.44% 
-0.00177 36.8472 564.977 87.6039 42.2873   7.53% 
-0.00175 36.0338 565.647 87.4067 42.1720 3.48E-07   7.58% 
-0.00144 44.9441 563.410 83.1154 40.3129 3.28E-07 0.30383 7.21% 
 
As can be seen from the above table, the best model that can be achieved is by 
remove the D/E ratio (control variable) from the model. This is because the R
2
 
value of the model without D/E ratio is the highest R
2
, 7.58%. 
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3-5-1-2 Regression Assumptions test 
There are four critical assumptions for regression model: collinearity, normality, 
homoscedasticity and linearity (Gujarati, 2003, Berenson et al., 2009). 
 
1. Collinearity Test 
One of the most important problems facing the use of multiple regression analysis 
is the probability of collinearity between independent variables, so that they 
cannot be fully independent (multi-collinearity) (Berenson et al., 2009). This 
collinearity occurs when there is a strong correlation between one or more 
independent variables with each other, although usually there is no new 
information added to the regression model. In addition, the relationship tends to 
distort the model results because of the difficulty of isolating the impact of 
relationship between the supposedly independent variables. 
 
One of method used to test collinearity between independent variables is Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) for each independent variable. VIF can be calculated 
through the following equation: 
 
VIF= 1 / (1 - R
2
) 
 
The decision rule is that if the VIF coefficient for any independent variable is 
equal to one, that variable independent of other variables; i.e. collinearity has no 
significant effect on the relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable. The independent variable is considered to be independent and 
in collinearity with other independent variables if the VIF coefficient of the 
variable is greater than five (Berenson et al., 2009). 
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The researcher conducted a collinearity test between the independent variables 
(cash dividend per share (CDPS), share dividend per share (SDPS), stock re 
purchase per share (SRPS), earning per share (EPS), retained earnings per share 
(REPS) and total assets (TA)) to examine the possibility of collinearity between 
the independent variables with a significant effect on the relationship between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable. The STATA programme was 
used for calculating the correlation between independent variables using the 
Pearson Matrix (see Table 3-4). 
 
One of the most important problems facing the use of multiple regression analysis 
is the probability of Collinearity between the independent variables, so that they 
cannot be fully independent (Multi-Collinearity) (Berenson et al., 2009)
 
. This 
collinearity comes out when there is a strong correlation between one or more 
independent variables with each other. Usually there is no new information added 
to the regression model. Added to that, it tends to distort the model results because 
of the difficulty represented in isolating the impact of relations between variables 
that are supposed to be independent of the dependent variable. 
Table 3- 4 Pearson matrix for correlation coefficient 
This table presents Pearson matrix of the independent variables (cash dividend, share 
dividend, share buy back, EPS, REPS and total assets) which will help in calculating the 
VIF for the sample of 362 UK companies from 1997 to 2008. 
 
 
 
 
CDPS SDPS SRPS EPS REPS TA 
CDPS 1.0000 
     SDPS -0.0029 1.0000 
    SRPS -0.0017 -0.0191 1.0000 
   EPS 0.0010 -0.0130 0.0816 1.0000 
  REPS -0.0010 -0.0305 0.1297 0.1594 1.0000 
 TA -0.0005 0.0011 0.0086 0.0206 0.0337 1.0000 
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From the above results, the VIF value between independent variables can be 
calculated as shown in Table 3-5.  
Table 3- 5 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
This table presents the VIF between the independent variables (cash dividend, share 
dividend, share buy back, EPS, REPS and total assets) for the sample of 362 UK 
companies from 1997 to 2008.  
    
VIF 
 
R R
2
 1-R
2
 1/(1-R
2
) 
CDPS, SDPS -  0.0029  0.00000841 0.99999159 1.00000841 
CDPS, SRPS -  0.0017  0.00000289 0.99999711 1.00000289 
CDPS, EPS    0.0010  0.00000100 0.99999900 1.00000100 
CDPS, REPS -  0.0010  0.00000100 0.99999900 1.00000100 
CDPS, TA -  0.0005  0.00000025 0.99999975 1.00000025 
SDPS, SRPS -  0.0191  0.00036481 0.99963519 1.00036494 
SDPS, EPS -  0.0130  0.00016900 0.99983100 1.00016903 
SDPS, REPS -  0.0305  0.00093025 0.99906975 1.00093112 
SDPS, TA    0.0011  0.00000121 0.99999879 1.00000121 
SRPS, EPS    0.0816  0.00665856 0.99334144 1.00670319 
SRPS, REPS    0.1297  0.01682209 0.98317791 1.01710991 
SRPS, TA    0.0086  0.00007396 0.99992604 1.00007397 
EPS, REPS    0.1594  0.02540836 0.97459164 1.02607078 
EPS, TA    0.0206  0.00042436 0.99957564 1.00042454 
REPS, TA    0.0337  0.00113569 0.99886431 1.00113698 
 
Based on the results, all the VIF values between the independent variables are 
very close to 1. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no collinearity 
between the independent variables that has a significant effect on the relationship 
of the independent variables and the dependent variable, to a 95% confidence 
level.  
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2. Normality Test 
The other important assumption of regression models is that the variables should 
follow a normal distribution, In this context, the more the data follows the normal 
distribution, the more accurate the results (Berenson et al., 2009). The researcher 
sought to test whether or not the independent variables and the dependent variable 
follow a normal distribution by calculating skewness and kurtosis. The skewness 
measures the loss of consistency in the data and how it follows a normal 
distribution. If skewness is zero then that the data follows a normal distribution; 
but if it is positive, then it refers to the deviation of the data to the right, while a 
negative value indicates a deviation to the left. The value of kurtosis refers to the 
concentration of data in the middle. If kurtosis is zero the data is a bell-shaped 
distribution, but if the value is negative then the data is flatter than a bell-shaped 
distribution, while if the value is positive, then it is sharper than a bell-shaped 
distribution (Berenson et al., 2009)
 
. 
 
Table 3-6 displays the value of skewness and kurtosis for all the variables over the 
ten year period. All the variables for a period of ten years move away from a 
normal distribution. The researcher thus resorted to Log Transformation in order 
to overcome the violations of the assumptions of the regression model (Berenson 
et al., 2009).  
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Table 3- 6 Descriptive statistic for variables  
This table displays the value of the mean, standard deviation, median, skewness and kurtosis for all the variables (market value, 
cash dividend, share dividend, share buy back, EPS, REPS, and total assets) for the sample of 362 UK companies from 1997 to 
2008.  
Panel       
  
Market Value 
(P0) 
Cash 
Dividend 
Share 
Dividend 
Stock 
Buyback EPS REPS 
Total 
Assets 
 
1 
Mean 368.2508 0.04769 0.024943 0.001018 0.109724 0.454782 4078521 
Standard Deviation 1129.439 0.092675 0.124273 0.011345 1.080632 4.406273 1.96E+07 
Median 182.56 0.027 0 0 0.08 0.288547 167866 
Skewness 13.08952 10.25002 11.0478 14.01401 -16.8879 -6.88141 7.775847 
Kurtosis 205.0874 156.0035 165.6552 213.9348 414.8657 188.3352 74.20745 
 
2 
Mean 411.5382 0.052932 0.025307 0.003052 0.134092 0.564959 4527164 
Standard Deviation 1218.89 0.108252 0.106175 0.044601 0.399624 3.744686 2.13E+07 
Median 198.435 0.028 0 0 0.079 0.318422 187424.5 
Skewness 13.00326 8.970474 5.862267 22.51317 4.112104 -1.10474 7.525409 
Kurtosis 219.7567 120.1794 39.79615 551.7129 84.79439 139.1433 68.84002 
 
3 
Mean 444.6838 0.052186 0.025026 0.005624 0.135082 0.661501 6365877 
Standard Deviation 1631.006 0.104441 0.097979 0.045159 0.478547 4.001269 3.14E+07 
Median 205.5 0.028 0 0 0.08 0.398113 221157 
Skewness 16.20801 9.347495 6.155666 11.54499 1.625977 -1.25038 7.177523 
Kurtosis 289.7671 133.9085 47.20296 160.5413 56.06016 144.6328 59.65525 
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4 
Mean 400.0069 0.053088 0.022271 0.004991 0.102228 0.724023 6829959 
Standard Deviation 1264.972 0.113647 0.111284 0.059131 0.426235 3.753056 3.43E+07 
Median 202.71 0.027 0 0 0.063 0.445283 239586 
Skewness 12.14223 9.665831 9.204043 19.83449 2.922551 2.947164 7.559127 
Kurtosis 166.2615 137.2627 115.4412 437.1153 42.57796 137.5759 66.65853 
 
5 
Mean 280.4226 0.051539 0.017996 0.006116 0.050094 0.704099 7256944 
Standard Deviation 578.2506 0.119266 0.093938 0.05213 0.642069 3.704285 3.76E+07 
Median 158.61 0.026 0 0 0.054 0.431167 236273 
Skewness 10.52738 11.82091 9.706988 13.1911 -5.79716 3.496372 7.927168 
Kurtosis 150.4798 194.99 122.6797 199.446 129.0546 127.9427 73.57518 
 
6 
Mean 319.3158 45.89673 0.016123 0.004146 0.098064 0.779731 7865650 
Standard Deviation 595.8949 1126.165 0.082197 0.021817 0.713934 4.608778 4.18E+07 
Median 190 0.029665 0 0 0.0635 0.40067 248428.5 
Skewness 9.809662 26.47694 7.548831 8.051832 4.191329 -0.07226 8.013342 
Kurtosis 136.4193 707.7602 66.39971 83.85947 98.27007 133.9841 74.44861 
 
7 
Mean 348.0828 4.235933 0.013903 0.006106 -0.02855 0.829048 8658209 
Standard Deviation 482.6302 112.57 0.058212 0.026524 3.030204 4.757136 4.88E+07 
Median 222.125 0.028 0 0 0.076 0.419922 270645.5 
Skewness 5.77342 26.85145 7.565891 6.932271 -18.6399 -0.24664 8.898524 
Kurtosis 54.02752 722.0008 78.33244 62.61918 356.1091 125.3297 92.42071 
 8 Mean 415.5555 0.058819 0.019248 0.015491 0.067639 0.93871 1.09E+07 
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Standard Deviation 601.3624 0.091359 0.085153 0.074152 2.803109 5.023385 6.85E+07 
Median 266.655 0.031 0.000118 0 0.0925 0.463644 292078 
Skewness 6.246868 4.263089 7.756425 8.632435 -25.1917 -0.98887 10.16171 
Kurtosis 63.14877 29.13242 74.46427 93.50561 662.0345 112.3202 118.313 
 
9 
Mean 499.9001 0.062771 0.01619 0.030464 0.23254 1.250588 1.19E+07 
Standard Deviation 734.0888 0.09826 0.060595 0.148495 0.708198 5.842273 7.60E+07 
Median 306.075 0.034 0.000633 0 0.1095 0.532292 323052 
Skewness 5.734905 4.334766 7.863253 8.969349 -1.59298 1.194995 10.27629 
Kurtosis 51.23563 29.66433 83.37934 108.2815 95.92368 87.8829 120.1912 
 
10 
Mean 512.4564 0.066848 0.017066 0.032951 0.289924 1.538414 1.49E+07 
Standard Deviation 741.6073 0.095797 0.066385 0.185101 0.76013 6.469473 1.08E+08 
Median 299.625 0.0375 0.000754 0 0.12 0.603361 403832 
Skewness 5.494696 3.785778 7.092258 11.66466 6.685957 2.762652 12.43484 
Kurtosis 51.07387 24.54043 64.70495 180.2199 65.4921 84.95142 180.8162 
 
Total 
Mean 400.0213 5.057854 0.019807 0.010996 0.119084 0.844585 8333511 
Standard Deviation 971.2053 357.9381 0.091137 0.086299 1.443107 4.722586 5.54E+07 
Median 213 0.03 0 0 0.079 0.414286 257755.5 
Skewness 16.1631 82.72949 9.155508 18.56773 -36.4238 0.484186 15.44673 
Kurtosis 379.2098 6956.378 125.8412 513.5282 1655.697 127.8728 344.1257 
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Table 3- 7 Descriptive statistic for Log variables 
This table displays the log value of the mean, standard deviation, median, skewness and kurtosis for all the variables (market 
value, cash dividend, share dividend, share buy back, EPS, REPS, and total assets) for the sample of 362 UK companies from 
1997 to 2008.  
Panel 
 
Log 
Market 
Value 
(P0) 
Log Cash 
Dividend 
Log Share 
Dividend 
Log 
Stock 
Buyback Log EPS 
Log 
REPS 
Log Total 
Assets 
 
1 
Mean 2.227136 -1.55424 -1.97363 -1.5609 -1.0569 -0.48054 5.296057 
Standard Deviation 0.506032 0.503201 0.867282 0.593211 0.534458 0.641612 0.990803 
Median 2.261405 -1.52288 -2.05836 -1.74757 -1.01773 -0.41379 5.224963 
Skewness -0.04736 -0.25423 0.025089 -0.23577 -0.18261 -0.50639 0.40105 
Kurtosis 3.977769 3.212178 2.878474 2.55557 4.002667 3.736168 3.490855 
 
2 
Mean 2.286596 -1.502 -2.05961 -1.59309 -1.05774 -0.42133 5.350877 
Standard Deviation 0.489554 0.483643 0.8963 0.800097 0.535605 0.603336 0.989378 
Median 2.297618 -1.48149 -2.1578 -1.75933 -1.01323 -0.36841 5.272822 
Skewness 0.007034 -0.07802 0.348239 -0.12336 -0.37518 -0.64162 0.419335 
Kurtosis 4.353937 3.55561 2.54154 3.153174 4.1034 5.491625 3.458073 
 
3 
Mean 2.301707 -1.47606 -1.98577 -1.4049 -1.0323 -0.34909 5.45277 
Standard Deviation 0.501212 0.473853 0.903187 0.672558 0.561682 0.578179 0.958113 
Median 2.312812 -1.44977 -2.05572 -1.50143 -0.98299 -0.31122 5.344701 
Skewness 0.038325 -0.07249 0.117439 0.081772 -0.50061 -0.59938 0.647404 
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Kurtosis 3.944936 3.368395 2.462489 2.44814 4.3704 4.875496 3.516599 
 
4 
Mean 2.267188 -1.46471 -2.09549 -1.59154 -1.04825 -0.27395 5.49762 
Standard Deviation 0.499914 0.468415 0.863206 0.78352 0.557185 0.53809 0.954765 
Median 2.306875 -1.44982 -2.15692 -1.65404 -0.98089 -0.25253 5.37946 
Skewness -0.05423 0.020354 0.33815 -0.46457 -0.44383 -0.74582 0.592489 
Kurtosis 4.087233 3.419026 2.943596 4.085486 4.14618 6.65563 3.573725 
 
5 
Mean 2.161875 -1.46871 -2.19656 -1.65625 -1.08892 -0.28163 5.508404 
Standard Deviation 0.502055 0.467293 0.84824 0.845404 0.528635 0.537043 0.962286 
Median 2.200328 -1.45593 -2.29276 -1.59194 -1.058 -0.24789 5.373414 
Skewness -0.38864 -0.08274 0.442272 -0.19865 -0.13251 -0.3779 0.554149 
Kurtosis 4.600577 4.080835 2.807958 2.446103 3.57232 4.534284 3.588356 
 
6 
Mean 2.250649 -1.42538 -2.31026 -1.7725 -1.05831 -0.26699 5.514921 
Standard Deviation 0.478418 0.571645 0.857108 0.662626 0.535746 0.55918 0.971956 
Median 2.278754 -1.42022 -2.39209 -1.77815 -1.05061 -0.22696 5.395173 
Skewness -0.61208 2.857157 0.546647 -0.31616 -0.16561 -0.2473 0.53082 
Kurtosis 5.853889 30.21534 3.02336 2.555576 4.153401 4.144177 3.618206 
 
7 
Mean 2.309514 -1.4379 -2.25579 -1.923 -1.00231 -0.24386 5.544521 
Standard Deviation 0.479848 0.514755 0.810161 0.709675 0.530798 0.560138 0.970671 
Median 2.346596 -1.42022 -2.2973 -1.92707 -0.97469 -0.20358 5.432398 
Skewness -0.80683 1.120809 0.348804 -0.16162 -0.40086 -0.30349 0.529773 
Kurtosis 6.05482 16.28006 2.798565 2.39552 4.056382 4.735483 3.645602 
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8 
Mean 2.366133 -1.39596 -2.26734 -1.76749 -0.95394 -0.18423 5.583973 
Standard Deviation 0.502693 0.476431 0.833586 0.840102 0.567078 0.543505 0.981375 
Median 2.425948 -1.38722 -2.27965 -1.74986 -0.93181 -0.18558 5.465492 
Skewness -0.68864 -0.1771 0.321712 -0.30976 -0.41767 0.082652 0.500581 
Kurtosis 4.852187 3.228979 2.97187 2.783277 3.899697 3.591253 3.811756 
 
9 
Mean 2.424749 -1.36392 -2.24197 -1.71352 -0.88616 -0.15227 5.626718 
Standard Deviation 0.537142 0.469215 0.774866 0.884841 0.591057 0.635446 0.97319 
Median 2.485828 -1.33724 -2.31503 -1.72491 -0.86487 -0.12539 5.509259 
Skewness -0.82133 -0.14868 0.277125 0.035042 -0.35277 -0.86499 0.515421 
Kurtosis 4.996724 3.313967 2.832811 2.504334 3.705837 6.915997 3.808451 
 
10 
Mean 2.418818 -1.33138 -2.26396 -1.54169 -0.84492 -0.08972 5.68059 
Standard Deviation 0.562656 0.471979 0.766233 0.870981 0.589222 0.604587 0.97157 
Median 2.476578 -1.30103 -2.35732 -1.48846 -0.82102 -0.08138 5.606201 
Skewness -0.86039 -0.27962 0.441727 -0.24492 -0.29458 -0.39499 0.548271 
Kurtosis 4.914485 3.380693 3.082747 2.903878 3.849927 4.958205 3.815858 
 
Total 
Mean 2.301437 -1.44344 -2.17701 -1.7 -1.00097 -0.27507 5.505645 
Standard Deviation 0.512336 0.494868 0.843196 0.81985 0.559241 0.591987 0.978221 
Median 2.32838 -1.42597 -2.25957 -1.72365 -0.97062 -0.23941 5.411208 
Skewness -0.40148 0.456118 0.342701 -0.13648 -0.29145 -0.47875 0.507861 
Kurtosis 4.546561 9.737147 2.825094 2.794729 3.94201 5.012748 3.631894 
Chapter Three: Dividend Effects on Market Value 
119 
 
As shown in Table 3-7, the value of skewness and kurtosis is calculated for all 
variables for the ten year period after the Log Transformation. It is shows that the 
data is closer to a significantly normal distribution. This allows the possibility of 
drawing on the results of the regression model. 
 
3. Homoscedasticity Test 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance of the error terms is 
constant for each observation (Berenson et al., 2009). There are two methods for 
testing hetroscedasticity; Cameron and Trivedi‘s decomposition of IM test and 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Wesberg. The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Wesberg is used to test 
hetroscedasticity in this study as shown in the table no. (3-8) below:  
Table 3- 8 Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Wesberg test 
This table presents the results of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Wesberg test for the sample of 
362 UK companies from 1997 to 2008.  
Test Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Wesberg 2.89 0.0890 
 
The above test indicates that errors have a constant variance. In other words the 
data does not suffer from hetroscedasticity  
 
4. Linearity Test 
The relationship between the dependent and independents variables should be 
linear. To ensure this occurs, the residuals versus the independent variable values 
can be plotted. If linearity exists, there will be no obvious clustering of negative 
residuals or a clustering of positive residuals (Berenson et al., 2009).  
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Using STATA, the linearity plots for residuals and each independent variable are 
displayed in figures (3-1 to 3-6):  
Figure3- 1 Residuals against Log Cash Dividend 
This figure shows the linearity plots for residuals against log cash dividend for the sample 
of 362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure3- 2 Residuals against Log Share Dividend 
This figure shows the linearity plots for residuals against log share dividend for the 
sample of 362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
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Figure3- 3 Residuals against Log Buyback 
This figure shows the linearity plots for residuals against log buyback for the sample of 
362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
 
 
Figure3- 4 Residuals against Log EPS 
This figure shows the linearity plots for residuals against log EPS for the sample of 362 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
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Figure3- 5 Residuals against Log REPS 
This figure shows the linearity plots for residuals against log REPS for the sample of 362 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
 
Figure3- 6 Residuals against Log Total Assets 
This figure show the linearity plots for residuals against log total assets for the sample of 
362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
 
From the above figures it can be concluded that the linear model is appropriate for 
the data of this study.  
 
According to the results of the previous assumptions test, we can conclude that the 
multiple regression analysis can be relied on to interpret the dependent variable. 
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3-5-1-3 Hausman Test 
The Hausman test (1978) helps to determine the use of fixed effect model or 
random effect model by calculating the value of Prob>chi2. The decision rule is if 
Prob>chi2 is lower than the study confidence level of 5%, then the assumptions 
for the random effects estimation are violated and fixed effect should be used, and 
vice versa.  
Table 3- 9 Hausman Test 
This table present the Hausman test result for the sample of 362 UK companies from 
1998 to 2008. 
Test Chi-square Prob>chi2 
Hausman Test 0.0022 20.52 
 
Table 3-9 shows the results of the Hausman test, giving the calculated value of 
Prob>chi2 as 0.0022 (less than 0.05), which means the assumptions for the 
random effects estimation are violated and the fixed effect estimation should be 
used. 
 
3-5-2 The Main Hypothesis Test  
The main null hypothesis states that there is no statistically significant relationship 
between dividend policy and company market value in the UK, while the main 
alternative hypothesis indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between dividend policy and company market value in the U.K, where it has been 
tested by the fixed-effect (within) regression using the STATA program. Table 3-
10 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable at 5% level of significance (95% confidence level).  
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Table 3- 10 The main hypothesis test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 362 UK 
companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the log 
share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.1834 3.00 0.003 
Log Share dividend 0.0187 1.00 0.320 
Log Buy Back 0.0989 4.37 0.000 
Log EPS 0.1159 2.35 0.020 
Log REPS 0.3503 7.47 0.000 
Log Total Assets 0.0362 2.45 0.015 
_cons 2.9414 26.35 0.000 
Adj R-2 73.96% 
F 83.43 
 
From Table 3-10 there is a statistically positive significant relationship between 
cash dividend, share buyback, earnings per share and return earnings per share 
with the market value of the company. However, before the results are explained, 
the model must be tested to determine the reliability of the results. 
 
3-5-2-1 Model Ability  
The ability of the independent variables to explain the dependent variable is tested 
through the value of R2. In this case R2 amounts to 73.96%, which means that the 
independent variables explain 73.96% of the dependent variable . In turn, this 
means that dividend policy and other variables within the model explain 73.96% 
of the market value of the company. To find out whether this result is statistically 
significant or not, the researcher conducted an F test by comparing the value of 
calculated F with its critical value. The decision rule in this case is: if the 
calculated value of F is greater than its critical value, this means that the value of 
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R2 has a statistical significance and that we can use the model result and vice 
versa. 
 
By comparing the critical F value (2.1) with the calculation F Value of 83.43 from 
Table 3-10, it can be concluded that the model results can be applied. This means 
there is a statistically significant relationship between independent variables and 
the dependent variable as a whole. Thus, dividend policy and other independent 
variables explain 73.96% of the change in the market value of the company at a 
confidence level of 95%. 
 
3-5-2-2 Results Explanation 
β1, β2, β3, β4, β 5 are called mutable regression coefficients. Studying the signs 
of regression coefficients, one can determine the relationship direction between 
the independent variables and the dependent variable.  
Table 3- 11 Independent variables coefficients 
This table present the regression coefficients for the independent variables (cash 
dividend, share dividend, stock buy back, EPS and REPS) for the sample of 362 UK 
companies from 1998 to 2008. 
Independent Variables Coefficients 
Cash dividend 0.18341 
Share dividend 0.01870 
Stock buyback 0.08992 
EPS 0.11593 
REPS 0.35032 
 
Table 3-11, which highlights the regression coefficients, reveals that there is a 
direct relationship between all independent variables (the cash dividend, share 
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dividend, share buyback, earnings per share (EPS) and retained earnings per Share 
(REPS)) and the dependent variable (the market value of the company). 
To test if these relationships are statistically significant, the researcher tested the 
regression significance of coefficients individually by using t test. The decision 
rule here is that if the calculated value of t is greater than its critical value, the null 
hypothesis is rejected. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis is accepted, which 
means that there is a statistically significant relationship between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable. This implies that if the t calculated value is 
less than or equal to its critical value, then the null hypothesis is accepted which 
means there is no statistically significant relationship, and therefore the alternative 
hypothesis is rejected. 
Table 3- 12  Independent variables T test 
This display the t test results for the independent variables (cash dividend, share dividend, 
stock buy back, EPS and REPS for the sample of 362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
Independent Variable Calculated t Critical t 
Cash dividend 3.00 (-1.96 and +1.96) 
Share dividend 1.00 (-1.96 and +1.96) 
Stock buyback 4.37 (-1.96 and +1.96) 
EPS 2.35 (-1.96 and +1.96) 
REPS 7.47 (-1.96 and +1.96) 
 
From Table 3-12 the following points can be explained: 
1- Regarding cash dividend, the null hypotheses can be refuted while the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted because the t calculated value is greater 
than its critical value. This means that there is a statistically significant 
relationship between cash dividend and market value of the UK companies 
at a 95% confidence level, taking into consideration the other independent 
variables.  
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2- Regarding share dividend, the null hypotheses can be accepted while the 
alternative hypothesis is rejected because the calculated value of t is less 
than t critical value. This means that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between share dividend and market value in the UK at 95% 
confidence level, taking into consideration the other independent variables.  
3- Regarding stock buyback, the null hypotheses can be refuted while 
accepting the alternative hypotheses because the calculated t value is more 
than its critical value. This means that there is statistically significant 
relationship between stock buyback and market value in the UK at 95% 
confidence level, taking into consideration the other independent variables. 
4- Regarding earnings per share (EPS), the null hypotheses can be refuted 
while accepting the alternative hypotheses because the calculated value of 
t is more than its critical value. This means that there is statistically 
significant relationship between EPS and market value in the UK at 95% 
taking into consideration the other independent variables. 
5- Regarding retained earnings per share (REPS), the null hypotheses can be 
refuted while accepting the alternative hypotheses because the calculated 
value of t is more than its critical value. This means that there is 
statistically significant relationship between REPS and market value in the 
UK at 95% confidence level, taking into consideration the other 
independent variables. 
 
The same results can be achieved by comparing P-value with the significance 
level. The decision rule is that if the P-value is greater than or equal to the 
required level of significance in the study, then the null hypotheses can be 
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accepted, but if the value of the P-value is less than the significance level required 
for the study, then the null hypothesis is rejected. This means that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable. 
 
Table 3- 13 Independent variables P test 
This table present the P test results for the independent variables (cash dividend, share 
dividend, stock buy back, EPS and REPS) for the sample of 362 UK companies from 
1998 to 2008. 
Independent Variables P-value Level of Significance 
Cash Dividend 0.003 0.050 
Share Dividend 0.320 0.050 
Stock Buyback 0.000 0.050 
EPS 0.020 0.050 
REPS 0.000 0.050 
 
From Table 3-13 it is apparent that the P-value for cash dividend, stock buyback, 
EPS and REPS is less than the significance level. This means that there is a 
statistically significant relationship between these variables and market value of 
the company in the UK, at the 5% level of significance, (95% confidence level). 
The P-value of share dividend is greater than the level of significance, which 
means there is no statistically significant relationship between this variable and 
the market value of the company in the UK. These results are the same as those 
reached by t testing. 
 
To recognize the importance of each independent variable and how it influences 
the dependent variable, that is the contribution of cash dividend, share dividend, 
stock buybacks, EPS and REPS to the change in the market value of the company 
in the UK, the researcher assessed the Confidence Interval Estimation for each of 
the independent variables shown in table 3-14 below:  
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Table 3- 14 Independent variables confidence level 
This table shows the results for the confidence interval for each independent variables 
cash dividend, share dividend, stock buy back, EPS and REPS) for the sample of 362 UK 
companies from 1998 to 2008. 
Independent Variable  
Confidence Interval 
Lower 95% Upper 95% 
Cash Dividend 0.0629030 0.3039170 
Share Dividend -0.0182866 0.0556875 
Stock Buyback 0.0494128 0.1304342 
EPS 0.0187374 0.2131405 
REPS 0.2579656 0.4426877 
 
The independent variables confidence level indicates that the increase of one unit 
in the dependent variable leads to an increase in the market value of companies at 
a value ranging between the minimum and maximum of the period of confidence 
at a confidence level of 95%.  
 
From table 3-13 above, it can be observed that REPS affects the market value 
more than the other variables. This is followed by the cash dividend. This, in turn, 
is followed by stock buyback and then EPS.  
 
3-5-3 Sub-hypothesis Testing 
The main hypotheses branches into 14 sub-hypotheses for each economic sector. 
These were tested by the fixed-effect (within) regression using STATA at the 
level of significance 5% (95% confidence level) for all economic sectors. 
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1- Banking Sector 
Table 3-15 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the banking sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 15 Banks Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 4 UK banking 
companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the log 
share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend -0.1432 -1.27 0.213 
Log Share dividend -0.0222 -0.68 0.502 
Log Buy Back 1.2914 0.67 0.505 
Log EPS 0.2413 2.90 0.007 
Log REPS 0.4935 4.98 0.000 
Log Total Assets -0.2590 -3.28 0.003 
_cons 4.8600 7.44 0.000 
Adj R-2 71.06% 
F 18.03 
 
The results indicate that in the banking sector there is no statistically significant 
relationship between any type of dividend policy and market value, but there is a 
positive statistically significant relationship between both EPS and REPS and the 
market value of a company. 
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2- Basic Materials 
Table 3-16 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the basic materials sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level). 
Table 3- 16 Basic Materials Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 17 basic 
materials UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent 
variable is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend -0.6871 -3.52 0.012 
Log Share dividend 0.0525 1.68 0.144 
Log Buy Back -0.1367 -3.69 0.010 
Log EPS 0.2033 0.70 0.510 
Log REPS 1.8126 4.77 0.003 
Log Total Assets 0.0214 0.94 0.385 
_cons 1.7415 4.84 0.003 
Adj R-2 90.09% 
F 137.30 
 
According to the results of the basic materials sector, there is a negative 
statistically significant relationship between cash dividend and stock buy back and 
the market value of companies. In addition, there is a positive statistically 
significant relationship between REPS and the market value of companies. 
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3- Consumer Goods 
Table 3-17 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the consumer goods sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 17 Consumer goods Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 42 consumer 
goods UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable 
is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend -0.4554 -1.30 0.223 
Log Share dividend 0.0701 1.86 0.092 
Log Buy Back 0.0565 0.70 0.499 
Log EPS 0.0718 0.46 0.657 
Log REPS 1.0250 4.21 0.002 
Log Total Assets -0.0489 -0.68 0.514 
_cons 2.4440 4.00 0.003 
Adj R-2 75.38% 
F 13.41 
 
According to the results, in the consumer goods sector a statistically positive 
significant relationship between REPS and market value was found. 
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4- Consumer Services 
Table 3-18 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the consumer services sector at 5% level of significance 
(95% confidence level).  
Table 3- 188 Consumer services Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 67 consumer 
services UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable 
is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.1837 1.38 0.176 
Log Share dividend 0.0105 0.31 0.756 
Log Buy Back -0.0003 -0.01 0.994 
Log EPS 0.2371 2.14 0.037 
Log REPS 0.2137 2.48 0.017 
Log Total Assets 0.0750 2.62 0.012 
_cons 2.5949 12.06 0.000 
Adj R-2 62.71% 
F 23.88 
 
According to the results there was no statistically significant relationship between 
any type of dividend policy and the market value in the consumer services sector. 
However, the researcher found a statistically positive significant relationship 
between EPS and REPS and the market value of companies. 
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5- Health Care 
Table 3-19 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the health care sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level). 
Table 3- 19 Health care Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 11 health care 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the 
log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.6012 1.53 0.169 
Log Share dividend -0.0331 -0.17 0.870 
Log Buy Back -0.1210 -0.99 0.357 
Log EPS -0.1173 -0.37 0.724 
Log REPS 0.4985 4.05 0.005 
Log Total Assets -0.2741 -1.65 0.143 
_cons 4.550 3.77 0.007 
Adj R-2 85.53% 
F 29.04 
 
According to results, in the health care sector no statistically significant 
relationship between all types of dividend policy and earnings per share (EPS) 
with the market value was found. However, there is a positive statistically 
significant relationship between REPS and the market value of companies.   
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6- Industrials 
Table 3-20 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the industrials sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 20 Industrials sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 116 industrial 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the 
log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.2596 4 0.000 
Log Share dividend -0.0049 -0.14 0.888 
Log Buy Back 4.0514 1.06 0.294 
Log EPS 0.0628 1.14 0.261 
Log REPS 0.28715 2.46 0.018 
Log Total Assets 0.1378 2.90 0.006 
_cons 2.3323 7.47 0.000 
Adj R-2 57.65% 
F 23.48 
 
According to the results of the industrials sector, a statistically positive significant 
relationship between cash dividend and the market value of the company was 
found. In addition, there is a statistically positive significant relationship between 
REPS and market value. 
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7- Insurance 
Table 3-21 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the insurance sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 21 Insurance Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 11 insurance UK 
companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the log 
share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.1543 1.26 0.213 
Log Share dividend -0.0059 -0.16 0.874 
Log Buy Back 0.1481 2.84 0.006 
Log EPS 0.0918 0.70 0.487 
Log REPS 0.3982 4.64 0.000 
Log Total Assets 0.6769 1.20 0.234 
_cons 2.8077 7.29 0.000 
Adj R-2 80.22% 
F 43.72 
 
According to the results, in the insurance sector there is a statistically positive 
significant relationship between stock buyback and market value, as well as 
between REPS and market value. 
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8- Oil and Gas 
Table 3-22 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the oil and gas sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 22 Oil and gas Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 13 oil and gas 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the 
log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.1705 0.40 0.702 
Log Share dividend 0.1128 1.00 0.352 
Log Buy Back 0.0943 0.87 0.415 
Log EPS -0.0320 -0.25 0.813 
Log REPS 0.8273 1.77 0.120 
Log Total Assets -0.0412 -0.38 0.714 
_cons 3.6790 6.08 0.001 
Adj R-2 70.05% 
F 8.78 
 
According to the results no statistically significant relationship between any type 
of dividend policy, EPS and REPS and the market value of companies in the oil 
and gas sector was found. 
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9- Technology 
Table 3-23 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the technology sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 23 Technology Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 27 technology 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the 
log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.3770 2.59 0.020 
Log Share dividend -0.0436 -0.83 0.421 
Log Buy Back 3.6784 3.34 0.004 
Log EPS 0.0536 0.52 0.609 
Log REPS 0.0888 0.51 0.616 
Log Total Assets 0.1301 2.74 0.015 
_cons 2.1931 4.67 0.000 
Adj R-2 81.48% 
F 22.66 
 
According to the resolute of the technology sector, there is a statistically positive 
significant relationship between the cash dividend and stock buyback and the 
market value of the company. 
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10- Telecommunications 
Table 3-24 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the telecommunications sector at 5% level of significance 
(95% confidence level).  
Table 3- 24 Telecommunications Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 3 
telecommunications UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of 
dependent variable is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.2455 0.98 0.374 
Log Share dividend -0.07267 -0.96 0.382 
Log Buy Back 0.0175 0.37 0.726 
Log EPS -0.0760 -0.35 0.742 
Log REPS -0.0711 -0.33 0.755 
Log Total Assets 0.3432 5.39 0.003 
_cons 0.6919 1.18 0.290 
Adj R-2 63.36% 
F 23.18 
 
According to the results, no statistically significant relationship between any type 
of dividend policy, EPS and REPS and the market value of companies in 
telecommunications sector was found. 
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11- Utilities 
Table 3-25 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the utilities sector at 5% level of significance (95% 
confidence level).  
Table 3- 25 Utilities Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 5 utilities UK 
companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable is the log 
share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.4001 4.39 0.000 
Log Share dividend 0.0269 1.21 0.230 
Log Buy Back 0.1411 0.86 0.396 
Log EPS -0.0706 -1.55 0.128 
Log REPS 0.0193 0.39 0.696 
Log Total Assets 0.4346 9.51 0.000 
_cons 0.5197 1.63 0.108 
Adj R-2 70.99% 
F 37.67 
 
According to the results, there is a statistically positive significant relationship 
between the cash dividend and the market value of company in utilities sector. 
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12- Real Estate Investment and Service 
Table 3-26 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the real estate investment and service sector at 5% level of 
significance (95% confidence level).  
Table 3- 26 Real estate investment and service Sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 13 real estate 
investment and service UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of 
dependent variable is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.2746 2.67 0.009 
Log Share dividend 0.0051 0.11 0.912 
Log Buy Back -14.9151 -1.61 0.111 
Log EPS 0.3509 3.57 0.001 
Log REPS 0.1383 1.27 0.209 
Log Total Assets 0.1110 2.29 0.025 
_cons 2.8129 7.58 0.000 
Adj R-2 52.32% 
F 16.14 
 
 
According to the results, in the real estate investment and service sector, there is a 
statistically positive significant relationship between the cash dividend and EPS 
and the market value of the company. 
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13- Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Table 3-27 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the real estate investment trusts sector at 5% level of 
significance (95% confidence level).  
Table 3- 27 Real estate investment trusts sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 11 real estate 
investment trust UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent 
variable is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.0201 0.18 0.859 
Log Share dividend -0.2303 -1.81 0.095 
Log Buy Back -7.165 -4.65 0.001 
Log EPS 0.0555 0.96 0.358 
Log REPS 0.2396 3.44 0.005 
Log Total Assets -0.0642 -0.61 0.555 
_cons 3.311 4.34 0.001 
Adj R-2 46.02% 
F 43.10 
 
According to the results, in the sector of real estate investment trusts there is a 
statistically negative significant relationship between stock buyback and the 
market value of the company but there is a positive significant relationship 
between REPS and the market value of the company. 
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14- Financial Services 
Table 3-28 displays the results of the analysis of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable in the financial services sector at 5% level of significance 
(95% confidence level).  
Table 3- 28 Financial services sector Test 
This table presents the fixed effect (within) regression results between the independent 
variables (log cash dividend, log share divided, log buy back, log EPS, log REPS and log 
total assets) and the dependent variable log share price for the sample of 22 financial 
services UK companies from 1998 to 2008.The operation definition of dependent variable 
is the log share price on dividend announcement date. 
Dependent variable Log Share Price 
Coefficient t P>t 
Independent Variables 
Log Cash Dividend 0.2341 3.32 0.002 
Log Share dividend 0.0240 1.21 0.235 
Log Buy Back 66.1765 1.90 0.067 
Log EPS 0.1579 2.49 0.018 
Log REPS 0.0241 0.41 0.687 
Log Total Assets 0.1296 2.15 0.040 
_cons 2.0806 4.91 0.000 
Adj R-2 63.42% 
F 24.13 
 
According to the results, there is a positive statistically significant relationship 
between cash dividend and EPS and the market value of the company in the sector 
of financial services sector. 
 
Accordingly, the regression results and equations for the various economic sectors 
are assessed below. 
 
3-5-3-1 Economic Sectors Models Ability  
The ability of the independent variables to explain the dependent variable in the 
models of the various economic sectors is tested through the value of R
2
 and F test 
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by comparing the calculated F with its critical value in order to find out if the 
result R
2
 is statistically significant or not. The decision rule is that if the value of 
the calculated F is greater than its critical value there is a statistically significant 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable, and 
that the R
2
 result is statistically significant, and vice versa, as show in table no. 3-
29 below: 
Table 3- 29 Sectors F test 
This table presents the results of the F test for each of the economic sectors for the sample 
of 362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
 
Sector R
2
 
Calculated 
F 
Critical 
F Note 
1 Banks 71.06% 18.03 2.42 R
2
 is significant statistically 
2 Basic Materials 90.09% 137.30 4.28 R
2
 is significant statistically 
3 Consumer Goods 75.38% 13.41 3.22 R
2
 is significant statistically 
4 Consumer Services    62.71% 23.88 2.31 R
2
 is significant statistically 
5 Health Care   85.53% 29.04 3.87 R
2
 is significant statistically 
6 Industrials 57.65% 23.48 2.34 R
2
 is significant statistically 
7 Insurance 80.22% 43.72 2.35 R
2
 is significant statistically 
8 Oil & Gas   70.05% 8.78 3.87 R
2
 is significant statistically 
9 Technology 81.48% 22.66 2.74 R
2
 is significant statistically 
10 Telecommunications  63.36% 23.18 4.95 R
2
 is significant statistically 
11 Utilities 70.99% 37.67 2.27 R
2
 is significant statistically 
12 
Real Estate 
Investment & 
Service 52.32 16.14 2.23 R
2
 is significant statistically 
13 
Real Estate 
Investment Trusts   46.02 43.10 3.00 R
2
 is significant statistically 
14 Financial Services 63.42% 24.13 2.42 R
2
 is significant statistically 
 
According to the results, the calculated F for all sectors is greater than the critical 
value. This means that the independent variables and dependent variable are 
statistically significant for each economic sector. Thus, the dividend policy and 
other independent variables are explained by the value of R2 for each sector of 
change in value market of the company at a confidence level of 95%. 
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3-5-3-2 Economic Sectors Results Explanation 
The researcher calculated the regression coefficients for the models of each 
economic sector. By studying their signals, the direction of the relationship 
between independent variables and the dependent variable in each sector can be 
determined. In addition, the values of these coefficients can be tested for statistical 
significance by regression coefficients t test for each sector independently. The 
decision rule here is that if the calculated value of t is greater than its critical value 
(less in the case of a negative reference), then the null hypothesis is rejected, 
while accepting the alternative hypothesis, which means that there is a statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. This presupposes that if the calculated value of t is less than or equal to 
its critical value (greater than or equal to the reference in the case of a negative 
signal), then the null hypotheses is accepted; that is there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the independent variable and the dependent 
variable. The alternative hypothesis is rejected.  
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Table 3- 30 Sectors t test 
This table presents the t test results for the independent variables (cash dividend, share 
dividend, stock buy back, EPS and REPS) in each economic sector for the sample of 362 
UK companies from 1998 to 2008. 
Independent 
Variables 
Banks 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend -0.143 -1.27  -2.0423 and +2.0423 Not significant relationship 
Share Dividend -0.022 -0.68 -2.0423 and +2.0423 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 1.291 0.67 -2.0423 and +2.0423 Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.241 2.90 -2.0423 and +2.0423 Positive Significant relationship 
REPS 0.493 4.98 -2.0423 and +2.0423 Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Basic Materials 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend -0.687 -3.52  -2.4469 and +2.4469 Negative  Significant relationship 
Share Dividend 0.052 1.68 -2.4469 and +2.4469 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback -0.136 -3.69 -2.4469 and +2.4469 Negative  Significant relationship 
EPS 0.203 0.70 -2.4469 and +2.4469 Not significant relationship 
REPS 1.812 4.77 -2.4469 and +2.4469 Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Consumer Goods 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend -0.455 -1.30  -2.2281 and +2.2281 Not significant relationship 
Share Dividend 0.070 1.86 -2.2281 and +2.2281 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 0.056 0.70 -2.2281 and +2.2281 Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.718 0.46 -2.2281 and +2.2281 Not significant relationship 
REPS 1.025 4.21 -2.2281 and +2.2281 Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Consumer Services 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.183 1.38  -2.0117 and +2.0117 Not significant relationship 
Share Dividend 0.010 0.31 -2.0117 and +2.0117 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback -0.0003 -0.01 -2.0117 and +2.0117 Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.237 2.14 -2.0117 and +2.0117 Positive Significant relationship 
REPS 0.213 2.48 -2.0117 and +2.0117 Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Health Care 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.601 1.53  -2.3646 and +2.3646 Not significant relationship 
Share Dividend -0.033 -0.17 -2.3646 and +2.3646 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback -0.121 -0.99 -2.3646 and +2.3646 Not significant relationship 
EPS -0.117 -0.37 -2.3646 and +2.3646 Not significant relationship 
REPS 0.498 4.05 -2.3646 and +2.3646 Positive Significant relationship 
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Independent 
Variables 
Industrials 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.259 4.00 -2.0181 and +2.0181 Positive Significant relationship  
Share Dividend -0.004 -0.14 -2.0181 and +2.0181 Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 4.051 1.06 -2.0181 and +2.0181 Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.062 1.14 -2.0181 and +2.0181 Not significant relationship 
REPS 0.287 2.46 -2.0181 and +2.0181 Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Insurance 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.154 1.26 -1.9925 and +1.9925  Not significant relationship  
Share Dividend -0.005 -0.16 -1.9925 and +1.9925  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 0.148 2.84 -1.9925 and +1.9925  Positive Significant relationship  
EPS 0.091 0.70 -1.9925 and +1.9925  Not significant relationship 
REPS 0.398 4.64 -1.9925 and +1.9925  Positive Significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Oil & Gas 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.170 0.40 -2.3646 and +2.3646  Not significant relationship  
Share Dividend 0.112 1.00 -2.3646 and +2.3646  Not significant relationship  
Stock Buyback 0.094 0.87 -2.3646 and +2.3646  Not significant relationship  
EPS -0.032 -0.25 -2.3646 and +2.3646   Not significant relationship 
REPS 0.827 1.77 -2.3646 and +2.3646  Not significant relationship  
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Technology 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.377 2.59 -2.1199 and +2.1199  Positive Significant relationship 
Share Dividend -0.043 -0.83 -2.1199 and +2.1199  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 3.678 3.34 -2.1199 and +2.1199  Positive Significant relationship  
EPS 0.053 0.52 -2.1199 and +2.1199  Not significant relationship  
REPS 0.088 0.51 -2.1199 and +2.1199  Not significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Telecommunications 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.245 0.98 -2.5706 and +2.5706  Not significant relationship 
Share Dividend -0.072 -0.96 -2.5706 and +2.5706  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 0.017 0.37 -2.5706 and +2.5706  Not significant relationship  
EPS -0.076 -0.35 -2.5706 and +2.5706  Not significant relationship 
REPS -0.071 -0.33 -2.5706 and +2.5706  Not significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Utilities 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.400 4.39 -2.0040 and +2.0040  Positive Significant relationship 
Share Dividend 0.026 1.21 -2.0040 and +2.0040  Not significant relationship 
Chapter Three: Dividend Effects on Market Value 
148 
 
Stock Buyback 0.141 0.86 -2.0040 and +2.0040  Not significant relationship 
EPS -0.070 -1.55 -2.0040 and +2.0040  Not significant relationship  
REPS 0.019 0.39 -2.0040 and +2.0040  Not significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Real Estate Investment & Service 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.274 2.67 -1.9913 and +1.9913  Positive Significant relationship  
Share Dividend 0.005 0.11 -1.9913 and +1.9913  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback -14.915 -1.61 -1.9913 and +1.9913  Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.350 3.57 -1.9913 and +1.9913  Positive Significant relationship  
REPS 0.138 1.27 -1.9913 and +1.9913  Not significant relationship 
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.020 0.18 -2.1788 and +2.1788  Not significant relationship  
Share Dividend -0.230 -1.81 -2.1788 and +2.1788  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback -7.165 -4.65 -2.1788 and +2.1788  Negative Significant relationship  
EPS 0.055 0.96 -2.1788 and +2.1788  Not significant relationship  
REPS 0.239 3.44 -2.1788 and +2.1788  Positive Significant relationship  
  
   
  
Independent 
Variables 
Financial Services 
Coefficients Calculated t Critical t Note 
Cash Dividend 0.234 3.32 -2.0423 and +2.0423  Positive Significant relationship  
Share Dividend 0.024 1.21 -2.0423 and +2.0423  Not significant relationship 
Stock Buyback 66.176 1.90 -2.0423 and +2.0423  Not significant relationship 
EPS 0.157 2.49 -2.0423 and +2.0423  Positive Significant relationship  
REPS 0.024 0.41 -2.0423 and +2.0423  Not significant relationship  
 
From Table 3-30, the following points can be derived. 
1- In the banking sector, there is no statistically significant relationship 
between any type of dividend policy and market value, but there is a 
positive statistically significant relationship between EPS and REPS and 
the market value of companies.   
2- In the basic materials sector, there is a negative statistically significant 
relationship between cash dividend and stock buyback and the market 
value of companies. In addition, there is a positive statistically significant 
relationship between REPS and the market value of companies. 
Chapter Three: Dividend Effects on Market Value 
149 
 
3- In the consumer goods sector, a positive statistically significant 
relationship between REPS and market value was found. 
4- No statistically significant relationship between any type of dividend 
policy and market value was found in the consumer services sector; 
instead, the researcher found a statistically positive significant relationship 
between EPS and REPS and the market value of companies. 
5- In the health care sector, no statistically significant relationship between 
any type of dividend policy and EPS and the market value but there is a 
positive statistically significant relationship between REPS and the market 
value of companies.   
6- In the industrials sector, a positive statistically significant relationship 
between cash dividend and the market value of the company was found. In 
addition, there is a positive statistically significant relationship between 
REPS and market value. 
7- In the insurance sector, there is a positive statistically significant 
relationship between stock buyback and market value, as well as between 
REPS and market value. 
8- No statistically significant relationship between any type of dividend 
policy, EPS and REPS and the market value of companies in the oil and 
gas sector were found. 
9- In the technology sector, there is a positive statistically significant 
relationship between the cash dividend and stock buyback and the market 
value of the company. 
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10- No statistically significant relationship between any type of dividend 
policy, EPS and REPS and the market value of companies in the 
telecommunications sector was found. 
11- There is a positive statistically significant relationship between the cash 
dividend and the market value of the company in the utilities sector. 
12- In the real estate investment and service sector, there is a positive 
statistically significant relationship between the cash dividend and EPS 
and the market value of the company. 
13- In the real estate investment trusts sector, there is a negative statistically 
significant relationship between stock buyback and the market value of the 
company but there is a positive statistically significant relationship 
between REPS and the market value of the company. 
14- There is a positive statistically significant relationship between cash 
dividend and EPS and the market value of the company in the financial 
services sector. 
 
In order to recognize the importance of each independent variable and how it 
influences the dependent variable in each economic sector, that is the extent of its 
contribution to change the market value of the company; the researcher assessed 
the Confidence Interval Estimation for each of the regression coefficients of the 
independent variables. The results, which are displayed in Table 3-31, indicate 
that an increase of one unit of the dependent variable would lead to an increase in 
the market value of companies at a value ranging between the minimum and the 
maximum of the confidence interval at a confidence level of 95%. 
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Table 3- 31 Sectors confidence interval test 
Table 3-31 shows the confidence interval results for the independent variables (cash 
dividend, share dividend, stock buy back, EPS and REPS) that have a significant 
relationship with dependent variable (market value) by economic sector for the sample of 
362 UK companies from 1998 to 2008.. 
 
Sector 
Independent 
Variables 
Confidence Interval 
Lower 95% Upper 95% 
1 Banks EPS 0.071423 0.4112042 
    REPS 0.291359 0.6958396 
 2 Basic Materials Cash Dividend -1.16463 -0.2097514 
    Stock Buyback -0.227337 -0.0461719 
    REPS 0.882409 2.742832 
 3 Consumer Goods REPS 0.482356 1.569197 
 4 Consumer Services EPS 0.0146545 0.4597241 
    REPS 0.0400519 0.3875204 
 5 Health Care REPS 0.2073576 0.7897481 
 6 Industrials  Cash Dividend 0.1286372 0.3907589 
    REPS 0.051142 0.5231731 
 7 Insurance Stock Buyback 0.0443241 0.2519041 
    REPS 0.2273798 0.5691362 
 8 Technology Cash Dividend 0.0687944 0.6852423 
    Stock Buyback 1.346882 6.01006 
 9 Utilities Cash Dividend 0.2176306 0.5826402 
 10 Real Estate Investment &  Cash Dividend 0.069501 0.4798496 
   Service EPS 0.1554514 0.5464458 
     11 Real Estate Investment trust Stock Buyback -10.52302 -3.807113 
  
REPS 0.0878968 0.3913382 
 12 Financial Services Cash Dividend 0.090152 0.3781509 
  
EPS 0.0286372 0.2872302 
 
3-6  Results discussions 
By reviewing the findings contained in the previous section, the following 
conclusions can be reached: 
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1- In relation to Irrelevant Theory, the results of the study do not support the 
theory, in general. This is in contrast with the findings of studies such as: 
Miller and Modigliani (1961), Watts (1973), Black and Scholes (1974), 
and Miller and Scholes (1978, 1982). This discrepancy results from the 
fact that Irrelevant Theory is based on the assumption of an efficient 
market, which relies on unrealistic assumptions, including: information 
symmetry between management and investors; the absence of taxes; the 
absence of transaction costs; and that investors are correctly advised when 
making their investment decisions. Despite the effort made by most of the 
financial markets to achieve a state of maximum efficiency through the 
rules and regulations that attempt to eliminate information asymmetry, 
taxes and transaction costs, and ensure the correct advice is given to 
investors, achieving maximum efficiency of any financial market is 
unlikely. This undermines Irrelevant Theory. 
2- The results indicate that share dividends have no effect on market value. 
This result is consistent with the concept that share dividends are a transfer 
fund process between equity accounts and therefore there is no effect on 
market value because of the lack of an outside cash flow (Levy and Sarnat, 
1994).  
3- The impact of dividend policy, earnings (earnings per share), and 
investment policy (retained earnings per share) on the market value of a 
company leads to the conclusion that dividend policy and investment 
policy are inseparable. This is consistent with many studies including 
Gordon (1962, 1963), Asquith and Mullins Jr (1983) and Kane et al. 
(1984). Furthermore, each variable complementary the others with regard 
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to the influence on the market value of the company, especially given that 
both dividends and earnings announcements are simultaneous in the UK. 
4- The findings of the study across the economic sectors. The researcher 
would like to focus on the results of the banking sector, as these show no 
relationship between dividend policy and market value but there is a 
relationship between earnings and retained earnings (investment policy) 
and market value. This finding corresponds with the stipulations of 
Irrelevant Theory. Interestingly, the results of the next chapter highlight 
that the banking sector follows a residual dividend policy which support 
the results of this chapter. Companies that adopt a residual dividend policy 
essentially place greater importance on investment policy than on dividend 
policy, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
3-7 Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the effect of dividend policy on the market value of a 
company in the UK. The effect on the market in general and across every 
economic sector, was measured by using the fixed-effect (within) regression for 
panel data for ten years from 1998 to 2007 in order to assess the differences in 
impact across the different sectors of the companies. This was achieved by using 
annual and semi-annual data from DataStream, from the companies‘ websites and 
through direct contact with these companies.  
 
The study found that there is a statistically significant relationship between each 
of cash dividend, share buyback, EPS and REPS and the market value of the 
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company. However, the relationship varies according to the economic sector in 
which the company operates. 
 
This study discusses Irrelevant Theory first proposed by Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), which refers to the absence of a relationship between dividend policy and 
market value. In this context, the researcher believes that the reason why the 
results of the study do not match the theory is mainly due to two important points: 
first, the assumptions adopted by the theory regarding the efficient market are 
almost impossible to achieve in practice. Second, it cannot be certain that the UK 
market is 100% efficient; also, the differences in the nature of corporate activity 
means the companies have different working conditions which are not related to 
the presence of efficient financial markets, exercising their impact at the same 
time on the dividend policy which will lead to influence the market value of the 
company. 
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4-1 Introduction 
There are many studies in the financial literature regarding dividend policy and its 
impact on market value, as discussed in chapter three. Some researchers (Gordon, 
1959, Litzenberger and Ramaswamy, 1979, Blume, 1980, Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy, 1982, Ang and Peterson, 1985, Dyl and Weigand, 1998, Koch and 
Shenoy, 1999) argue for  such a relationship, while others deny its existence 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1961, Black and Scholes, 1974, Merton and Rock, 1985, 
Peter, 1996). . Those that argue deny the relationship argue that investment policy 
and investment decisions affect the market value of the company. 
 
With the emergence of a new variable -the investment policy- and the belief of 
researchers‘ that a company‘s market value does determine the investment policy  
based on the premise that current and future earnings result from a company‘s 
investment policy. Thus, a company‘s value depends mainly on its  ability to 
achieve continued earnings, even if it does not  distribute dividends either in the 
present or in the future and the dividend policy is only a tool for distribution 
earnings that are achieved through the company‘s investment policy to 
shareholders (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, Horne and McDonald, 1971, Fama, 
1974, Titman, 1984, Cornell and Shapiro, 1987, Holder et al., 1998). These 
researchers added that such a policy is of importance because it represents one 
type of signal sent by the management to shareholders about the company‘s 
ability to continuously achieve future earnings under the non-symmetry of 
information available to management and shareholders, known as ‗signal 
hypothesis‘. 
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Because of this view of the relationship between investment and dividends, 
investment decisions have acquired greater importance as they are responsible for 
the company‘s future earnings. The dividend decision is arguably complementary 
to the investment decision; therefore, funds available should be directed primarily 
towards investment, while the surplus funds (after the exhaustion of all investment 
opportunities) should be directed to dividends. This is known as the "Residual 
Dividends Policy‖ (Baker, 2009) . 
 
The residual dividend policy concept means that the company tends to direct all 
available funds to investment opportunities. If there are surplus funds after 
exhausting all opportunities for investment, then the company will consider 
paying dividends, but if there are no surplus funds then there no dividend will be 
distributed (Baker, 2009). 
 
A number of questions come to the fore in this respect: Is there a "pure" residual 
dividend policy? (Baker and Smith, 2006) What happens if there are no funds on 
hand after exhausting investment opportunities over a long period? Will a 
company stop distributing dividends? Will the management seek to issue new 
equities if it is found that the cash available is not sufficient for investment 
opportunities? To what extent? What impact will this then have on the finance 
decision? 
 
Following a pure residual dividend policy, would create a problematic situation 
for the company. If the company were following such a policy the when it 
announced the payment of a dividend, this would lead shareholders to believe that 
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the management had exhausted all investment opportunities available. In turn, this 
would lead shareholders to question the future earnings capacity of the company, 
especially given the current asymmetry of information between management and 
shareholders. 
 
There is a second disadvantage resulting from the pure residual dividend policy 
without the guarantee of the payment of cash dividends. That is, shareholders fear 
that the management would enter into non-profitable projects, in order to exhaust 
all available funds, which increases the agency costs (Jensen, 1986). 
 
For these reasons, the adoption of a residual dividend policy does not necessarily 
mean that cash dividends are not distributed (Baker and Smith, 2006). Therefore, 
the management of a company always sets a target for the dividends ratio, based 
on the proviso that any shortage in funds is covered by external financing; a target 
is also set for the leverage ratio. 
 
This chapter focuses on exploring whether or not UK companies followed a 
residual dividend policy in the period 1998 to 2007 by using Baker and Smith 
(2006) methodology by calculating the Standardized Free Cash Flow (SFCF) as 
per the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) definition, as the mean and standard deviation 
for standardized free cash flow for the companies that follow a residual dividends 
policy close to zero. 
 
Our sample was the active equity companies in UK pound which have been 
available for ten years from 1998 till 2007 from the DataStream. The total number 
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of available sample companies amounted to 590 out of 691 companies (85.38%) 
divided into 14 sectors. 
 
The standardized free cash flow (SFCF) was calculated by using excel sheets for 
each of the companies and sectors in the sample. Thereafter, the means and 
standard deviation for the market in general and for each individual sector were 
calculated. This was followed by running the one-sample t test by using SPSS. 
We find that UK companies in general did not follow a residual dividend policy, 
with the exception of the banking and insurance sectors.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4-2 is a review of literature review, 
followed by section 4-3 looks at the methodology and variables; the details of the 
statistical sample are included in section 4-4. The results and discussion of these 
results would be in section 4-5 and 4-6, while the last section will be devoted to 
conclusions together with a summary section (4-7). 
 
4-2 Prior studies  
The development of management and finance sciences and intellectual schools of 
thought led to a mismatch in visions about adopting some financial decisions and 
policies. Today, researchers cannot seem to agree unequivocally on a particular 
topic, or more accurately the impact of those financial decisions and policies on 
the market value of the company, despite some researchers have suggested that 
dividend policy has affected the market value (as was discussed in the previous 
chapter). However, others deny this effect and confirm that dividend policy has no 
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effect on the market value; the real impact, according to them, is attributed to the 
investment policy. 
 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) in their seminal study confirm that the dividend 
policy has no effect on the market value under the conditions and assumptions of 
the efficient market in terms of providing information to all shareholders at the 
same time, no taxes and no transaction costs. This is termed Irrelevance Theory 
which means the lack of relationship between dividend policy and market value. 
The study reports the real influence on market value comes instead from the 
investment policy which generates the company‘s earnings. 
 
Fama (1974) tested for the presence of a relationship between the dividends 
decision and the investment decision. The study finds that the investment decision 
taken, from time to time, by the efficient market is separate from the dividend 
decision and the two decisions are independent. Thus, the results are consistent 
with the Miller and Modigliani study. 
 
Other researchers (see: Kalay and Loewenstein, 1986; Impson, 1997; Doron and 
Ziv, 2001) argue that the dividend decision assumes a special importance because  
it is used by the management to send information to shareholders about their 
company status and the future expected earnings, regardless of investment 
decision. This is termed signal theory (referred to in the second chapter). These 
researchers also highlight that dividend policy and investment decisions are 
separate elements. 
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Partington (1985) points to three types of dividend policy: first, the residual 
dividend policy meaning that cash dividends should be resorted to only after 
exhausting all the investment opportunities available to the company. In other 
words, priority must be given to the investment decision in allocating available 
funds. The second is the independence of the dividend policy, regardless of the 
investment and finance policies. The third type follows neither the residuals nor 
the independent dividend policy.  
 
Partington finds that the dividend decision and the investment decision are not 
related, as companies finance their investments and projects from the surplus of 
cash distributions and cover any shortage of funds from loans or the issuance of 
new shares. In other words, the dividend decision is of the second type 
(independent decision). Companies do not follow the residual dividend policy as a 
dividend policy. 
 
Loderer (1989) deals with the relationship of investment, finance and dividend 
decisions, in which he discusses the idea of paying dividends in the case of 
corporate debts. The study aims to verify this phenomenon regarding US 
companies by assessing two scenarios: first, do these companies seek to pay 
dividends and finance the required funds for investment and dividends; second, do 
companies seek to raise the leverage target and pay for dividends using funds 
which are not required for investment. 
 
The study discusses which decision comes first, the dividend decision or the 
financing decision. In other words, does the dividend decision precede the finance 
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decision or does it follow? The study also asks if there is a pure residual dividend 
policy.  
 
The study tests the two scenarios and finds that there is no target for corporate 
dividends under the first scenario. For the second scenario, the study highlights 
that financing decision and investment decisions cannot be separated, as managers 
undertake both decisions simultaneously. Therefore, the dividend decision 
becomes the residual decision. The results prove to be better than those achieved 
by the first scenario, but not to the extent that it can be circular, for the companies 
seek leverage targeting even if they have a dividend target. 
 
The study results stress that investment decisions are simultaneously made with 
the dividend and financial decisions. This means that dividend considerations 
affect investment decisions, which means that the managers are not only willing 
to incur the transaction costs of raising outside funds to maintain a certain level of 
dividend, but they are also willing to forego otherwise beneficial investment 
projects in order to pay dividends. 
 
Alli, Khan and Ramires study (1993) tests the dividends policy through many 
factors. The study tested the dividends payout ratio in connection with eight 
factors: issuance costs, pecking order, ownership dispersion, dividends stability, 
tax and agency cost effects, financial slack, and cash flow quality and capital 
structure flexibility. The final sample for the study was about 105 companies in 
the United States for the period 1985-1987. 
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The study diagnoses a significant negative relationship between the dividend 
payout ratio and both issuance costs and pecking order. This indicates that the 
companies which suffer from high issuance costs and have growth, risk and an 
expected high level of capital expenditure will pay low dividends. This supports 
the residual dividend theory in that the funds are prioritized for growth and capital 
expenditure and company will not issue new equity to reduce the issuance costs.  
 
The study also found a significant positive relationship between the dividend 
payout ratio and capital structure flexibility (easier access to capital markets). This 
result means that the companies with greater flexibility in their capital structure 
are able to pay higher dividends, which is consistent with the residual dividend 
theory because of the greater availability of surplus funds resulting from the 
flexibility of the financial structure. 
 
Olson and McCann (1994) investigate the link between dividends and earnings 
over 48 quarters between 1978 and 1989 in the US, by determining whether or not 
earnings can be used as a predictor of dividends and conversely whether or not 
dividends can be used as a predictor of earnings. 
 
The study arrived at many results but for our study about residual dividend policy, 
an autoregressive model for dividends was estimated and contrasted with a model 
that included the earnings information set as well as an autoregressive earnings 
series. 
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The results indicate that the inclusion of earnings data improves the predictability 
of the autoregressive dividends model using both the level of variables and 
deviations from expected values measures. This result is consistent with the 
residual dividends policy. 
 
In addition, the study uncovers a number of financial characteristics for the firms 
adopting the residual dividend policy. These firms have higher growth in asset 
turnover, lower growth in sales and use less debt than firms that do not follow the 
residual dividend policy. 
 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely study (2005) made a survey to identify 
factors that monitor dividends and repurchases decisions in the United State. The 
survey covered 384 financial executives in 256 public companies and 128 private 
companies. The public companies have been divided as follows: 166 companies 
that paid dividends, 167 companies that have bought back their shares, and 77 
companies that didn't pay dividends. The results of the study adopted as the results 
depended mainly on the responses of the public companies. 
 
The researchers also conducted separate interviews with 23 financial executives 
for the sake of raising questions and inquiring about any matters that lack clarity. 
The answers resulting from personal interviews have been taken into account in 
terms of their support of the study. 
   
The study finds many important results, but there two of particular importance to 
this research. First, the companies try as far as possible to avoid reducing 
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dividends, seeking to make them stable. However, the companies only tend to 
increase dividends after covering all investment and liquidity requirements. This 
is consistent with the residual dividend concept.  
 
In addition, the study finds that companies do not repurchase their shares before 
crystallizing any investment decisions. This result is also consistent with the 
residual dividend concept. 
 
The researcher think that the most important weaknesses of the above studies that 
they were not addressed mainly to investigate and discuss if the companies follow 
up residual dividend policy or not, but their results come to support the residual 
dividend policy concepts. 
 
The study of Baker and Smith (2006) consisted of two sections. The first is a 
survey of 309 companies to ascertain whether or not their behavior is consistent 
with the residual dividends policy. The study has shown that the companies 
choose one of three methods for their dividends. The first one being the pure 
residual dividend policy, the second is the managed dividends policy; and the 
third is the modified residual dividends policy which enjoys characteristics of the 
above two methods.   
   
The second part is dedicated to know the companies' managers‘ visions on how 
they set their dividends policies. 
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Moreover, the first part of the study sought to explore whether the companies 
follow the residual dividends policy or not during the nineties, despite the 
availability of the necessary data for twenty years in order to obtain a balance 
between the necessary information required on the one hand, and the fact that the 
management will be responsible for such data on dividends on the other. 
 
The study has based its findings on the fact that the companies that follow the 
residual dividends policy are those where the mean and standard deviation of the 
standardized free cash flow (SFCF) is zero or close to zero. It adopted the 
operational definition of standardized free cash flow (SFCF) in Lehn and 
Poulsen‘s study in 1989. 
 
The study also found that during the nineties, most companies follow the modified 
residual dividends policy. 
 
4-3 Model and hypotheses  
4-3-1 Study Model 
This chapter depends in its methodology on the same procedures taken up by both 
Baker and Smith (2006) to identify firms that have pursuing a residual dividends 
policy in the UK for a period of ten years from 1998 to 2007. The Standardized 
Free Cash Flow (SFCF) is calculated for all companies and sectors thereafter we 
test the hypotheses by t – test on 95% confidence level to find if the market or any 
sector in the hypotheses accepted aria to accept or refuse the hypotheses. 
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Why Standardized Free Cash Flow (SFCF)?  
Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that agency cost exist in firms 
because managers may not always want to maximize shareholders‘ wealth due to 
the separation of the ownership and control. This conflict between them becomes 
clearer about the Free Cash Flow (FCF) when the shareholders prefer cash 
dividends while management prefers to invest it in new projects.  
 
Free Cash Flow is a measure of the after-tax operational funds produced by 
company, without taking in consideration the source of debt and equity financing 
that is available for distribution to the stakeholders. It is important to stress that 
the free cash flow must be available for distribution to the stakeholders (Tham and 
Velez Pareja, 2004).  
 
Jensen (1986) defines the Free Cash Flow as ―cash flow in excess of that required 
to fund all projects that have positive net present value when discounted at the 
relevant cost of capital" (Jensen, 1986, p323).  
 
The Residual Dividends Policy concept means that the company tends to direct all 
available funds to the investment opportunities available to it, and if there remains 
a surplus of funds after exhausting all opportunities there may be a chance for 
dividends, but if there are no extra funds, there will be no dividends for 
distribution (Lumby and Jones, 1999, Baker, 2009).   
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Based on the above concepts, the researcher agree with Baker and Smith (2006) 
opinion that low standardized free cash flow will be manifestation of Residual 
Dividend Policy. 
 
4-3-2 Operational Definition 
The operational definition used by Lehn and Poulsen (1989) is adopted to 
determine the operational definition of the concept of standardized free cash flow 
(SFCF). It will be calculated according to the following steps for each one of the 
ten years: 
 
The Undistributed cash flow = The operating profits before depreciation – 
income taxes – gross interests – preferred stock cash dividends – stock cash 
dividends .  
The Free cash flow = The undistributed cash flow - capital expenditure. 
Standardized calculation of free cash flow = Free cash flow / market value of 
the company. 
 
4-3-3 Study Hypothesis 
The main null hypothesis of this chapter can be summarized as follows: 
"UK companies follow the residual dividends policy" 
 
Also we can have a sub-hypothesis for each economic sector in UK to test if any 
of companies in these sectors follow Residual Dividend Policy. In London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) there are 14 sectors, so we will have 14 sub-hypotheses for the 
following sectors: 
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1- Banking sector. 
2- Basic Materials sector. 
3- Consumer Goods sector. 
4- Consumer Services sector. 
5- Health Care sector. 
6- Industrials sector. 
7- Insurance sector. 
8- Oil & Gas sector. 
9- Technology sector. 
10- Telecommunications sector. 
11- Utilities sector. 
12- Real Estate Investment & Service sector. 
13- Real Estate Investment Trusts sector. 
14- Financial Services sector. 
 
4-4 Data Collection and description  
We attempted to sample as many companies as possible in order to provide a fair 
reflection of the behaviour of companies in UK.  
 
The sample was obtained through the following criteria: an active equity company 
in UK pound whose base date goes back to 1/1/1998 (in order to obtain ten years 
of data from 1998 to 2007) in DataStream. We excluded 2008 from the sample 
period because of the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis, which could 
affect the study results. 
 
Chapter Four: Residual Dividend Policy  
170 
 
The number of companies that met the above criteria was 691 across various 
sectors. Excluding the companies with incomplete data, the resulting sample 
consists of 590 companies representing 85.38% of the total number of companies, 
as is shown in table no. (4-1) below: 
Table 4- 1 The Sample Details 
This table presents the initial sample size and available data (annual) from Datastream for 
the period 1998-2007 broken down by economic sector . 
 
Sector Sample Available Percentage 
1 Banks 7 7 100.00% 
2 Basic Materials 33 28 84.85% 
3 Consumer Goods 76 67 88.16% 
4 Consumer Services 121 104 85.95% 
5 Health Care 31 29 93.55% 
6 Industrials 200 193 96.50% 
7 Insurance 14 11 78.57% 
8 Oil & Gas 25 19 76.00% 
9 Technology 56 51 91.07% 
10 Telecommunications 4 4 100.00% 
11 Unclassified 19 0 0.00% 
12 Utilities 12 8 66.67% 
13 Real Estate Investment & Service 34 25 73.53% 
14 Real Estate Investment Trusts 15 14 93.33% 
15 Financial Services (Sector) 44 30 68.18% 
Total 691 590 85.38% 
 
4-5 Empirical Results 
The null hypothesis states that the UK companies follow the residual dividends 
policy, while the alternative hypothesis states that UK companies do not follow 
the residual dividends policy. The companies tend to follow the residual 
dividend policy if the mean and standard deviation of Standardized Free Cash 
Flow (SFCF), calculated according to Lehn and Poulsen model (1989), is equal to 
zero during the study period. Therefore, we can write this hypothesis in a 
statistical format as follows: 
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Ho2: µk = 0 
Ha2: µk ≠ 0 
Where: µk represents the mean of the Standardized Free Cash Flow (SFCF) 
during the study period. 
 
The SFCF has been calculated by using excel program for the companies in the 
sample at the level of the market in general and at level of each sector in particular 
(Appendix 4-1). The SFCF is summarized in table (4-2). 
 
Table 4-3 provides a descriptive statistical analysis of SFCF mean for the market 
and sectors, showing that the mean value is not equal to zero. Therefore it may be 
concluded that companies in UK do not follow the residual dividend policy in 
general and for most sectors. In addition, it is been found that some sectors, such 
as banks and insurance, are very close to zero which mean that these sectors 
follow up the residual dividend policy. 
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Table 4- 2 SFCF for Market and Sectors 
This table shows the calculations of standardized free cash flow (SFCF) by economic sector for each of the years 1998-2007 inclusive for the 
sample of 590 UK companies. The SFCF calculations based on Lehn and Poulsen (1989). The SFCF calculated according to the following steps: 
The Undistributed cash flow = The operating profits before depreciation – income taxes – gross interests – preferred stock cash dividends – stock 
cash dividends .  
The Free cash flow = The undistributed cash flow - capital expenditure. 
Standardized calculation of free cash flow = Free cash flow / market value of the company. 
SFCF Year 
Sectors 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Banks -2E-06 0.01102 0.01363 0.00806 0.00215 0.00345 0.02121 -0.00766 -0.04746 -0.04134 
Basic Materials -0.32648 -0.59067 -0.19792 -0.12547 -0.06967 -0.08552 -0.07476 -0.04852 -0.02321 -0.01769 
Consumer Goods -0.06254 -0.10774 -0.0783 -0.12409 -0.07871 -0.09307 -0.09647 -0.08956 -0.08434 -0.05557 
Consumer Services -0.09945 -0.12580 -0.09710 -0.10965 -0.12341 -0.18250 -0.11541 -0.10172 -0.10454 -0.06839 
Health Care -0.12753 -0.19667 -0.08359 -0.05857 -0.1504 -0.31898 -0.08463 -0.09647 -0.0767 -0.07384 
Industrials -0.05807 -0.07386 -0.08276 -0.0883 -0.09524 -0.1268 -0.08565 -0.09609 -0.06041 -0.0342 
Insurance -0.00833 0.00933 -0.08803 -0.18925 -0.04314 0.11985 0.07854 0.02449 0.07901 0.05515 
Oil & Gas -0.1215 -0.17824 -0.13154 -0.27107 -0.13288 -0.19887 -0.07829 -0.07806 -0.06381 -0.09315 
Technology -0.1424 -0.22333 -0.21864 -0.11784 -0.18859 -0.27157 -0.10541 -0.05853 -0.07135 -0.06096 
Telecommunications -0.07778 -0.04519 -0.0485 -0.12788 -0.30341 -0.42035 -0.35856 -0.27514 -0.07578 -0.27249 
Utilities -0.06623 -0.0525 -0.08555 -0.19609 -0.2052 -0.2984 -0.37346 -0.2692 -0.19194 -0.37663 
Real Estate Investment 
& Service -0.2509 -0.35955 -0.26591 -0.19065 -0.23242 -0.1857 -0.15578 -0.13187 -0.11247 -0.09954 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts -0.27702 -0.35669 -0.36847 -0.26747 -0.31125 -0.22582 -0.23102 -0.19218 -0.21617 -0.10692 
Financial Services  -0.11101 -0.11521 -0.09292 -0.16612 -0.15672 -0.16447 -0.07894 -0.04191 -0.0461 -0.03204 
Market -0.10604 -0.15159 -0.11742 -0.11988 -0.12395 -0.16005 -0.10053 -0.09158 -0.07531 -0.05709 
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 Table 4- 3 Descriptive Statistics 
This table presents a descriptive statistical analysis (mean, standard error of mean, median, standard deviation, variance, range, minimum, 
maximum and sum) of the SFCF mean for the total market and each sector for the sample of 590 UK companies. 
 
 
Sector 
Mean Std. Error of 
Mean 
Median Std. 
Deviation 
Variance Range Min. Max. Sum 
Banks .00291 .00611 .00637 .01931 .00037 .06266 -.03654 .02613 .02910 
Basic Materials -.15599 .05657 -.08014 .17889 .03200 .57298 -.59067 -.01769 -1.55991 
Consumer Goods -.08856 .00641 -.08930 .02029 .00041 .06823 -.12770 -.05947 -.88563 
Consumer Services -.11165 .00956 -.10636 .03024 .00091 .11771 -.18311 -.06541 -1.11648 
Health Care -.12674 .02515 -.09055 .07952 .00632 .26041 -.31898 -.05857 -1.26738 
Industrials -.07886 .00790 -.08259 .02497 .00062 .09167 -.12501 -.03333 -.78858 
Insurance .00376 .02903 .01691 .09181 .00843 .30910 -.18925 .11985 .03763 
Oil & Gas -.13474 .02053 -.12652 .06493 .00422 .20726 -.27107 -.06381 -1.34739 
Technology -.14586 .02398 -.13012 .07583 .00575 .21305 -.27157 -.05853 -1.45861 
Telecomm -.20051 .04444 -.20019 .14055 .01975 .37516 -.42035 -.04519 -2.00508 
Utilities -.19946 .03650 -.18933 .11543 .01332 .31663 -.36293 -.04630 -1.99455 
Real Estate Investment & Service -.19848 .02540 -.18818 .08032 .00645 .26001 -.35955 -.09954 -1.98479 
Real Estate Investment Trusts -.25530 .02491 -.24924 .07876 .00620 .26155 -.36847 -.10692 -2.55300 
Financial Services (Sector) -.10054 .01616 -.10197 .05109 .00261 .13409 -.16612 -.03204 -1.00544 
Market -.10986 .00994 -.11071 .03143 .00099 .10280 -.15969 -.05689 -1.09864 
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To ensure that these results are statistically significant, the researcher conducted a 
t test by comparing the t calculations with the two-tail critical value of t (±2.262) 
at significant level 5% and 9 freedom degrees. The decision rule is: Reject Ho if t 
< -2.262 or if > +2.262 otherwise accepted Ho. 
Table 4- 4 One-Sample Statistics 
The table shows the calculated t for the mean of SFCF for the total market and each 
sector.present t test for the SFCF based on annual data sample from DataStream consist 
of 590 UK companies from 1997 to 2008 for full UK market and each sector. 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
 Banks .00290980 .01931371 .00610753 
 Basic Materials -.15599135 .17889379 .05657118 
 Consumer Goods -.08856293 .02028568 .00641489 
 Consumer Services -.11164826 .03023727 .00956186 
 Health Care -.12673817 .07951734 .02514559 
 Industrials -.07885836 .02496837 .00789569 
 Insurance .00376304 .09180833 .02903234 
 Oil & Gas -.13473949 .06492786 .02053199 
 Technology -.14586079 .07582867 .02397913 
 Telecommunications -.20050810 .14054542 .04444436 
 Utilities -.19945503 .11542886 .03650181 
 Real Estate Investment & Service -.19847882 .08031828 .02539887 
 Real Estate Investment Trusts -.25530020 .07876005 .02490612 
 Financial Services (Sector) -.10054427 .05108679 .01615506 
 Market -.10986395 .03143194 .00993965 
 One-Sample Test 
  Test Value = 0 
  
t df 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
95% Confidence Interval 
of the Difference 
  Lower Upper 
Banks .476 9 .64512 .0029098 -.0109064 .0167260 
Basic Materials -2.757 9 .02221 -.1559913 -.2839643 -.0280184 
Consumer Goods -13.806 9 .00000 -.0885629 -.1030744 -.0740514 
Consumer Services -11.676 9 .00000 -.1116483 -.1332787 -.0900178 
Health Care -5.040 9 .00070 -.1267382 -.1836214 -.0698549 
Industrials -9.988 9 .00000 -.0788584 -.0967197 -.0609971 
Insurance .130 9 .89972 .0037630 -.0619127 .0694388 
Oil & Gas -6.562 9 .00010 -.1347395 -.1811861 -.0882929 
Technology -6.083 9 .00018 -.1458608 -.2001054 -.0916162 
Telecommunications -4.511 9 .00146 -.2005081 -.3010482 -.0999680 
Utilities -5.464 9 .00040 -.1994550 -.2820279 -.1168822 
Real Estate Investment & Service -7.814 9 .00003 -.1984788 -.2559351 -.1410226 
Real Estate Investment Trusts -10.251 9 .00000 -.2553002 -.3116417 -.1989586 
Financial Services (Sector) -6.224 9 .00015 -.1005443 -.1370896 -.0639990 
Market -11.053 9 .00000 -.1098640 -.1323490 -.0873789 
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Table 4-4 shows that the calculated t for the mean of SFCF for the market and 
most sectors is in the rejection area except for banking and insurance sectors 
where their calculated t for the mean of SFCF is in the accepted area . 
 
The above results indicate that we refuse the null hypotheses which state that UK 
companies adopt the residual dividend policy in general and economic sectors in 
particular. Conversely, we accept the alternative hypothesis which states that the 
UK companies do not follow the residual dividend policy in general and 
according to economic sectors in particular, except for the banking and insurance 
sectors which follow the residual dividend policy. 
 
In addition, the P-value in table 4-4 confirm the t test results that the market in 
general does not follow residual dividends policy and that all sectors do not 
follow residual dividend policy with the exception of the banking and insurance 
sectors. This is because P value is less than the level of significance (5%) in the 
market in general and all other sectors except banking and insurance sectors. 
   
4-6 Results discussions 
The results in the previous section showed that the companies in general do not 
follow the residual dividend policy as a policy for cash dividends at the market 
level in general and all other individual sectors except bank and insurance which 
do follow residual dividend policy. These results not consist with Baker and 
Smith (2006) which found that during the nineties, most companies follow the 
modified residual dividends policy.   
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This result gives us evidence that the companies in UK not prefer investment 
policy than dividend policy which is one of the main results of Irrelevant Theory. 
On other words, this result provides us further evidence of the non-validity of 
Miller and Modigliani assumption in 1961 as saying that the companies follow the 
residual dividends policy where the cash dividends depend absolutely on the 
remaining funds after meeting all the company's investments available. 
 
The above result indicates that there is a separation between the investment policy 
and dividend policy. This is supported by Fama‘s study (1974) regarding the 
independence of investment decisions from the cash dividends decisions. 
 
Regarding bank and insurance sectors, the results show that they are follow 
residual dividend policy which mean that the companies in these sectors prefer 
investment policy than dividend policy.  
 
The researcher belief that this results is attributed to several reasons, most 
important of which are the nature of banking and insurance needs in terms of 
liquidity needed for the continued evolution of the work of banks in the 
operational aspects. On the other, the investment policy in insurance companies is 
connected with the nature of the insurance concept of the operation as the 
investment income is one of the main sources of insurance to cover various 
expenses.  
 
The banking sector results in this chapter is supported through the analyses in the 
previous chapter where it has become clear that there is no effect of all kinds of 
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dividend policy (cash dividends, shares dividends and stock buybacks) on the 
market value of the company. While there is an effect of the earnings and 
investment policy (retained earnings) on the market value . However there is no 
same conformation for insurance sector results. 
 
4-7 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined and tested to what extent the companies in UK follow 
the residual dividend policy as a policy for their cash dividends at the market level 
in general and at each individual sector in particular.  
 
Our sample was the active equity companies in UK pound which have been 
available for ten years from 1998 till 2007 from the DataStream. The total number 
of available sample companies amounted to 590 out of 691 companies (85.38%) 
divided into 14 sectors. 
 
In this respect, the results showed that the companies in general do not follow the 
residual dividend policy as a policy for cash dividends at the market level in 
general except for banking and insurance sectors for the period from 1998 up to 
2007 by using Baker and Smith methodology in their study (2006) by calculating 
the standardized free cash flow as per the Lehn and Poulsen (1989) definition, as 
the mean and standard deviation for standardized free cash flow for the companies 
that follow a residual dividends policy close to zero . 
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5-1 Introduction 
Developments in the science of management in general and financial management 
in particular have caused a variety of processes and procedures to be adopted 
across different firms. Companies differ in the way they adopt policies associated 
with finance, dividends and capital structure. Such differences result from 
multiple factors inside and outside the company.  
 
These factors, which limit the options available for companies in different ways, 
may not be understood or known to shareholders, thereby highlighting an 
important issue of asymmetric information between company management, 
investors and shareholders (Dewenter and Warther, 1998). This is liable to create 
a state of uncertainty, misunderstanding, and unreliable assessment and evaluation 
of management decisions on the part of investors and shareholders. 
 
Financial literature highlights that the main goal of financial management should 
be mainly to maximize the market value of the project owners (the shareholders) 
(Ward, 1993). Shareholders certainly do not want another goal from their 
investment in the company. Hence, management works hard to achieve this goal, 
through the appropriate policies, decisions and actions.  
 
However, this goal may not be achieved or may be difficult to achieve because of 
certain conditions facing management which override the wishes of shareholders. 
In addition, the multiplicity of investors and the differences in their situations 
makes it difficult for management to meet the various requirements, thereby 
creating a gap between management and shareholders in this regard. 
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Therefore, shareholders‘ knowledge of the considerations and circumstances of 
the context of decisions taken by management would assist the shareholder in 
taking the correct investment decision commensurate with his/her circumstances. 
This will lead to reduce the likelihood of exposure to potential losses in the event 
that those policies and decisions do not match shareholders‘ wishes and 
preferences, which, in turn, would undermine the market value of a company. 
When management decisions do not correspond with the preferences of 
shareholders, then shareholders would be motivated to invest in shares of other 
companies with a consequent positive impact on their market value. 
 
Financial literature has dealt extensively with financial policies and, in particular, 
dividends policy; however, there are few studies using surveys that cover the 
motives of the management regarding dividends policy like or focusing the 
reasons that drive companies to opt for a particular type of dividends, such as 
Baker, Farley and Edelman (1985) investigating cash dividends, Lasfer (1997) 
assessing scrip dividends, Barker (1958) exploring stock dividends and Mitchell, 
Dharmawan and Clarke (2001) examining share buybacks, or a particular method 
such as Baker and Smith (2006) about residual dividend policy. The researcher 
thinks that poor management response rates to surveys are the main causes for the 
lack of research about understanding the reasons behind management policies in 
general and about dividend policy in particular.  
 
This chapter seeks to investigate the importance of the factors that affect 
management when setting their dividend policy and find if there is any effect of 
the nature of company business on these factors importance.  
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The researcher tests the importance of six factors: company market value; 
investment decision; finance decision; signal theory; agency theory; and 
shareholder structure.  
 
For this purpose, a questionnaire was sent via e-mail to 1319 UK companies in 
various economic sectors. The number of responses received was 208 from 
various economic sectors, amounting to about 15.77%. 
 
It has been found that in order of importance of these factors is: shareholder 
structure, finance decision, signal theory, company market value, investment 
decision and agency theory. It was also found that the nature of business 
(economic sector) had no affect on each of the factors with the exception of the 
finance decision on the real estate investment and insurance sectors and the 
technology sector on signaling theory. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 5-2 is a review of previous studies; 
Section 5-3 is dedicated to methodology and hypotheses; the details of the 
statistical sample are included in Section 5-4; the results are discussed in Sections 
5-5 and 5-6, while the last section (5-7) is devoted to a summary and conclusions. 
 
5-2 Prior studies 
Many studies within financial literature deal with management vision with regard 
to dividends policy. In this respect, Baker, Farley and Edelman (1985) in their 
study made a survey for financial managers working in the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). Those surveyed were asked about the considerations they take 
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into account when they determine their company‘s dividends policy. The aim was 
to test the awareness of managers of the impact of the signal and clients theories.  
 
The study used a three-part questionnaire: the first contained 15 closed questions 
on the importance of the factors used by each company to determine the dividends 
policy; the second had 18 closed questions on the theoretical aspects used in the 
dividends policy of companies; and the third part was related to the information 
about the company such as the rate of profit and dividends per share. 
 
The questionnaire was mailed to 562 companies, of which 318 were returned. The 
study finds that in order of importance the level of expected future earnings of the 
company, the model of previous dividends, the availability of cash, and 
maintaining or increasing the share price are important factors in determining 
dividends policy.  
 
On the other hand, the study also finds that companies avoid changing the 
dividends rate and struggling to continue. Furthermore, respondents from all 
sectors considered that dividends have an impact on share prices as the market 
uses dividends‘ announcements as information to evaluate stocks. 
 
Allen (1992) in his studies in UK try to examines the extent of usage of explicit 
target payouts, the range of target payouts adopted and frequency of change in 
such targets and the factors which influence a company‘s choice of these targets. 
 
Chapter Five: The Perspective of Management about Dividend Policy 
183 
 
The study used a questionnaire consisting of two parts: the first part investigated 
if companies had a target dividend payout ratio and other details about this target; 
and the second part measured the factors influencing the target dividend payout 
ratio on a five-point Likert scale. 
 
The questionnaires were mailed out in the third week of January 1990 and follow-
up letters were sent three weeks later. The response rate was disappointing with 
67 returned, giving a response rate of 13.4%. 
 
The paper concludes to the following findings: 
 52% of respondent firms reported using a target payout and 6% reported 
that their dividend policy is a percentage payment on the par value of their 
stock. 
 51% of respondent firms reported that they had changed their target 
payout at least once during the period 1980 to 1990 and 36% more than 
once. 
 There is no association between the use of targets and industry sectors. 
 
In addition, the paper finds that the following factors in order of importance were 
taken into consideration when setting the target payout dividend ratio.  
 A desire to maintain stable dividends. 
 The company‘s recent dividend history. 
 To signal the management‘s views of potential future company 
performance. 
 The availability of liquid funds. 
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 The requirements of planned investment policy. 
 Planned new capital issues. 
 The average payout level in the industry. 
 Working capital requirements. 
 
Lasfer (1997) examines the motivation underlying the payment of scrip dividends 
through a questionnaire survey conducted among a sample of UK companies 
listed on London Stock Exchange (LSE) that offered their shareholders this 
option, and a control sample of firms that paid only cash dividends.  
 
The data on manager vision of the scrip dividend option was collected by a postal 
questionnaire sent during the first quarter of 1995 which covering all companies 
identified from Extel Takeovers, Offers and New Issues publications as having 
offered the scrip dividend option at least once between 1987 and 1992.  
 
The control sample was constructed by matching every company that paid scrip 
dividends with a similar company that paid a cash dividend (same industry, size 
and as close as possible in market value of equity).  
 
The questionnaire send to the both samples included a set of closed-end questions 
to explore the propositions that the scrip dividend option is motivated by tax 
saving, lack of cash, signaling and shareholder pressure. In addition, the 
respondents were also asked to list in order of importance the reasons why their 
company paid or did not paid scrip dividends. 
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The response rate for the scrip dividend sample was 24.75% (50 responses) while 
the control sample respond rate was 16.83% (34 responses). The total response 
was 20.79% (84 responses). 
 
The results show that the overwhelming majority of respondents from both groups 
felt that the scrip dividend option is driven by current and/or potential high 
irrecoverable Advance Corroborate Tax (ACT) and they strongly rejected the 
proposition that the scrip option is a substitute for external financing or a cut in 
cash dividend. In addition, the managers felt that the scrip dividend allows small 
shareholders to increase their holding without incurring transaction costs and are 
not intended to convey information that leads to a rise in the share price. 
 
On other side the main reason given by respondents for not paying scrip dividend 
are: the relatively high administration costs of setting up and running the scheme 
given the expected low take-up rate and the large number of shareholders(Lasfer, 
1997). 
 
Baker and Powell (1999) investigate the views of corporate managers about the 
relationship between dividend policy and value and the explanation of dividend 
relevance including the bird in the hand, signaling, tax-preference and agency 
explanations. In addition, the paper tests if the responses vary among three 
industry groups (manufacturing, wholesale/retail trade and utilities).  
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The survey was sent in mid-1997 to 603 US corporations listed on the NYSE that 
paid a cash dividend in at least one year between 1994 and 1995. The usable 
responses totalled 198.  
 
The paper finds that most managers believed that dividend policy affects firm 
value and they are highly concerned about continuity of dividends. Also, there is a 
high level of agreement with statements about signaling, while the respondents 
were uncertain about involving the tax preferences and bird in the hand 
explanations, and they were inconsistent regarding the agency explanation about 
paying dividends. The research finds that there was no effect of the industry sector 
on the above results. 
 
Baker and Powell (2000) conducted a survey to verify management‘s vision in US 
companies on the factors that affect the dividends policy. It sought to establish 
that these factors could change over time by comparing the results with a study 
published in 1985.  
 
A questionnaire was sent to the chief financial officer (CFO) of 603 US 
companies, of which 198 were returned. The study found that the results were no 
different from those in the previous study, as the factors that affect the dividends 
policy in terms of importance were:  
 The level of current and future expected earnings. 
 Continuing the same dividends level.  
 Paying attention to the continuing increase in the share price. 
 Changing dividends may give a false signal to investors. 
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 The stability of cash flow. 
 
An Australian study (Mitchell et al., 2001) using survey method tries to provides 
evidence on management considerations as to the appropriate and relevant 
motivations for buy back and if management in general considers buy-back 
activity to be merited.  
 
The survey was sent to 508 CFOs of which 112 useable responses were received. 
The paper finds that improving financial performance and financial position are 
the most relevant motivations, followed by signaling of future expectations or 
under pricing. In addition, the Australian managers believed that they are familiar 
with the potential benefits and legislative requirements of buy back, but that their 
shareholders often do not understand or are not favourably disposed towards buy 
back. 
 
Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) investigates the views of managers in Nasdaq 
firms that consistently pay cash dividend in order to determine their views about 
dividend policy, the relationship between dividend policy and market value and 
four common explanations (signaling, tax-preference, agency cost and the bird in 
hand) for paying dividends.  
 
Surveys, which were sent in mid-June 1999 to 630 financial managers of Nasdaq 
firms of which 188 were usable, included by ask about their view for 27 closed-
end statements. Responses followed a five-point, equal interval scale: -2 = strong 
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disagree, -1 = disagree, 0 = no opinion, +1 = agree, and 02 = strongly agree.  The 
usable responses were 188 responses. 
 
The paper finds that managers stress the importance of maintaining dividend 
continuity and widely agree that changes in dividend affect firm value. In 
addition, managers gave the strongest support to the signaling explanation for 
paying dividends, weak to little support for tax and agency explanations, and no 
support to the bird in the hand explanation.  
 
The study of Baker and Smith (2006) is primarily devoted to discussing 
companies that follow a residual dividend policy. The study consisted of two 
sections: the first section sought to identify firms that pursue a residual dividend 
policy in the nineties of the last century where it covered 309 companies. The 
second part is a questionnaire for these 309 companies. The other sample of 
companies corresponds to the first sample in terms of industry sector and size to 
determine the factors that affect the distribution policy. 
 
 The study finds that the level of previous dividends, the stability of earnings, and 
the desire for a long-term continuation of the dividends ratio were the most 
important factors for the financial executive directors that follow a residual 
dividend policy. The interview sample was a continuation of the dividends level 
in the long run is found to be the most important factor. 
 
Baker, Saadi, Sutta and Gandhi (2007) investigate the perception of dividends by 
managers of dividend-paying firms listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX).  
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The survey, which was sent in March 2005 to CFOs of 291 firms, contained three 
sections. First, the survey asked the respondents to indicated the importance of 22 
factors in determining their firm‘s dividend policy by used a four-point scale 
where 0 = no importance, 1 = low importance, 2 = moderate importance and 3 = 
high importance. The second section asked respondents to indicate their general 
opinion about each of 27 closed-end statement based on a five-points scale: -2 = 
strongly disagree, -1 = disagree, 0 = no opinion, +1 = agree and +2 = strongly 
agree. The third section contained 6 questions that provided a profile of the 
respondents and their firms. The usable responses were 103.  
 
The paper finds that the most important factors influencing dividend policy are the 
level of current and expected future earnings, the stability of earnings and the 
pattern of the past dividends.  
 
In addition, Canadian managers believe that the dividend policy affects firm value 
but express little agreement with the theory of a residual dividend policy. They 
express strong support for signaling theory but not for the bird in the hand, tax 
preference and agency cost theories. 
 
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) conducted a survey to identify 
factors that monitor dividends and repurchases decisions in the US. The survey 
covered 384 financial executives in 256 public companies and 128 private 
companies. The public companies are divided as follows: 166 companies that paid 
dividends, 167 companies that have bought back their shares, and 77 companies 
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that did not pay dividends. The results of the study depended mainly on the 
responses of public companies.  
 
In addition, the researchers conducted separate interviews with 23 financial 
executives in order to clarify any issues raising questions and inquiring about any 
matters that lack clarity from the survey. The answers resulting from personal 
interviews have been taken into account in terms of their support of the study. 
 
The authors found that maintaining the dividend level is important and the 
stability of future earnings affects the dividends policy. In addition, they found 
that many managers favour repurchases because they are viewed as being more 
flexible than dividends and believe that institutions differentiate between 
dividends and repurchases and that the payout policy has little impact on their 
investor clientele. 
 
Dhanani (2005) study about UK companies finance managers‘ views on dividend 
policy. Its cover the general dividend relevance/irrelevance hypotheses along with 
the specific dividend hypotheses relating to finance and investment decisions, 
signaling implications, agency issues and ownership structure.     
 
Dhanani deals with the irrelevant hypothesis, which assumes an efficient market, 
where the hypothesis formulated by the market efficiency imperfections, which 
denies irrelevance that the dividend policy affects one or more of the various 
market imperfections prevalent and enhances the firm‘s value to shareholders.  
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He then formulates four sub-hypotheses related to the following market 
imperfections: capital availability and structure; information asymmetry; agency 
problems; and shareholder circumstances.  
 
In addition, he conducts studies on the impact of a firm‘s characteristics on the 
above hypotheses. He assesses the characteristics of size, market listing, industry, 
financial leverage, growth opportunities, information asymmetry, profitability, 
agency costs and ownership structure through a questionnaire that included 26 
questions measured on a Likert scale. The questionnaire was sent to 1000 
companies in the UK (800 on the LSE and 200 in the AIM). The volume of usable 
questionnaires, which entered the final sample, was 164 questionnaires (119 in 
LSE and 45 AIM).  
 
The study results support the general hypothesis, in which dividend policy serves 
to enhance corporate market value. In addition, managers support the specific 
hypotheses relating to signaling and ownership structure, in preference to those 
about capital structure and investment decisions and agency issues.  
 
For corporate characteristics the study finds that companies face more stringent 
capital structure decisions and are therefore forced to be more flexible in their 
dividend decisions and at the same time look to dividend policy as an important 
signaling mechanism.  
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Further, the study finds in its industry analysis clear evidence that companies in 
the financial and utility sectors support the dividend signaling hypothesis more 
than their counterparts in other sectors. 
 
5-3 Model and hypotheses 
5-3-1 Study Model 
The questionnaire method has considerable support for the use of this method in 
the social sciences because it can reflect the strength of opinions, perceptions, 
attitudes and views (Black, 1999). In finance, accounting and economics research, 
as a part of the social sciences, the questionnaire method has the advantage of 
providing direct evidence of managements‘ motives and reasons for engaging in 
activities (Mitchell et al., 2001) and it is useful for both describing and explaining 
managerial behaviour (Abernethy et al., 1999).  
 
Therefore, the model used in this chapter depends mainly on a questionnaire 
adapted for management, which was sent by e-mail to financial 
managers/directors of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
The researcher aimed to access as large a possible proportion of respondents in 
order to more accurately reflect the total population.  
 
5-3-2 Questionnaire Design and Administration  
The questionnaire method has a number of limitations. However, these limitations 
were minimized by following the techniques associated with good questionnaire 
design (Roberts, 1999). These techniques related to the development of the 
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measurement instrument as well as to the design and administration of the 
questionnaire.  
1. In the beginnings special interest was focus to the development of the 
factors affecting management when they set their dividend policy by 
reviewing academic literature about the subject, which is explained earlier 
in second chapter and in previous studies section in this chapter. Six 
variables where selected which explained in section (5-3-3). 
2. The first draft of the questionnaire was prepare by the researcher in the 
second stage and presented to two PhD. student colleagues in order to 
obtain feedback on its clarity, validity and appropriateness of the questions 
and questionnaire design.  
3. Thereafter a number of changes are made. Two academic staff in Durham 
Business School who had expertise in questionnaire design and 
administration independently reviewed the questionnaire. Their 
suggestions consisted of both technical matters (understanding the aims 
and wording of questions) and practical issues such as the size, visual 
appearance and layout.  
4. Lastly, the questionnaire was pilot tested. A pilot study is a small-scale 
study which is performed before the full-scale research in order to identify 
any problems with the research design and to rectify them prior to 
implementation of the major study, which is often costly and time-
consuming (Polit et al., 2001). Typically, pilot studies are conducted on a 
small group of respondents who are as similar as possible to the target 
population. They can be preformed for a number of different purposes, 
from assessing the likely success of a research approach, to testing the 
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internal validity of a questionnaire, to providing evidence for a funding 
body that further, full-scale study is valuable (Holloway, 1997). The role 
of the pilot study in this study was to identify the reliability and internal 
validity of the questionnaire. This can assist in the identification of 
ambiguous or unnecessary questions, as well as items which do not exhibit 
internal validity and which should therefore be discarded. Two finance 
managers from outside the sample populations who had substantial 
commercial experience were used for the pilot study.   
5. Following this feedback further adjustments were made before the 
questionnaire was distributed via e-mail. Follow up procedures (Section 5-
4-1) were conducted to increase the response rate. 
 
5-3-3 Variable operation definition 
Dhanani (2005) designed a questionnaire which examined five sections using 26 
questions. The first section dealt with dividends policy and market value in 
general through three questions. The second section focused on finance and 
investment decisions by asking eight questions. The third section dealt with the 
signaling theory through seven questions. The fourth section dealt with the agency 
theory by raising three questions, while the last section was about the structure of 
the shareholders through five questions. 
 
However, the researcher considers that Dhanani‘s questionnaire has a number of 
drawbacks as follows:  
1. Length of the questionnaire in terms of the number of questions (26 
questions).  
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2. Integrating investment and financing decisions in one section even 
when they quite different.  
3. Disparity of the number of questions in each section.  
4. The lack of any reference to managements‘ visions and their 
preferences for a particular type of dividends to other types.  
 
In designing his questionnaire (p: 275), the researcher thus sought to make use the 
same factors included in Dhanani‘s study (2005), taking into consideration the 
above points. Thus, the questionnaire comprised two sections. The first one deals 
with four main issue about: 1) the economic sector in which the company 
operates; 2) the manager‘s/director‘s belief about the importance of the type of 
dividends to shareholders; 3) the financial manager‘s/director‘s preference for the 
type of company management, including a sub-question about the reason for such 
a preference; and 4) if the company has any research on shareholders‘ wishes in 
relation to dividends.  
 
The second section includes 18 structural questions covering six factors (each 
factor measure by three statements) using a 5-point Likert scale concerning the 
factors (statements) that affect management when setting their dividend policy. 
The Likert scale ―is the most popular scaling procedure in use today‖ 
(Oppenheim, 2000), Likert scale is distributed and coded within (5 = Strongly 
important , 4 = Important, 3 = Neutral, 2 = Not important, 1 = Strongly not 
important) and respondents are asked to evaluate the importance or lack of 
importance of the following statements:  
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Company Value  
 The company develops its dividend policy in light of shareholders needs in 
order to maximize company market value. 
 The dividend policy affects company market value. 
 The dividend policy is the main factor affecting company market value. 
The Investment Decision   
 There is no link between dividend and investment decisions. 
 The dividend decision is a residual decision after the investment decision 
has been made. 
 Dividend policy is less important than investment policy. 
The Finance Decision 
 The company prefers funding from retained earnings before resorting to 
external financing. 
 Cash dividends are considered a fixed cost. 
 Cash dividends will weaken the company‘s financial flexibility. 
The Signaling Theory 
 Dividends are the most important tool used by the company to send 
information to shareholders about company performance. 
 A decrease in the dividend always refers to a reduction in future company 
earnings. 
 Distributed dividend reflects the company‘s inability to use the available 
funds in other profitable projects. 
The Agency Theory 
 The company takes a dividend decision, despite being put under the 
control of external financiers. 
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 Investors monitor the company, if funding of a new investment comes 
from retained earnings rather than external financing. 
 Increasing dividends will reduce shareholders‘ control over management. 
The Shareholders Structures 
 The company develops its dividend policy based on the main shareholders 
requirements. 
 The company develops the dividend policy based on the dividend tax 
effect on the main shareholders. 
 The company uses cash dividend because of investor preferences for 
certainty. 
 
5-3-4 Study Hypotheses 
The main null hypothesis for this chapter is: 
There are no statistically significant differences between finance manager’s 
responses about the factors that are taken into account when setting dividend 
policy.  
In addition, in order to test if there are any affects on company business on the 
factors affecting management when setting dividend policy in the UK, we will 
have sub-hypotheses for the following 15 sectors: 
1. Banks 
2. Basic Materials 
3. Consumer Goods 
4. Consumer Services 
5. Health Care 
6. Industrials 
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7. Insurance 
8. Oil & Gas 
9. Technology 
10. Telecommunications 
11. Unclassified 
12. Utilities 
13. Real Estate Investment & Service 
14. Real Estate Investment Trusts 
15. Financial Services 
 
5-4 Data collection and description  
5-4-1 Data collection  
The data collection process had two stages of data collection. The first stage, 
which took three weeks, included collecting the e-mail addresses of finance 
managers/directors of all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 
A total of 1319 e-mail addresses of various economic sectors were collected from 
company web site first and second by phone calls the company directly to 
collected.  
 
In the second phase, the questionnaire was sent three times by e-mail within 45 
days between the start of January and mid-February 2010. At this stage, the 
percentage of responses was very low, at about 2% only. The researcher then 
tended, in his fourth time, to adopt a different method whereby the questionnaire 
was sent in separate groups to be followed-up then with the companies 
themselves. The process included addressing 100 companies in one day; in the 
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following days, the companies that received the questionnaire were contacted by 
phone. This process took almost another 45 days between mid-February and the 
end of March 2010 in order to increase the response rate to 13.42% with 177 
responses across the various economic sectors.  
 
In order to further increase the response rate, the researcher re-sent the 
questionnaire in May 2010 and again followed up with the concerned companies 
was carried out by phone call. 31 more responses were obtained bringing the 
response rate up to 15.77%., where 208 responses were received from various 
economic sectors as shown in Table 5-1: 
Table 5- 1 Questionnaire sample 
This table presents the questionnaire sample response percentages by sector collected 
from UK companies in the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
  Sector No. of Co.    Respond Percentage 
1 Banks 8 0 0.00% 
2 Basic Materials 105 13 12.38% 
3 Consumer Goods 73 15 20.55% 
4 Consumer Services 177 28 15.82% 
5 Health Care 82 15 18.29% 
6 Industrials 294 53 18.03% 
7 Insurance 36 4 11.11% 
8 Oil & Gas 80 12 15.00% 
9 Technology 131 19 14.50% 
10 Telecommunications 23 2 8.70% 
11 Unclassified 8 1 12.50% 
12 Utilities 23 5 21.74% 
13 Real Estate Investment & Service 57 13 22.81% 
14 Real Estate Investment Trusts 19 9 47.37% 
15 Financial Services  203 19 9.36% 
Total 1319 208 15.77% 
 
From the table no. 5-1, one can observe the size of the sample used in general and 
by each sector in particular. For example, the banking sector is not represented in 
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this part and the representation of sectors is inconsistent, which raises a lot of 
doubts and queries about the possibility of generalizing the results. 
 
Despite the above criticism and to what extent they are objective or not, but the 
responses received provide a reasonable amount of information that cannot be 
ignored and also set up the basis to build on. Added to that, the responses 
represent the best rate possible and accessible compared with the previous studies 
in this area, especially if we know that a large proportion of companies did not 
respond claiming that the instructions and internal administrative procedures in 
the company prevented them from responding to the questionnaire. 
 
5-4-2 Sample statistical description 
The statistical description of the sample in table (5-2) below can be interpreted as 
follows: 
Table 5- 2 Sample by sector 
This table shows frequency, percentage and valid percentage for each sector for the 
questionnaire sample which collected from UK companies in the period between January 
2010 and end of May 2010.   
Sector Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Basic Materials 13 6.3 6.3 6.3 
Consumer Goods 15 7.2 7.2 13.5 
Consumer Services 28 13.5 13.5 26.9 
Financial Services (Sector) 19 9.1 9.1 36.1 
Health Care 15 7.2 7.2 43.3 
Industrials 53 25.5 25.5 68.8 
Insurance 4 1.9 1.9 70.7 
Oil & Gas 12 5.8 5.8 76.4 
Real Estate Investment & Service 13 6.3 6.3 82.7 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 9 4.3 4.3 87.0 
Technology 19 9.1 9.1 96.2 
Telecommunications 2 1.0 1.0 97.1 
Unclassified 1 .5 .5 97.6 
Utilities 5 2.4 2.4 100.0 
Total 208 100.0 100.0  
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The above table shows the representation of each sector to the total sectors where 
we find that the industry sector is the largest sector which amounts to 25.4%. 
5-5 Empirical Results 
Before started data analyses validity and reliability were tested. 
 
5-5-1 Validity analysis 
Validity is a measure of the extent to which the scale represents the concept of the 
study (Robinson et al., 1991). Typically validity can be classified into two types: 
the first is convergent validity which describes the extent to which two measures 
of the same concept are correlated; and the second is discriminate validity which 
measures the degree to which two concepts which bear similarities are distinct 
from each other (Robinson et al., 1991). Both convergent and discriminate 
validity can be assessed by using the expletory factor analyses.  
 
Factor analysis is essential to reduce a large number of related items to a small 
number which is more useful. This is a achieved by grouping similar items 
together (Hair et al., 2006). Factor analyses can be classified into two types: 
expletory factor analyses which aims to gather information about the relationship 
between variables; and confirmatory factor analyses which is used to confirm 
relationships between variables that are already specified (Hair et al., 2006).     
 
In factor analysis there are two main steps are used by SPSS to evaluate the 
suitability of the data. The first step is the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of 
sampling adequacy and the second is the Bartlett‘s test of sphericity (Tabachnick 
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and Fidell, 1996). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) should be 0.6 or above and 
the Bartlett‘s test of sphericity should be 0.05 or less (Tabachnick and Fidell, 
1996). 
 
The tests (for our questionnaire 18 questions) showed that Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
(KMO) was 0.792 and the significant value of Bartlett‘s test was 0.00. Therefore 
the data of this study is suitable for factor analysis. Table (5-3) bellow shows this 
result. 
Table 5- 3 KMO and Bartlett’s Test 
This table presents the results of the KMO and Bartlett‘s test for the sample of 208 
questionnaires which collected from UK companies in the period between January 2010 
and end of May 2010.   
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. 0.792 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity Approx. Chi-Square 782.067 
df 153 
Sig. 0 
 
Furthermore, principle component analysis (PCA) showed six components with 
an eigenvalue greater than 1, explaining 25.225%, 7.866%, 7.560%, 7.367%, 
5.866% and 5.315% of the variance respectively (see Appendix 5-2). In addition, I 
used rotated component matrix which clarified the six components that have 
factor loading above 0.50 (see Table 5-4). 
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Table 5- 4 Rotated Component Matrix  
This table presents the results of the rotated component matrix (factor analysis) in relation 
to the company value, the investment decision, the finance decision, signaling, agency 
and shareholders for the sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK 
companies in the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
 Component 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
The Company Value Q1 .247 -.048 .198 .649 .169 .023 
The Company Value Q2 .159 -.277 .242 .669 -.058 -.266 
The Company Value Q3 .225 .052 .156 .614 .086 .007 
Investment Decision Q1 .244 .575 .232 .068 .225 .101 
Investment Decision Q2 .256 .509 -.116 .089 -.232 .178 
Investment Decision Q3 .269 .565 -.165 .245 -.177 -.254 
Finance Decision Q1 .547 .069 -.280 .130 -.151 -.019 
Finance Decision Q2 .572 -.126 -.256 .150 .103 -.103 
Finance Decision Q3 .514 -.257 -.178 -.082 -.209 -.097 
Signaling Q1 .166 -.100 .027 -.082 .518 .189 
Signaling Q2 .273 -.196 -.107 -.270 .530 .086 
Signaling Q3 .057 .157 .230 -.080 .553 -.138 
Agency Q1 .248 .025 .535 .018 -.213 .083 
Agency Q2 .250 .251 .502 .156 -.252 .218 
Agency Q3 -.081 .130 .528 -.154 -.278 -.255 
Shareholders Q1 -.139 -.109 -.131 .001 .015 .561 
Shareholders Q2 .194 .065 -.011 -.233 .285 .505 
Shareholders Q3 .182 -.142 -.178 .048 -.108 .521 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
a  6 components extracted. 
5-5-2 Reliability analysis 
Reliability refers to the ―purity and consistency of the measure, to repeatability, to 
the probability of obtaining the same results again if the measure were to be 
duplicated‖ (Oppenheim, 2000).  
 
In the social sciences, the main statistic measure used to test reliability in 
questionnaires is Cronbach‘s Coefficient Alpha (Cronbach, 1951), which 
estimates the degree of correlation among a group of items and gives an idea 
about the variances among them.  
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Therefore, the researcher calculated the reliability coefficient for the identification 
through the application of Cornbach‘s Alpha to ensure the stability of resolution. 
From Table (5-5) it can be seen that the value of Cornbach‘s Alpha coefficient is 
82.40% which indicates that it is an acceptable rate constant.  
Table 5- 5 Reliability test 
This table presents the results of the Cronbach Alpha reliability test for the sample of 208 
questionnaires which collected from UK companies in the period between January 2010 
and end of May 2010.   
Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
.824 18 
 
5-5-3 Analyzing the results of the questionnaire 
5-5-3-1 The first part data 
Analysis of this part of the questionnaire data is obtained by the use of 
percentages derived from measuring means for all factors in order to estimate the 
importance of each answer, as well as gauging the effect of different economic 
sectors on that answer. 
 
1 - The importance of the type of dividend  
Each respondent was asked what kind of dividend is believed to be more 
important to shareholders. For this purpose, there were four options given: cash 
dividends; share dividends; buy backs as three options and a fourth option on the 
lack of importance of dividends. The results of the answers can be seen in Table 
No. (5-6) which shows that 69.23% of the respondents believe that the cash 
dividend is the most important to shareholders, followed by the belief that the 
dividends are not important (13.94%) . Then comes the share dividends with 
8.65% and finally re-purchase at a rate of 8.17%.  
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Table 5- 6 The sample think per sector 
This table shows the results of UK management think about the important of dividend 
type by sector for the sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK companies 
in the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
Sector 
Think 
Cash Dividend Share Dividend 
Repurchasing 
Share 
Dividend Type Not 
Important 
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % 
Basic Materials 9 69.23% 2 15.38% 1 7.69% 1 7.69% 
Consumer Goods 11 73.33% 0 0.00% 2 13.33% 2 13.33% 
Consumer Services 16 57.14% 3 10.71% 4 14.29% 5 17.86% 
Financial Services 
(Sector) 17 89.47% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 2 10.53% 
Health Care 9 60.00% 3 20.00% 2 13.33% 1 6.67% 
Industrials 34 64.15% 5 9.43% 6 11.32% 8 15.09% 
Insurance 3 75.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 25.00% 
Oil & Gas 9 75.00% 2 16.67% 0 0.00% 1 8.33% 
Real Estate Investment 
& Service 12 92.31% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 7.69% 
Real Estate Investment 
Trusts 9 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Technology 11 57.89% 3 15.79% 1 5.26% 4 21.05% 
Telecommunications 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Unclassified 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 1 100.00% 
Utilities 2 40.00% 0 0.00% 1 20.00% 2 40.00% 
Total 144 69.23% 18 8.65% 17 8.17% 29 13.94% 
 
In addition, the finance managers/directors believe that the importance of cash 
dividends to shareholders is ranked first in all economic sectors, although to 
different degrees, whereas the importance of the other options vary from sector to 
sector, as is shown in Table (5-7). 
 
2- Respondents preferences and reasons  
The second part of the first section of the questionnaire was devoted to 
ascertaining the respondents‘ preferences (the management) for each type of 
dividend and the reason for this preference. We find that 71.63% of the sample 
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preferred cash dividends, followed by buying back stock at a rate of 10.10%. The 
other reasons only received small percentages.  
 
The results reveal that 51.01% of those who preferred cash dividends opted for 
such a preference primarily due to the ease of implementation, followed by 
flexibility (22.82%). The next most popular reason is to meet the requirements of 
the major shareholders (14.09%); the last reason is the lack of wish to change the 
previous dividends method (12.08%). The option of share repurchase focused on 
the ease of implementation and of being more flexible than other reasons. The 
results are highlighted in Table (5-7) below: 
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Table 5- 7 The sample preferences and reasons 
This table shows the results of the preferences of UK management for the dividend type according to reasons for the sample of 208 
questionnaires which collected from UK companies in the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
Prefer 
Why Prefer 
Total % 
More 
flexible % 
Easy in 
implementation % 
Avoid 
changing 
previous 
method % 
Main 
shareholders 
required % 
Cash Dividend 34 22.82% 76 51.01% 18 12.08% 21 14.09% 149 71.63% 
Share Dividend 9 90.00% 0 0.00% 1 10.00% 0 0.00% 10 4.81% 
Repurchasing Share 8 38.10% 10 47.62% 2 9.52% 1 4.76% 21 10.10% 
Cash & Share Dividend 6 37.50% 7 43.75% 1 6.25% 2 12.50% 16 7.69% 
Cash Dividend & 
Repurchasing Share 3 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 3 1.44% 
Share Dividend & 
Repurchasing Share 0 0.00% 6 100.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 6 2.88% 
No preference 0 0.00% 1 33.33% 2 66.67% 0 0.00% 3 1.44% 
Total 60 28.85% 100 48.08% 24 11.54% 24 11.54% 208 100.00% 
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3- Shareholders’ wishes studies  
The last part of the first section of the questionnaire inquired whether the company 
has studied shareholders‘ wishes in respect of dividend type or not. The aim is to 
understand if companies attempt to meet their shareholders‘ wishes regarding 
dividends. The answers to this question are displayed in Table (5-8) below:  
Table 5- 8 The sample shareholders wishes studies 
This table presents the response by sector to the question if management has previously 
studied the wishes of investors for the dividend policy for the sample of 208 questionnaires 
which collected from UK companies in the period between January 2010 and end of May 
2010.   
Sector 
Investor Previous Studies 
Total 
Yes No 
Freq. % Freq. % 
Basic Materials 4 30.77% 9 69.23% 13 
Consumer Goods 11 73.33% 4 26.67% 15 
Consumer Services 13 46.43% 15 53.57% 28 
Financial Services (Sector) 11 57.89% 8 42.11% 19 
Health Care 4 26.67% 11 73.33% 15 
Industrials 25 47.17% 28 52.83% 53 
Insurance 2 50.00% 2 50.00% 4 
Oil & Gas 3 25.00% 9 75.00% 12 
Real Estate Investment & Service 4 30.77% 9 69.23% 13 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 8 88.89% 1 11.11% 9 
Technology 7 36.84% 12 63.16% 19 
Telecommunications 2 100.00% 0 0.00% 2 
Unclassified 1 100.00% 0 0.00% 1 
Utilities 2 40.00% 3 60.00% 5 
Total 97 46.63% 111 53.37% 208 
 
From the table it is clear that the number of companies, which have studied 
shareholders‘ preferences for the dividend type, is 46.63%, whereas the companies 
that lack such studies amounted to 53.37%. These percentages vary according to the 
economic sector. 
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5-5-3-2 Second part data analyses  
The second part of the questionnaire was designed to determine the importance of the 
factors considered by management when setting their dividends policy, highlighting 
the relative importance of the factor, and exploring how this importance varies 
according to economic sector. In this respect, 18 questions were asked concerning six 
factors, namely: company value; investment decision; finance decision; signaling 
theory; agency theory; and the structure of shareholders. The results are presented in 
Table (5-9) below: 
Table 5- 9 The factories important 
This table presents the ranking in importance of the factors (company value, investment 
decision, finance decision, signaling, agency and shareholder) that affect management when 
setting dividend policy for the sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK 
companies in the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
 N Mini Max Mean 
Percentage  
Per Question 
Percentage  
Per 
 Factor 
Rank 
The Company Value Q1 208 1 5 3.19 63.80%   
The Company Value Q2 208 1 5 3.39 67.80% 63.07% Forth 
The Company Value Q3 208 1 5 2.88 57.60%   
Investment Decision Q1 208 1 5 3.05 61.00%   
Investment Decision Q2 208 1 5 3.08 61.60% 62.13% Fifth 
Investment Decision Q3 208 1 5 3.19 63.80%   
Finance Decision Q1 208 1 5 3.30 66.00%   
Finance Decision Q2 208 1 5 3.17 63.40% 64.47% Second 
Finance Decision Q3 208 1 5 3.20 64.00%   
Signaling Q1 208 1 5 3.22 64.40%   
Signaling Q2 208 1 5 3.26 65.20% 63.40% Third 
Signaling Q3 208 1 5 3.03 60.60%   
Agency Q1 208 1 5 3.07 61.40%   
Agency Q2 208 1 5 3.00 60.00% 61.20% Sixth 
Agency Q3 208 1 5 3.11 62.20%   
Shareholders Q1 208 1 5 3.35 67.00%   
Shareholders Q2 208 1 5 3.13 62.60% 65.20% First 
Shareholders Q3 208 1 5 3.30 66.00%   
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From Table (5-9) above, we find that the most important factor that management 
takes into account when setting dividend policy is shareholder structure, followed by 
finance decision, signaling theory, company market value, and investment decision 
with agency theory ranked last. 
 
In order to determine if these results vary according to economic sectors or not, the 
researcher used the ANOVA test by comparing the value of calculated F with the 
value of critical F at a confidence level of 95%. This is based on the fact that if 
calculation F is less than critical F, then the answers do not vary according to sectors; 
that is the importance of this factor does not change from sector to sector. Similarly, 
if calculation F is more than the critical F, then the answers do vary according to 
sector, which means that the importance of the factor under investigation varies from 
sector to sector. The results are shown in Table No (5-10) below: 
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Table 5- 6 The sector F test 
This table shows the F test results for factors affecting management when they sit their 
dividend policy for the sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK companies in 
the period between January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
   
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Company Value Between Groups 10.069 13 .775 1.549 .103 
  Within Groups 97.025 194 .500     
  Total 107.094 207       
Investment Decision Between Groups 8.669 13 .667 1.454 .138 
  Within Groups 88.992 194 .459     
  Total 97.661 207       
Finance Decision Between Groups 12.015 13 .924 2.086 .017 
  Within Groups 85.961 194 .443     
  Total 97.976 207       
Signaling Between Groups 10.766 13 .828 1.732 .057 
  Within Groups 92.785 194 .478     
  Total 103.551 207       
Agency Between Groups 7.226 13 .556 1.250 .247 
  Within Groups 86.294 194 .445     
  Total 93.519 207       
Shareholders Between Groups 10.938 13 .841 1.530 .109 
  Within Groups 106.663 194 .550     
  Total 117.602 207       
 
Comparing the value of calculated F in Table 5-10 with the value of the critical value 
of F with the 95% confidence level, only the finance decision (2.086) and signal 
theory factors (1.732) are larger than the value of critical F (1,723). This means that 
the importance of the finance decision and signaling theory differs across the 
economic sectors. 
 
 Finance Decision 
In order to find which economic sector was more than others in its answer means on 
finance decision factors, the researcher calculated the means and the percentages ratio 
for each economic sector as is shown in Table no. (5-11) below: 
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Table 5- 7 The Finance Decision factor by sector 
This table present the importance of the finance decision factor in each economic sector for 
the sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK companies in the period between 
January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
Sector Mean Percentage Rank N 
Basic Materials 3.46162 69.23% 4 13 
Consumer Goods 3.08884 61.78% 12 15 
Consumer Services 3.24995 65.00% 7 28 
Financial Services (Sector) 3.35084 67.02% 6 19 
Health Care 3.3556 67.11% 5 15 
Industrials 3.10692 62.14% 10 53 
Insurance 3.49992 70.00% 2 4 
Oil & Gas 3.19447 63.89% 8 12 
Real Estate Investment & Service 3.48715 69.74% 3 13 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 3.55556 71.11% 1 9 
Technology 3.10523 62.10% 11 19 
Telecommunications 2.1665 43.33% 13 2 
Unclassified 1 20.00% 14 1 
Utilities 3.1332 62.66% 9 5 
Total 3.22435 64.49%   208 
 
From Table 5-11, it is found that the management of companies in the real estate 
investment trusts sector and insurance sector are more concerned with the finance 
decision when setting their dividend policy than companies in other sectors.  
 
 Signaling Theory 
In order to find which economic sector was more than others in its answer means 
with respect to signaling theory factors, the researcher calculated the means and the 
percentages ratio for each economic sector as is shown in Table no. (5-12) below: 
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Table 5- 8 The Signaling factor by sector 
This table present the importance of the signaling factor in each economic sector for the 
sample of 208 questionnaires which collected from UK companies in the period between 
January 2010 and end of May 2010.   
Sector Mean Percentage Rank N 
Basic Materials 3.30769 66.15% 4 13 
Consumer Goods 3.20004 64.00% 8 15 
Consumer Services 3.30957 66.19% 3 28 
Financial Services  3.31567 66.31% 2 19 
Health Care 3.20009 64.00% 7 15 
Industrials 3.05033 61.01% 11 53 
Insurance 3.25008 65.00% 6 4 
Oil & Gas 3.05556 61.11% 10 12 
Real Estate Investment & Service 3.17956 63.59% 9 13 
Real Estate Investment Trusts 3.25933 65.19% 5 9 
Technology 3.35098 67.02% 1 19 
Telecommunications 1.99983 40.00% 13 2 
Unclassified 1 20.00% 14 1 
Utilities 2.8668 57.34% 12 5 
Total 3.1715 63.43%   208 
 
From Table (5-12) above, it can be found that the technology sector is more 
concerned with signaling theory than other sectors. This indicates that the 
management of companies in the technology sector are concerned with dividend 
policy as a means to send signals to shareholders in light of the information 
asymmetry between shareholders and management. 
 
5-6 Results discussions 
Three main points can be derived from the results highlighted in the previous section: 
the importance of cash dividends; the importance of factors that affect management 
when setting dividend policy; and the effect of the type of business (sector) on the 
factor importance. 
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5-6-1 The Importance of Cash Dividends 
The results found in the previous section indicate that 13.94% of respondents said 
that dividends are not important to market value while 69.23% of respondents think 
that cash dividends are important. This result means there is no support for Irrelevant 
Theory which is consistent with the results in the previous chapters. In other words, 
this result means that there is support for the relationship between dividend policy 
and company market value which is consistent with Dhanani (2005) results. 
 
The results also indicate that the importance of cash dividend over other types of 
dividends (stock dividend and stock re-purchase). The researcher argues that this is 
because shareholders are reassured by cash dividends. Furthermore, the findings 
highlight the importance of cash dividend over capital gains which arise from other 
dividend types; this is consistent with bird in hand theory. 
 
Finally, the results indicate that management prefers to use cash dividends because 
they are easy to apply in comparison with other types of dividends. The researcher 
thinks that this is due to the dividend in the UK are distributed twice a year (annual 
and semi-annual dividend) which gives management good experience in the use of 
cash dividends.  
 
5-6-2 The Importance of Factors that Affect Management  
With regard to the importance of factors that impact on management when setting 
dividend policy, the study found that shareholder structure is the most important 
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factor, followed by finance decision, signaling theory, company market value and 
investment decision, with agency theory ranked bottom. The following points are 
raised from the results. 
1. Managements‘ tendency to meet the wishes of the main shareholders (the first 
reason) when preparing the dividends policy, leads the former not to fear 
conflict with the latter (agency theory—the bottom ranked reason).  
2. The finance decision‘s rank as second is due to the fact that it is intimately 
connected with the operational activity of the company, which directly reflects 
the performance of management which, on its part, attempts to reflect it to 
shareholders in the dividends policy (the signaling theory).  
3. The market value of a company is considered to be an important factor, 
although it is not considered a priority for management because its increase or 
decrease does not directly affect the management. This is especially true if 
management has a policy of satisfying the major shareholders through the 
dividends policy. 
4. The investment decision‘s rank as fifth is due to the fact that the results of 
those investments would not necessarily be reflected on a company‘s activity 
in the present; rather it could be reflected in the future. In addition, significant 
investment decisions often require substantial funds which exceed the amount 
of the dividends. 
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5-6-3 Type of Business Sector on Factor Importance 
The findings contained in the previous section highlight that companies in the real 
estate investment trusts sector and insurance sector are more concerned with the 
finance decision than companies in other sectors.  
 
Regarding the finance decision factors, it is the researcher‘s belief that the various 
economic sectors differ in determining the importance of the financing decision 
primarily because of the different nature of economic activity and the differing needs 
for funds for operational activities. This makes the financing decision factor more 
important for these companies which have a greater need for funds for operational 
activities thereby impacting differently on their dividends policies. This is shown in 
Table 5-12 in which companies in the insurance, real estate investment trust, and real 
estate service sectors have top three positions in the importance of the financing 
decision when undertaking their dividends policy. This has a noticeable effect on the 
cash flow which is closely related to the financing decision. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Chapter Four regarding the insurance companies‘ residual 
dividend policy and their continuing need for funds to be channelled for investment 
purposes. 
 
Despite the fact that the real estate companies do not tend to adopt a residual 
dividend policy, they take the financing decision into account when making dividend 
policy. This is attributed to the following two main reasons: 
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1. The reasoning behind whether or not companies usually follow a residual 
dividend policy has been based on the ten years that preceded the latest global 
financial crisis, a period that has seen a steady growth in real estate 
companies. 
2. The questionnaire was carried out after the global crisis which has affected 
most real estate companies, notably in the financing and sales spheres. It is 
believed therefore that the real estate companies will follow a residual 
dividends policy in the future. 
 
On the other side, the results also indicate that the technology sector is more 
concerned with the signaling theory than other sectors. This result is not consisting 
with Dhanani (2005) result which finds that financial and utility sectors support the 
signaling theory.  
 
The researcher believes that the technology sector is more concerned with the 
signaling theory than other sectors because technology companies are working in a 
market characterized by rapid change, development, and continuing competition that 
makes it necessary not to disclose all their technical information as this would impact 
on their activities and future profit expectations. This is liable to broaden the 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, which stimulates 
management to use dividends policy to convey information about expectations. 
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5-7 Conclusions 
This chapter studies the factors that management takes into consideration when 
setting dividends policy through the questionnaire in order to provide a clear 
understanding of those factors. This understanding can reduce the information 
asymmetry between management and shareholders. Clarifying this understanding 
would help to rationalize shareholders‘ investment decisions in accordance with their 
wishes, which in turn would be reflected on the market value of the company. 
 
The questionnaire was sent to 1319 companies in UK, with 208 responses, amounting 
to a response rate of 15.77% across the different economic sectors.  
 
Data analysis of the results highlight a number of important conclusions, the most 
prominent of which is that management believes in and prefers cash dividends to 
other types of dividends. This is primarily due to the ease of implementation. On 
other hand, the shareholders structuring was the main factor affecting management 
when setting dividend policy. The least important factor is agency theory. 
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6-1 Summary of results 
The main purpose of this study is to verify the effect of dividends policy on the 
market value of companies in UK. In order to achieve this purpose, the important 
theories on this subject have been outlined. The most important one is the Irrelevant 
Theory formulated by Miller and Modigliani in 1961. The subject is dealt with by 
using three empirical models. The first model seeks to explore the relationship 
between dividends policy (represented by three types—cash dividend, shares 
dividend and share repurchase), earnings, the investment policy (represented by 
retained earnings) and market value of a company. The purpose of the second model 
is to investigate whether or not companies in the UK adopt a residual dividends 
policy. The third model explores the most important factors that affect the 
management when setting dividends policy. The results of the study can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. There is a relationship between dividends policy (cash and repurchase), the 
earnings and investment policy (retained earnings) and the market value of 
companies in the UK. This result indicates clearly that the Irrelevant Theory is 
invalid. The researcher believes that this result is arrived at because the 
Irrelevant Theory is based on market efficiency assumptions which are 
unrealistic as one cannot be sure of their existence in any financial market. In 
addition, the result suggests that dividends policy, earnings and investment 
policy act jointly and simultaneously in influencing the market value of a 
company. 
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2. The results show that the impact is different across economic sectors; this 
means that there is an impact according to a company‘s activity (economic 
sector) on the relationship between dividends policy, earnings and investment 
policy, and the market value of companies in the UK. 
3. The results indicate that there is no effect of a shares dividend policy on the 
market value of a company in UK. This is because these dividends are 
deemed a transfer of funds within the equity accounts and does not include 
any outside cash flows. 
4. The study found that UK companies in general do not follow a residual 
dividends policy—further proof that the companies in UK do not prefer 
investment policy to dividends policy. This result confirms previous findings 
which indicate that the Irrelevant Theory is invalid. 
5. The analysis of the results of the economic sectors shows that banks and 
insurance companies sectors follow a residual dividends policy in the UK, 
which means that they prefer investment policy over dividends policy. This is 
attributed to the nature of the activities of banks and insurance companies that 
rely heavily on investment in their operations. The result is supported through 
the analysis of the banking sector in the first part of this study where it is clear 
that there is no effect of any type of dividends policy (cash dividends, shares 
dividends and stock buyback) on the market value of the company. However, 
there is an effect of the earnings and investment policy (retained earnings) on 
market value. The study, however, could not confirm the same result for the 
insurance sector. 
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6. On the other hand, it has been arrived at that around 69% of companies‘ 
managements in the UK believe that cash dividends are the most important 
type of dividend for shareholders. Also, approximately 72% of companies‘ 
managements in the UK prefer cash dividends, where 51% of them indicated 
that the cause of their preference for cash dividends is due to its easy 
implementation. This result clearly highlights that cash dividends are the most 
important type of dividend, which makes many people calling cash dividends 
as a dividends policy. 
7. The study finds that about 47% of the companies‘ managements highlight 
they have studied investors‘ wishes regarding dividends policy. 
8. The research finds that the factors affecting the management when preparing 
dividends policy is in order of importance: shareholders structure; financing 
decisions; signaling theory; a company‘s market value; investment decisions; 
and finally the agency theory. This outcome is logical, as satisfying the 
company‘s major shareholders (the structure of capital—the first factor) 
would lead to a reduction in conflict between management and shareholders 
(agency theory—the last factor). Financing decisions come second because it 
is intimately connected with management‘s operations, evaluating its work 
and reflect the cost of financing on the outcome of the direct activity of the 
company. Management then tends to send a signal to shareholders. The 
market value of the company takes fourth position because it is not related 
directly to a company‘s activities. The investment decision occupies the fifth 
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rank despite its importance as its outcomes are reflected in future periods and 
often necessitates funds that exceed those required for dividends. 
 
6-2 Study limits 
The main limits of the study are related to the period of time and the size of the 
sample covered by the study. Most research seeks to cover the largest possible 
proportion of its targeted community and for the longest period of time possible in 
order to attain rigorous and reliable results that can be generalized confidently. The 
researcher in this study, however, faced a number of hurdles in that the longer the 
period covered, the more limited the sample. A period of ten years was adopted for 
this purpose. Also, the researcher excluded two years (2008 and 2009) from the 
period covered by the study because these two years were significantly affected by 
the latest global financial crisis, which led to their exclusion from the sample to be 
sure that the study results are not influenced by the global financial crisis. 
Consequently, the ten years selected were 1998 to 2007. 
 
The adoption of the first hypothesis on annual and semi-annual data contributed to 
the reduction of the size of the sample because of the lack of semi-annual data in Data 
Stream. With this in mind, the researcher attempted to access data directly from the 
companies; however, many of them to deal with requests from students because of 
their management‘s internal instructions and procedures. This explains the difference 
between the size of the sample in the first and second parts, because the second part 
depends only on annual data, which is widely available in Data Stream. 
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A further limitation was the lack of response by management in the companies 
concerned to the questionnaires. This contributed to reduce the size of the sample—
thereby raising questions over the possibility of generalizing the results from this part 
of the study. 
 
The problem related to data collection affected the representation sample of the 
economic sector, making it both unfit and inconsistent, which may gives rise to 
doubts as to the results of this sector. This can be observed clearly in the responses 
rate to the questionnaire, which contributed to a lack of validity of some results. 
 
6- 3 Recommendations 
The following areas can be explored in by future researchers on the effect of 
dividends policy on market value: 
1) Researchers can retest the first and second models using the same 
methodology by increasing the size of the sample and prolonging the time 
period in order to attain results that can be considered stronger and more 
comprehensive and therefore open to generalization. This requires obtaining 
data from the companies themselves, or through other data-providing bodies 
such as Data Stream, especially in relation to semi-annual data. 
2) The researcher believes that retesting the management questionnaire with the 
aim of increasing the response rate is very important in helping to generalize 
the results. 
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3) The researcher believes that surveying the importance of the factors that affect 
management when preparing their dividends policy is only part of the picture. 
This picture will be completed if investors‘ wishes are investigated regarding 
their preferences towards cash dividends or capital gains along with the 
reasons for such a preference. This would add an extra dimension to 
understanding the relationship between dividends policy and market value 
which will improve the results of study and make the results more 
comprehensive. 
4) Furthermore, using methodologies other than the questionnaire, such as 
interviews with management and/or shareholders will increase the explanatory 
power of the results. 
5) Despite the fact that the dividends policy is one of the financial topics, it 
could be examined and discussed through another approach of operational 
research that is the subject of game theory. 
6) Considering cash dividends as the most important type of dividends and the 
most common and applicable as well emanate from being a cash flow out, 
making it an interesting situation, especially during the period of the global 
financial crisis that began in 2008. The reason is to explore the effect of this 
financial crisis on the relationship between the dividends policy and the 
market value by comparing the results of this relationship for the time period 
covered by this study or part of it with the results of the relationship of the 
global financial crisis period. 
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Appendix 3-1 
List of companies by sector in the first model 
Sr. 
No. Company Name Sector 
1 Barclays Banks 
2 Lloyds Banking Group Banks 
3 Royal Bank of Scotland Group Banks 
4 Standard Chartered Banks 
5 Anglo American Basic Materials 
6 Anglo Pacific Group Basic Materials 
7 Antofagasta Basic Materials 
8 Avocet Basic Materials Basic Materials 
9 BHP Billiton Basic Materials 
10 Carclo Basic Materials 
11 Croda International Basic Materials 
12 Cropper (James) Basic Materials 
13 Elementis Basic Materials 
14 Johnson Matthey Basic Materials 
15 Lonmin Basic Materials 
16 Norman Hay Basic Materials 
17 Rio Tinto Basic Materials 
18 Scapa Group Basic Materials 
19 United Kingdom Coal Basic Materials 
20 Victrex Basic Materials 
21 Yule Catto Basic Materials 
22 Abbeycrest Consumer Goods 
23 AGA Rangemaster Group Consumer Goods 
24 Airea Consumer Goods 
25 Airsprung Furniture Group Consumer Goods 
26 Alexandra Consumer Goods 
27 Anglo-Eastern Plantations Consumer Goods 
28 Associated British Foods Consumer Goods 
29 Barr (Agency) Consumer Goods 
30 Barratt Developments Consumer Goods 
31 Bellway Consumer Goods 
32 Berkeley Group Holdings (the) Consumer Goods 
33 Bovis Homes Group Consumer Goods 
34 Cadbury Consumer Goods 
35 Carr's Milling Consumer Goods 
36 Chapelthorpe Consumer Goods 
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37 Character Group Consumer Goods 
38 Dairy Crest Consumer Goods 
39 Dawson International Consumer Goods 
40 Devro Consumer Goods 
41 Diageo Consumer Goods 
42 Games Workshop Consumer Goods 
43 Headlam Group Consumer Goods 
44 Hornby Consumer Goods 
45 Imperial Consumer Goods Group Consumer Goods 
46 Mcbride Consumer Goods 
47 Nichols Consumer Goods 
48 Northern Foods Consumer Goods 
49 Persimmon Consumer Goods 
50 Photo-ME International Consumer Goods 
51 Pittard Consumer Goods 
52 Portmeirion Group Consumer Goods 
53 PZ Cussons Consumer Goods 
54 Reckitt Benckiser Group Consumer Goods 
55 Redrow Consumer Goods 
56 Robert Wiseman Dairies Consumer Goods 
57 SSL International Consumer Goods 
58 Taylor Wimpey Consumer Goods 
59 Unilever (United Kingdom) Consumer Goods 
60 Uniq Consumer Goods 
61 Victoria Consumer Goods 
62 Vitec Group Consumer Goods 
63 Worthington Group Consumer Goods 
64 Aegis Group Consumer Services 
65 Arriva Consumer Services 
66 Avis Europe Consumer Services 
67 Bloomsbury Publishing Consumer Services 
68 British Airways Consumer Services 
69 British Sky Broadcasting Group Consumer Services 
70 Brown (N) Group Consumer Services 
71 Caffyns Consumer Services 
72 Carpetright Consumer Services 
73 Chime Communications Consumer Services 
74 Clinton Cards Consumer Services 
75 Daily Mail 'A' Consumer Services 
76 Dart Group Consumer Services 
77 DSG International Consumer Services 
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78 Enterprise Inns Consumer Services 
79 Euromoney Institutional Investor Consumer Services 
80 Findel Consumer Services 
81 First Group Consumer Services 
82 French Connection Group Consumer Services 
83 Fuller Smith 'A' Consumer Services 
84 Game Group Consumer Services 
85 GO-Ahead Group Consumer Services 
86 Greene King Consumer Services 
87 Greggs Consumer Services 
88 Haynes Publishng Consumer Services 
89 Holidaybreak Consumer Services 
90 Huntsworth Consumer Services 
91 Inchcape Consumer Services 
92 International Greetings Consumer Services 
93 ITE Group Consumer Services 
94 JD Sports Fashion Consumer Services 
95 JJB Sports Consumer Services 
96 Johnston Press Consumer Services 
97 Kingfisher Consumer Services 
98 Ladbrokes Consumer Services 
99 Lookers Consumer Services 
100 Majestic Wine Consumer Services 
101 Mallett Consumer Services 
102 Marks and Spencer Group Consumer Services 
103 Marston's Consumer Services 
104 Millennium and Copthorne Hotels Consumer Services 
105 Morrison (WM) Supermarkets Consumer Services 
106 Moss Brothers Group Consumer Services 
107 Mothercare Consumer Services 
108 National Express Consumer Services 
109 Next Consumer Services 
110 Pearson Consumer Services 
111 Pendragon Consumer Services 
112 Quarto Group Consumer Services 
113 Rank Group Consumer Services 
114 Reed Elsevier Consumer Services 
115 Restaurant Group Consumer Services 
116 Sainsbury (J) Consumer Services 
117 Sportech Consumer Services 
118 Stagecoach Group Consumer Services 
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119 Ted Baker Consumer Services 
120 Tesco Consumer Services 
121 Thorntons Consumer Services 
122 Topps Tiles Consumer Services 
123 Tottenham Hotspur Consumer Services 
124 Trinity Mirror Consumer Services 
125 United Business Consumer Services Consumer Services 
126 Wetherspoon (JD) Consumer Services 
127 Whitbread Consumer Services 
128 Wilmington Group Consumer Services 
129 WPP Consumer Services 
130 Young and Company Brewery 'A' Consumer Services 
131 Astrazeneca Health Care 
132 BTG Health Care 
133 Care United Kingdom Health Care 
134 Consort Medical Health Care 
135 Eco Animal Health Group Health Care 
136 IS Pharma Health Care 
137 Nestor Healthcare Health Care 
138 Oxford Biomedica Health Care 
139 Skyepharma Health Care 
140 Smith and Nephew Health Care 
141 Source Bioscience Health Care 
142 Acal Industrials 
143 AEA Technology Industrials 
144 Aggreko Industrials 
145 Alumasc Group Industrials 
146 Ashtead Group Industrials 
147 Atkins (WS) Industrials 
148 Autologic Industrials 
149 Avingtrans Industrials 
150 Avon Rubber Industrials 
151 Babcock International Industrials 
152 BAE Systems Industrials 
153 Balfour Beatty Industrials 
154 BBA Aviation Industrials 
155 Bodycote Industrials 
156 British Polythene Industries Industrials 
157 BSS Group Industrials 
158 Bunzl Industrials 
159 Business Post Group Industrials 
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160 Cape Industrials 
161 Capita Group Industrials 
162 Chamberlin Industrials 
163 Chemring Group Industrials 
164 Chloride Group Industrials 
165 Christie Group Industrials 
166 Clarkson Industrials 
167 Cobham Industrials 
168 Communisis Industrials 
169 Cookson Group Industrials 
170 Coral Products Industrials 
171 Cosalt Industrials 
172 Datacash Group Industrials 
173 Davis Service Group Industrials 
174 Dawson Holdings Industrials 
175 De La Rue Industrials 
176 Delta Industrials 
177 Dialight Industrials 
178 Diploma Industrials 
179 Domino Printing Sciences Industrials 
180 Electrocomponents Industrials 
181 Elektron Industrials 
182 Ensor Holdings Industrials 
183 Fenner Industrials 
184 Forth Ports Industrials 
185 Galiform Industrials 
186 Galliford TRY Industrials 
187 Gleeson (MJ) Group Industrials 
188 Halma Industrials 
189 Harvey Nash Group Industrials 
190 Hays Industrials 
191 Heywood Williams Industrials 
192 Hill and Smith Industrials 
193 Holders Technology Industrials 
194 Homeserve Industrials 
195 Hydro International Industrials 
196 IMI Industrials 
197 Interserve Industrials 
198 James Halstead Industrials 
199 Jarvis Industrials 
200 Johnson Service Group Industrials 
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201 Keller Industrials 
202 Kier Group Industrials 
203 Latchways Industrials 
204 Lavendon Group Industrials 
205 LOW and Bonar Industrials 
206 Lupus Capital Industrials 
207 Macfarlane Group Industrials 
208 Management Consulting Group Industrials 
209 Manganese Bronze Holdings Industrials 
210 Marshalls Industrials 
211 Mears Group Industrials 
212 Meggitt Industrials 
213 Metalrax Group Industrials 
214 Mitie Group Industrials 
215 Molins Industrials 
216 Morgan Crucible Industrials 
217 Morgan Sindall Industrials 
218 Newmark Security Industrials 
219 Northgate Industrials 
220 NWF Group Industrials 
221 Parkwood Holdings Industrials 
222 Penna Consulting Industrials 
223 Pochin's Industrials 
224 Premier Farnell Industrials 
225 Renew Holdings Industrials 
226 Renishaw Industrials 
227 Renold Industrials 
228 Rentokil Initial Industrials 
229 Rexam Industrials 
230 Ricardo Industrials 
231 ROK Industrials 
232 Rolls-Royce Group Industrials 
233 Rotork Industrials 
234 RPC Group Industrials 
235 Senior Industrials 
236 Serco Group Industrials 
237 Severfield-Rowen Industrials 
238 Shanks Group Industrials 
239 SIG Industrials 
240 Smith (DS) Industrials 
241 Spectris Industrials 
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242 Speedy Hire Industrials 
243 Spirax-Sarco Industrials 
244 Stadium Group Industrials 
245 Thorpe (FW) Industrials 
246 Titon Holdings Industrials 
247 Tomkins Industrials 
248 Travis Perkins Industrials 
249 Trifast Industrials 
250 Ultra Electronics Holdings Industrials 
251 Umeco Industrials 
252 Volex Group Industrials 
253 VP Industrials 
254 Weir Group Industrials 
255 White Young Green Industrials 
256 Wolseley Industrials 
257 WSP Group Industrials 
258 Amlin Insurance 
259 Aviva Insurance 
260 British Insurance Holdings Insurance 
261 Chaucer Holdings Insurance 
262 Hardy Underwriting Bermuda (di) Insurance 
263 Hiscox Insurance 
264 Jardine Lloyd Thompson Insurance 
265 Legal and General Insurance 
266 Prudential Insurance 
267 RSA Insurance Group Insurance 
268 Saint James's Place Insurance 
269 Amec Oil & Gas 
270 BG Group Oil & Gas 
271 BP Oil & Gas 
272 Cairn Energy Oil & Gas 
273 Emerald Energy Oil & Gas 
274 GTL Resources Oil & Gas 
275 Hunting Oil & Gas 
276 KBC Advanced Technologies Oil & Gas 
277 Northern Petroleum Oil & Gas 
278 Porvair Oil & Gas 
279 Premier Oil Oil & Gas 
280 Royal Dutch Shell B Oil & Gas 
281 Soco International Oil & Gas 
282 Alphameric Technology 
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283 Aveva Group Technology 
284 Belgravium Technologies Technology 
285 Clinical Computing Technology 
286 CML Microsystems Technology 
287 Delcam Technology 
288 Fidessa Group Technology 
289 Filtronic Technology 
290 Gresham Computing Technology 
291 Imagination Technologies Technology 
292 Intelek Technology 
293 Invensys Technology 
294 Kewill Technology 
295 Kofax Technology 
296 Logica Technology 
297 Netcall Technology 
298 Northamber Technology 
299 Pace Technology 
300 Parity Group Technology 
301 Portrait Software Technology 
302 Psion Technology 
303 RM Technology 
304 Sage Group Technology 
305 Sopheon Technology 
306 Spirent Communications Technology 
307 Triad Group Technology 
308 Ultrasis Technology 
309 BT Group Telecommunications 
310 Cable and Wireless Telecommunications 
311 Vodafone Group Telecommunications 
312 Centrica Utilities 
313 International Power Utilities 
314 National Grid Utilities 
315 Pennon Group Utilities 
316 United Utilities Group Utilities 
317 Capital and Regional Real Estate Investment & Service 
318 CLS Holdings Real Estate Investment & Service 
319 Daejan Holdings Real Estate Investment & Service 
320 Development Securities Real Estate Investment & Service 
321 DTZ Holdings Real Estate Investment & Service 
322 Grainger Real Estate Investment & Service 
323 Helical Bar Real Estate Investment & Service 
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324 Minerva Real Estate Investment & Service 
325 Panther Securities Real Estate Investment & Service 
326 Quintain Estates and Development Real Estate Investment & Service 
327 Savills Real Estate Investment & Service 
328 ST Modwen Properties Real Estate Investment & Service 
329 Wynnstay Properties Real Estate Investment & Service 
330 British Land Real Estate Investment Trusts 
331 Great Portland Estate Real Estate Investment Trusts 
332 Hammerson Real Estate Investment Trusts 
333 Land Securities Group Real Estate Investment Trusts 
334 Liberty International Real Estate Investment Trusts 
335 Mckay Securities Real Estate Investment Trusts 
336 Mucklow (A and J) Group Real Estate Investment Trusts 
337 Primary Health Properties Real Estate Investment Trusts 
338 Segro Real Estate Investment Trusts 
339 Shaftesbury Real Estate Investment Trusts 
340 Workspace Group Real Estate Investment Trusts 
341 Aberdeen Asset Management Financial Services  
342 Albemarle and Bond Holdings Financial Services  
343 Camellia Financial Services  
344 Charles Stanley Group Financial Services  
345 Charles Taylor Consulting Financial Services  
346 City of London Group Financial Services  
347 Evolution Group Financial Services  
348 F and C Asset Management Financial Services  
349 GR Holdings Financial Services  
350 Guinness Peat Group Financial Services  
351 Helphire Group Financial Services  
352 Integrated Asset Management Financial Services  
353 
InterConsumer Serviceste Capital 
Group Financial Services  
354 Leeds Group Financial Services  
355 Numis Financial Services  
356 Paragon Group of Companies Financial Services  
357 Provident Financial Financial Services  
358 Quayle Munro Holdings Financial Services  
359 Rathbone Brothers Financial Services  
360 S and U Financial Services  
361 Schroders Financial Services  
362 Walker Crips Group Financial Services  
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Appendix 4-1 
SFCF by company and sectors in model 2 
Name 
SFCF 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
APITAL  0.08059 0.11789 0.03815 0.0161 0.02175 0.04096 0.04048 0.03612 0.03055 0.03619 
BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS  0.07222 0.09206 0.10847 0.13316 0.12339 0.17452 0.16792 0.15022 0.08963 0.07893 
BARCLAYS  -0.02947 -0.00715 -0.00939 -0.02553 -0.02202 -0.01517 -0.00823 -0.06386 -0.11301 -0.13918 
BEALE  -0.03194 -0.07977 -0.10225 -0.06162 -0.10163 -0.19563 -0.10652 -0.13005 -0.25709 -0.14384 
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP 0.02485 0.02513 0.02309 0.01415 -0.01239 0.00582 0.00694 -0.04975 -0.06173 -0.07434 
ROYAL BANK OF SCTL.GP.  -0.03081 -0.01214 0.0823 0.03676 0.01529 0.01034 0.02831 -0.00022 -0.02205 -0.05164 
STANDARD CHARTERED  -0.08545 -0.05887 -0.04493 -0.05655 -0.00929 0.00331 0.01962 0.00391 0.00147 0.00451 
Banks -2E-06 0.011022 0.013632 0.008067 0.002157 0.003451 0.021219 -0.00766 -0.04746 -0.04134 
                      
ANGLO AMERICAN PLC  -0.12603 -0.18884 -0.04287 -0.07966 -0.0712 -0.13317 -0.07881 -0.04232 -0.02085 -0.00337 
ANGLO PACIFIC GROUP  -0.0467 -0.22727 0.03133 0.14103 0.14886 0.00453 0.02747 0.04736 0.00742 -0.01646 
ANTOFAGASTA PLC  -0.56888 -1.13049 -0.16099 -0.09954 0.00038 0.06865 0.19964 0.20506 0.1924 0.09896 
AXIS-SHIELD PLC  -0.01095 -0.05542 -0.0295 -0.00747 -0.02482 -0.17788 -0.06106 -0.0289 0.04363 -0.00565 
BHP BILLITON PLC  -0.04956 -0.16222 -0.06418 -0.29356 -0.20725 -0.17577 -0.06049 -0.0055 -0.04074 -0.02407 
BIOCOMPATIBLES INT'L  -0.09675 -0.27946 -0.04849 -0.04311 -0.08137 -0.18312 -0.13522 -0.11925 -0.09538 -0.12297 
BLACKS LEISURE GROUP  -0.04038 -0.09807 -0.03966 -0.09752 -0.13141 -0.08154 -0.02979 -0.01895 -0.01114 -0.09232 
ANGLESEY MINING PLC -0.00945 -0.02674 -0.04813 -0.05259 -0.06264 -0.10603 -0.04 -0.02753 -0.02578 -0.03247 
CARCLO PLC  -0.04702 -0.12986 -0.13034 -0.13743 -0.43892 -0.09696 -0.12481 -0.08571 -0.00275 -0.01123 
CRODA INTERNATIONAL  -0.04325 -0.04365 -0.06959 -0.05992 -0.00741 -0.01083 -0.01461 -0.0021 -0.00884 -0.02558 
DYSON GROUP PLC  -0.95038 -0.23325 -0.13147 -0.21435 -0.11125 -0.02321 -0.15522 -0.10623 -0.06515 -0.0773 
ELEMENTIS PLC  -0.01632 -0.12735 0.01759 -0.03553 -0.06063 -0.14953 -0.20024 -0.06533 0.03428 0.01495 
INVERESK PLC  -0.14977 -0.20634 -0.62906 -0.36523 0.32121 0.49799 -0.04519 -0.34988 -0.06374 -0.1075 
JAMES CROPPER PLC  -0.15271 -0.29304 -0.04605 -0.29608 -0.18869 -0.14035 -0.21909 -0.21165 -0.24855 -0.14313 
JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC  -0.00899 -0.04054 -0.02022 -0.01495 -0.0321 -0.03739 -0.0324 -0.01754 -0.01099 -0.0104 
LONMIN PLC  -0.06773 -0.05928 0.03521 0.04413 -0.00538 -0.0982 -0.05663 -0.0495 0.07269 -0.00011 
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MWANA AFRICA PLC  -0.18159 -0.11115 -0.08931 -0.03811 -0.01472 -0.07654 -0.06444 -0.03822 -0.0149 0.13974 
NORMAN HAY PLC  0.05842 -0.04389 -0.02413 -0.13067 -0.01116 -0.08543 -0.03784 0.05704 0.05611 0.00788 
PALMARIS CAPITAL PLC  -0.23391 -0.38008 -0.22049 -0.1343 -0.21844 -0.06916 -0.04081 -0.00861 -0.00672 -0.01025 
RANDGOLD RESOURCES  -0.78562 -1.24766 -1.43958 -0.07929 0.59072 0.13302 -0.06969 -0.05276 -0.01703 -0.01136 
REFLEC PLC  -5.48907 -11.3316 -0.02622 -0.03437 -0.30744 -0.36824 -0.07765 -0.07284 0.04239 0.01984 
RIO TINTO PLC  -0.09112 -0.05521 -0.02164 -0.04927 -0.05309 -0.06439 -0.05208 0.02295 -0.01471 -0.01617 
SCAPA GROUP PLC  -0.01955 -0.06662 -0.74145 -0.04734 -0.1196 -0.22839 -0.01526 0.022 0.03316 0.09683 
TREATT PLC  0.03388 -0.02767 -0.00428 -0.07995 -0.07998 -0.02739 -0.01626 0.02517 0.00925 -0.01481 
UK COAL PLC  0.04651 0.12377 -1.36791 -0.92013 -0.44738 -0.62063 -0.57094 -0.36915 -0.38474 -0.04497 
VICTREX PLC  -0.00844 0.00283 0.04815 0.02592 -0.00348 0.01484 0.01195 0.03082 -0.00312 -0.02089 
YULE CATTO & CO PLC  -0.05785 -0.05457 -0.11063 -0.16753 -0.06226 -0.03665 -0.08297 -0.02525 -0.04124 -0.03647 
ZOTEFOAMS PLC  -0.02813 -0.04518 -0.16799 -0.24623 -0.27137 -0.12277 -0.05072 -0.07185 -0.06483 -0.04607 
Basic Materials -0.32648 -0.59067 -0.19792 -0.12547 -0.06967 -0.08552 -0.07476 -0.04852 -0.02321 -0.01769 
                      
ABBEYCREST PLC  0.02197 0.076 0.0141 -0.04092 -0.08503 -0.56339 -0.05676 -0.23504 -1.96576 -0.40725 
AGA RANGEMASTER  -0.08314 -0.04873 -0.05724 -0.08079 -0.04181 -0.05058 -0.04103 0.00757 -0.00432 -0.13142 
AIREA PLC  0.01788 -0.00525 0.04601 0.03086 -0.09046 -0.05159 -0.06907 -0.06063 0.04248 -0.21001 
AIRSPRUNG FURNITURE  -0.01281 0.0196 -0.04609 -0.13994 -0.08832 -0.07158 -0.23339 -0.35885 -0.15234 0.18086 
ALEXANDRA PLC  -0.00974 -0.01015 0.0145 -0.023 -0.0981 0.03535 0.02292 -0.00151 0.01598 0.04246 
ANGLO-EASTERN PLANTS  -0.14797 -0.21073 -0.18002 -0.28214 -0.04439 0.09364 0.01881 0.03106 -0.0139 0.07164 
ANTONOV PLC  -0.03519 -0.03723 -0.03806 -0.08039 -0.06301 -0.06479 -0.18257 -0.14836 -0.12682 -0.13159 
ARRIVA PLC  -0.4469 -0.35342 -0.22748 -0.23105 -0.13465 -0.27506 -0.27698 -0.19713 -0.11531 -0.13026 
ASHTEAD GROUP PLC  -0.14748 -0.27476 -0.25428 -0.4467 -0.70111 -1.54031 -1.81061 -0.46063 -0.27416 -0.24145 
BBA AVIATION  -0.03832 -0.04047 -0.06887 -0.03715 -0.05468 -0.11276 -0.06158 -0.05317 -0.08704 -0.04488 
BERKELEY  0.01464 -0.5164 -0.14176 -0.93014 -0.28199 -0.25827 -0.8205 -0.272 -0.34576 0.06044 
BLOOMSBURY  0.10971 0.05424 0.02193 0.02427 0.03241 0.06785 0.05129 0.0454 -0.00826 0.03922 
BOVIS HOMES GROUP  0.11017 0.09684 0.09334 0.0931 0.12411 0.16325 0.13181 0.07538 0.06393 0.02661 
BRIT INSURANCE HOLD  0.02005 -0.13663 -0.07582 -0.42028 0.04804 0.11194 0.04873 -0.0164 0.11974 0.057 
BRITISH AMERICAN TOB  -0.03087 -0.05399 -0.02226 -0.02604 -0.02077 -0.01442 -0.02036 0.00701 0.00504 0.00313 
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CADBURY PLC  0.00019 0.00136 0.00901 0.00371 0.00286 -0.00025 0.00165 0.01303 -0.00096 -0.01572 
CARR'S MILLING INDS  -0.25717 -0.26289 0.00315 -0.0677 -0.09985 -0.07659 -0.05371 -0.01571 -0.0184 -0.01059 
CASSIDY BROTHERS PLC  -0.221 -0.18533 -0.31644 -0.16965 0.0972 -0.06482 -0.12467 -0.17025 -0.08096 -0.12231 
CHAPELTHORPE PLC  -0.10782 -0.16531 -0.13769 -0.15734 -0.17368 -0.01055 -0.00606 -0.0316 -0.00944 -0.57408 
CHARACTER GROUP PLC  0.05192 0.057 -0.24804 -1.20957 0.00737 0.21643 0.01395 -0.05015 -0.05259 0.11315 
CHURCHILL CHINA PLC  -0.10944 -0.12521 0.08146 -0.05726 -0.03626 -0.00042 -0.03609 -0.04824 -0.0027 -0.02279 
COBURG GROUP PLC  -0.27353 -0.41875 -0.06752 -0.05467 -0.12487 -0.07634 -0.25169 -0.41781 -0.24954 -0.14859 
COLEFAX GROUP PLC  -0.00205 -0.06987 -0.01035 -0.02128 -0.04662 -0.06511 -0.02854 -0.0328 0.02424 0.05824 
CRANSWICK PLC  -0.05683 -0.00123 -0.03217 0.01818 0.02545 0.01697 -0.01261 -0.03945 0.00383 0.00873 
CREIGHTONS PLC  -0.20285 -1.09363 -0.8171 -0.08065 -0.17874 -0.26631 0.04995 -0.01737 0.20046 0.04529 
DAIRY CREST GROUP  -0.01429 -0.04809 -0.15821 -0.00716 -0.03587 -0.06509 -0.01374 -0.03358 -0.04156 -0.02906 
DAWSON INTERNATIONAL  -0.14763 -0.05898 -0.28362 -0.05606 -0.17154 -0.49046 -0.20926 0.10107 -0.07114 -0.35613 
DEVRO PLC  -0.02121 -0.05664 -0.03701 -0.12376 0.00845 -0.0089 -0.03387 -0.04205 -0.06568 -0.02716 
DIAGEO PLC  -0.03543 -0.00691 -0.00616 0.00596 -0.02518 -0.00319 0.00238 0.0093 0.01887 -0.00051 
FINSBURY FOOD GROUP  -0.09003 -0.20846 -0.08624 -0.21786 -0.01057 0.0702 -0.12816 -0.20056 -0.03908 -0.10098 
GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP  -0.02347 0.00457 -0.01067 0.01595 -0.00307 -0.01295 -0.0334 -0.03513 -0.11904 -0.10436 
GKN PLC  -0.02263 -0.02536 -0.01263 -0.06858 -0.12259 -0.14073 -0.11324 -0.09605 -0.07041 -0.03731 
HARVARD INTERNATION  0.01618 0.04229 0.03438 -0.01599 -0.00362 0.046 0.0386 0.01776 -0.0181 -0.35398 
HAVELOCK EUROPA PLC  0.03735 -0.13519 -0.05072 -0.07937 -0.08145 -0.0044 -0.03969 0.0147 0.03371 -0.02821 
HEADLAM GROUP PLC  0.03767 0.02424 0.00141 0.05707 -0.00855 -0.06266 -0.00287 0.0074 0.00108 0.00125 
HIDONG ESTATE PLC  -0.01287 0.03717 -0.0087 -0.14281 -0.18459 0.0708 0.07895 0.04591 -0.05733 0 
HORNBY PLC  -0.06138 -0.06964 -0.06337 -0.00054 -0.00315 0.02453 0.01168 0.00528 0.00405 0.00224 
IMPERIAL Consumer Goods GRP  0.0385 0.02176 0.04028 0.03388 0.03434 0.01379 0.01482 0.01402 0.02951 0.02453 
INTIMAS GROUP PLC  -0.1742 -0.13515 -0.30504 -0.08311 0.02056 -0.06203 -0.18409 -0.11554 0.00195 -0.2809 
LEWIS OF HUNGERFORD  -0.22601 -0.05662 0.02637 -0.16238 -0.11666 0.05534 -0.16484 -0.1467 0.01768 0.05588 
M.P. EVANS  -0.01902 -0.03842 -0.05075 -0.04214 -0.01902 -0.01332 -0.04515 -0.07571 -0.11372 -0.1084 
MCBRIDE PLC  -0.02947 -0.06005 -0.11254 -0.07959 -0.00284 0.04222 -0.01374 -0.01121 -0.02227 -0.01938 
NICHOLS PLC  -0.10192 -0.12686 -0.10789 -0.14326 -0.03981 -0.00786 -0.0152 0.00186 0.02426 0.02739 
NORTHERN FOODS PLC  -0.08315 -0.06801 -0.11253 -0.03297 -0.09518 -0.04122 -0.07104 -0.04218 -0.05898 -0.0216 
NXT PLC  -0.04131 -0.04752 -0.01671 -0.03296 -0.11557 -0.29128 -0.09762 -0.12811 -0.04759 -0.11808 
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PERSIMMON PLC  0.06477 0.11244 0.1034 0.19201 0.11177 0.15124 0.16717 0.1358 0.08576 0.05527 
PGI GROUP PLC  -0.11555 -0.38559 -0.20178 -0.44653 -0.27237 -0.22612 -0.41596 -0.61437 -0.05352 -0.03614 
PHOTO-ME INT'L PLC  -0.27708 -0.11855 -0.01869 -0.12922 -0.15816 -0.24126 0.00293 -0.04349 -0.03564 -0.11078 
PITTARDS PLC  -0.14878 0.0236 0.06634 -0.27977 -0.15049 -0.22759 -0.38849 -0.67008 -1.25331 -0.20038 
PORTMEIRION GROUP  -0.064 -0.09122 -0.03864 -0.11534 -0.01363 -0.05035 -0.10882 -0.03253 -0.0687 0.00322 
PZ CUSSONS PLC  -0.31944 -0.43647 -0.10322 -0.03303 0.02009 -0.00486 0.02539 -0.00705 -0.01102 -0.0034 
R.E.A. HOLDINGS PLC  -0.14122 -0.83971 -0.39266 -0.33398 -0.11683 -0.53771 -0.01636 -0.17838 -0.12825 -0.07974 
RECKITT BENCKISER  -0.00046 -0.04062 -0.02205 -0.0014 0.0133 0.02134 0.02584 0.02208 0.02754 0.02179 
REDROW PLC  0.0661 0.08063 0.08017 0.10988 0.14003 0.16427 0.12018 0.13059 0.07477 0.04537 
ROBERT WISEMAN  -0.09172 -0.08097 -0.21397 -0.26544 -0.2096 -0.04374 -0.03162 -0.03977 -0.06118 -0.05561 
SINCLAIR (WILLIAM)  -0.0114 -0.10607 -0.03817 -0.04166 0.00959 -0.16445 -0.1357 -0.14472 -0.21159 -0.12943 
SLIMMA PLC  -0.18997 0.11985 0.11688 0.17384 0.04746 0.0365 0.03571 0.04737 -0.01416 -0.21552 
SSL INTERNATIONAL  0.02092 0.02188 0.01661 0.00728 -0.04643 -0.00142 0.01443 0.01594 0.0275 0.0244 
TAYLOR WIMPEY PLC  0.01435 0.06292 0.0283 0.09253 0.10323 0.1686 0.12134 0.11994 0.07682 0.01392 
THEO FENNELL PLC  0.02491 -0.05204 0.00985 -0.05939 -0.03598 -0.02615 -0.01947 -0.08077 0.00688 0.06632 
UNILEVER PLC  -0.00073 -0.17717 0.00639 -0.02506 0.00495 0.00653 0.04338 0.05723 0.0116 0.03298 
UNIQ PLC  -0.05815 -0.09222 -0.1954 -0.25441 -0.23502 -0.04423 -0.03739 -0.19085 -0.33224 -0.12884 
VICTORIA PLC  -0.19715 -0.11407 -0.36819 -0.41902 -0.18566 -0.31792 -0.07445 -0.12066 -0.22265 -0.09128 
WALKER GREENBANK PLC  -0.022 -0.23688 -0.27491 -0.76096 -0.60392 -0.5746 -0.65934 -0.97243 -0.16908 -0.03449 
WENSUM COMPANY PLC  0.02668 0.04276 0.07012 0.04968 0.02632 -0.01873 -0.03563 0.01902 0.04844 0.02417 
WORTHINGTON GROUP  0.03441 -0.19382 -0.09684 -0.20311 -0.63921 -0.34069 -0.31644 -0.29512 0.16322 0.00688 
WS ATKINS PLC  0.0062 -0.00018 -0.00161 -0.00848 -0.08007 -0.22577 -0.01339 -0.00123 0.01407 0.02674 
Consumer Goods -0.06254 -0.10774 -0.0783 -0.12409 -0.07871 -0.09307 -0.09647 -0.08956 -0.08434 -0.05557 
                      
4IMPRINT GROUP PLC  -0.03198 -0.46904 -0.09203 -0.06674 -0.05014 0.16982 0.13394 0.03299 0.03224 0.0386 
AEGIS GROUP PLC  0.02829 0.02086 0.00132 -0.02327 -0.00595 -0.01356 -0.01292 0.0188 0.02032 0.01976 
AIR PARTNER PLC  0.03868 0.01973 0.00744 -0.11268 0.04942 -0.01519 0.02151 0.02362 -0.01222 0.02101 
ALEXON GROUP PLC  0.06444 0.09756 0.10164 0.01279 0.06577 0.06048 0.06576 0.06017 0.05134 0.02787 
ARENA LEISURE PLC  -0.0057 -0.0049 -0.02424 -0.02605 0.00692 -0.1986 -0.06089 -0.01018 -0.07345 -0.12916 
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ASSOC. BRITISH ENG  -0.03668 -0.17272 -0.63421 -0.24916 -0.16673 -0.31527 -0.77142 -0.11302 0.31863 0.5822 
AVINGTRANS  0.04104 -0.00809 -0.09401 -0.15433 -0.06873 0.02881 -0.01503 0.05936 0.06467 0.00337 
AVIS EUROPE PLC  -1.04741 -0.5893 -0.85815 -1.03559 -1.12343 -2.35478 -1.97121 -1.20818 -0.58187 -0.51965 
AVOCET  -0.34368 -0.96082 -0.0816 -0.12156 -0.11992 -0.03052 0.00603 -0.01492 0.01288 -0.00745 
BELLWAY PLC  0.07414 0.09034 0.11964 0.1193 0.12718 0.18121 0.1416 0.12174 0.09094 0.06996 
BLACK ARROW GROUP  0.01292 -0.11072 -0.07898 -0.07484 -0.32808 -0.18903 -0.2546 -0.19698 -0.22254 -0.20923 
BLUE OAR PLC  -0.19114 0.59602 -0.02315 -0.10926 -0.23011 -0.2638 -0.05987 -0.06441 -0.00373 -0.03505 
BODYCOTE  -0.05734 -0.07109 -0.0474 -0.0639 -0.0982 -0.20825 -0.07947 -0.05888 -0.0307 -0.04951 
BP PLC  -0.11211 -0.04248 -0.02998 -0.05038 -0.06959 -0.06201 -0.03524 -0.00287 -0.0397 -0.04836 
BSKYB GROUP PLC  0.0097 0.00494 -0.00605 -0.00807 -0.0192 0.00825 0.00382 0.00233 0.0156 -0.01543 
CAFFYNS PLC  -0.06387 -0.13382 -0.03062 -0.17193 0.00312 0.08964 -0.10098 -0.12378 -0.17208 -0.10465 
REED ELSEVIER PLC -0.02517 -0.03218 -0.01901 -0.01471 -0.01899 -0.0217 -0.02694 -0.03039 -0.02962 -0.03338 
CARPETRIGHT PLC  -0.03701 -0.11825 -0.00154 -0.03032 -0.02674 -0.02383 -0.00132 -0.03356 -0.03203 -0.03112 
CELTIC PLC  -0.13934 -0.04842 -0.09214 -0.18209 -0.35088 -1.07384 -0.45484 -0.58515 -0.17806 0.07454 
CHIME COMMUNICATIONS  0.00763 0.01697 0.00288 0.01314 0.01147 0.18463 0.05507 0.08706 0.07199 0.0497 
CHRYSALIS GROUP PLC  -0.04376 -0.04843 -0.00811 -0.02279 -0.00384 -0.01002 -0.02488 -0.03713 -0.0002 -0.03303 
CLINTON CARDS PLC  -0.05251 -0.02995 -0.03198 -0.00635 -0.01695 -0.05687 -0.05903 -0.01606 -0.23689 -0.04818 
COFFEE REPUBLIC PLC  -0.17274 -0.49306 -0.28754 -0.15957 -0.53236 -1.03695 -0.36748 -0.46374 -0.27 -0.13592 
CONTENTFILM PLC  0.01113 0.04835 0.02366 0.01992 -0.2426 -4.60804 -1.60525 -0.82825 -0.1214 0.18702 
CRESTON PLC  -0.4894 -0.2989 0.02169 -0.87984 0.00225 0.05789 0.02986 0.0428 -0.0058 0.01239 
DAILY MAIL & GENERAL  0.01078 0.00823 -0.00607 -0.01768 -0.01727 -0.0354 -0.02514 -0.01203 -0.01285 0.01205 
DSG INTERNATIONAL  -0.00738 -0.00175 -0.02452 -0.02043 -0.02745 -0.06104 -0.03232 -0.03836 -0.06722 -0.04921 
ENTERPRISE INNS PLC  -0.11381 -0.36678 -0.13065 -0.12417 -0.00511 0.01993 0.01657 0.0218 0.00246 -0.00025 
EUROMONEY INSTL INV  0.02267 -0.00438 -0.00144 -0.00822 0.00523 -0.0265 0.00843 0.02232 0.03656 -0.00056 
FINDEL PLC  -0.03175 -0.13899 -0.03236 0.0322 0.02348 0.02421 0.02365 0.01942 0.02836 0.02369 
FIRSTGROUP PLC  0.01726 0.01228 -0.00927 -0.07447 -0.07535 -0.05662 -0.11076 -0.05159 -0.07403 -0.072 
FRENCH CONNECTION GR  -0.00954 -0.0756 -0.02822 -0.00212 0.01102 0.04393 0.02975 0.01959 -0.05503 -0.06649 
FULLER, SMITH  -0.18163 -0.2245 -0.19423 -0.42195 -0.26226 -0.08251 -0.12377 -0.11429 -0.09381 -0.08464 
GAME GROUP PLC (THE)  0.022 0.01241 -0.06241 -0.02848 0.00333 -0.07335 -0.06408 -0.0931 -0.09947 -0.01965 
GO-AHEAD GROUP PLC  -0.06145 -0.0191 -0.03408 -0.08304 -0.00576 0.00119 -0.0131 -0.04774 -0.04692 -0.03182 
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GREENE KING PLC  -0.04334 -0.06697 -0.02241 -0.01391 -0.04471 -0.07177 -0.06953 -0.01143 -0.01538 -0.01422 
GREGGS PLC  -0.07232 -0.04096 -0.02419 -0.04567 -0.07161 -0.03872 -0.01385 -0.05065 -0.02159 -0.04672 
H.R. OWEN PLC  -0.01959 -0.16632 -0.37356 -0.1565 -0.12057 -0.24216 -0.15464 -0.29606 -0.1654 0.0383 
HANDMADE PLC  -0.13678 -0.51188 -0.09936 -0.04984 -0.23794 -0.21429 -0.43333 -0.338 -1.01595 -0.25499 
HAYNES PUBLISHING  -0.10449 -0.01794 -0.18182 -0.28144 -0.05841 0.27767 0.11515 0.08221 0.09866 0.08609 
HEAVITREE BREWERY  0.01868 -0.04864 -0.1009 -0.07641 -0.34256 -0.19263 -0.11363 -0.11739 -0.0542 -0.04086 
HOLIDAYBREAK PLC  -0.08411 -0.02647 -0.01871 -0.01566 0.00048 -0.00046 -0.00971 -0.00526 -0.00697 -0.01799 
HUNTSWORTH PLC  0.20582 0.15878 -0.27007 -0.04215 0.00281 0.08109 0.08882 0.06725 0.03144 0.03824 
INCHCAPE PLC  -0.31093 -0.94124 -0.15231 -0.09364 -0.02669 -0.01365 0.02006 0.01549 0.03405 0.00882 
IND Consumer Services DISTBN  0.04621 -0.13467 -0.05744 0.00897 -0.51314 -0.02101 -0.03534 -0.07651 -0.08086 0.01863 
INFORMA PLC  0.0276 0.01547 0.00829 -0.02369 -0.01156 -0.00159 0.02373 -0.02764 0.0094 0.00115 
INSTORE PLC  -0.26553 0.07628 0.01761 -0.19378 -0.63942 0.06831 -0.11555 -0.08396 -0.04763 -0.31753 
INTERNAT GREETINGS  -0.00523 -0.03807 0.00418 -0.00701 -0.03723 0.03672 0.00457 -0.03621 -0.00995 -0.02098 
ITE GROUP PLC  0.31436 0.06997 0.01326 0.01534 0.02308 0.03696 0.02353 0.02451 0.02293 0.02261 
JACQUES VERT PLC  -0.80504 -0.07104 0.09029 -0.06886 0.05796 -0.1203 -0.01264 0.04407 -0.00461 0.05407 
JD SPORTS FASHION  -0.1097 -0.23295 0.00308 -0.02647 -0.01012 -0.07561 -0.16314 0.00506 0.03754 -0.00506 
JJB SPORTS PLC  0.00298 -0.06857 -0.02748 -0.01826 -0.00039 -0.08011 -0.02304 -0.1103 -0.13402 -0.04669 
JOHN SWAN & SONS  -0.02615 -0.09436 -0.12517 -0.04848 -0.08122 -0.37978 -0.20918 -0.16974 -0.10068 -0.05665 
JOHNSTON PRESS PLC  0.03758 0.04944 0.0208 0.02879 0.06665 0.05729 0.05107 0.0164 0.0101 0.05336 
KINGFISHER PLC  -0.02245 -0.03295 -0.04609 -0.09207 -0.11391 -0.05252 -0.01336 -0.02432 -0.05224 -0.08207 
LADBROKES PLC  -0.02028 -0.11063 -0.14348 -0.05055 -0.06334 -0.08818 -0.03312 -0.05081 -0.71023 0.05501 
LAURA ASHLEY  -0.26157 -0.37018 -0.03974 -0.00752 -0.0413 -0.38832 -0.03129 -0.01859 -0.00636 -0.01477 
LOOKERS PLC  -0.38435 -0.63339 -0.2917 -0.27941 -0.22052 -0.12822 -0.20745 -0.09373 -0.02229 0.00977 
LUMINAR GROUP  -0.18223 -0.16566 -0.12382 -0.06805 -0.10154 -0.20457 -0.09093 -0.05191 -0.08455 -0.08551 
MAJESTIC WINE PLC  -0.03291 -0.06178 -0.02515 -0.06144 -0.03176 -0.0237 -0.01 -0.01494 -0.01665 -0.01505 
MALLETT PLC  0.17032 0.16029 0.12797 0.07535 0.05378 -0.02846 0.00893 -0.00322 -0.11957 -0.05303 
MARKS & SPENCER  -0.02075 -0.05515 -0.05648 -0.03826 -0.01245 -0.00592 -0.02409 -0.01275 -0.00305 -0.0284 
MARSTON'S PLC  -0.09214 -0.08608 -0.046 -0.01921 -0.18838 -0.0629 -0.10818 -0.07706 -0.06542 -0.07362 
METRODOME GROUP PLC  -0.10148 0.04603 0.05964 -0.20376 -0.25188 0.24097 0.05512 -0.02528 -0.44578 -0.64315 
MILLENNIUM  -0.03567 0.00521 -0.02008 -0.05925 -0.05408 -0.06887 -0.0036 -0.02628 0.01381 0.018 
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MILLWALL HOLDINGS  -0.24793 -0.23798 -0.14744 -0.14875 -0.06846 -0.57697 -0.51385 -0.80477 -1.26363 -0.8283 
MOSS BROS GROUP PLC  -0.02258 -0.03502 -0.13943 -0.45996 -0.32914 -0.13236 -0.05484 0.00728 -0.03111 -0.13315 
MOTHERCARE PLC  -0.0707 -0.18927 -0.62937 -0.11576 -0.05758 -0.3571 0.05706 -0.04558 -0.04266 -0.03475 
MULBERRY GROUP  -0.11582 -0.30472 -0.1341 -0.03108 -0.1948 -0.20122 -0.01545 0.02854 0.03461 0.01104 
N BROWN GROUP PLC  -0.00011 0.01648 0.00758 0.00447 0.01263 0.01564 -0.02629 0.04207 0.01017 0.01691 
NATIONAL EXPRESS GRP  -0.01451 -0.04127 -0.06202 -0.069 -0.12436 -0.09396 -0.07331 -0.00201 -0.02092 -0.06363 
NEWMARKET INVESTMENT  -0.06416 -0.14763 -0.07255 -0.05656 -0.38769 -0.45341 -1.07055 -0.49781 -0.36541 -1.10417 
NEXT PLC  -0.00717 -0.04166 -0.00341 0.00502 0.00659 0.01078 0.01613 0.01183 0.00841 0.02153 
PEARSON PLC  -0.06067 -0.04666 -0.03024 -0.0288 -0.05009 -0.06105 -0.05911 -0.01232 0.00021 -0.01916 
PENDRAGON PLC  -0.2805 -0.43835 -0.44976 -0.37637 -0.57733 -0.20023 -0.2851 -0.34117 -0.18682 -0.20083 
PRESTON NORTH END  -0.44909 -0.17007 -0.337 -0.17823 -0.32082 -1.11686 -0.97652 -0.70336 -1.3358 -1.11685 
PRIME FOCUS LONDON  0.01379 0.07535 -0.07701 0.0053 -0.02362 -0.06911 -0.00786 -0.09214 -0.93685 -0.09633 
PUBS 'N' BARS PLC  -1.5557 -1.48881 -0.48155 -0.16421 -0.06706 -0.22535 -0.17313 -1.14476 -0.11705 0.00699 
QUARTO GROUP INC  0.0482 0.10825 0.0662 0.10802 0.17328 0.03337 0.06986 0.05794 0.05316 0.05106 
RANK GROUP PLC (THE)  -0.13502 -0.26572 -0.06907 -0.05739 -0.06964 -0.05027 -0.05865 -0.06749 -0.03179 -0.31191 
REGENT INNS PLC  -0.06315 -0.25112 -0.13673 -0.11341 -0.26402 -0.61206 -0.27427 0.01401 -0.00948 -0.02223 
RESTAURANT GROUP PLC  -0.12102 -0.20327 -0.19859 -0.13288 -0.07362 -0.13481 -0.12375 -0.14063 -0.20098 -0.04814 
RICHOUX GROUP PLC  -0.16073 -0.36849 -0.38256 -0.64557 -0.74182 -0.27222 -0.09727 -0.13718 -0.07422 -0.00524 
SAINSBURY J PLC  -0.04669 -0.06495 -0.10331 -0.12465 -0.14478 -0.19474 -0.1449 -0.18016 -0.09026 -0.09437 
SPORTECH PLC  -0.25013 -0.31518 -0.40923 -0.02903 -0.02058 -0.02824 -0.04891 0.18309 0.14944 0.15523 
STAGECOACH GROUP PLC  -0.07162 -0.06314 -0.13702 -0.23922 -0.15878 -0.34583 -0.12327 -0.17238 -0.19639 -0.13208 
STV GROUP PLC  0.00091 0.01464 -0.0121 -0.05179 -0.04626 -0.03132 -0.05103 -0.02144 -0.02184 -0.04221 
TARSUS GROUP PLC  0.07176 0.0381 -0.04207 -0.03961 -0.11005 -0.20846 0.00014 0.04488 0.02831 0.04831 
TED BAKER PLC  0.03058 0.01134 -0.02349 -0.02131 -0.0081 -0.06485 -0.00701 -0.0151 -0.0039 -0.00134 
TESCO PLC  -0.04208 -0.06099 -0.07638 -0.08213 -0.0855 -0.11659 -0.08239 -0.0648 -0.07396 -0.06991 
THORNTONS PLC  -0.19569 -0.24799 -0.06107 -0.04593 -0.00091 -0.04203 -0.04129 -0.0357 -0.0575 -0.05382 
TOPPS TILES PLC  0.00677 -0.01567 0.00126 0.00955 0.03919 -0.04268 0.00622 -0.00438 -0.00857 -0.00694 
TOTTENHAM HOTSPUR  -0.17655 -0.05512 -0.09529 -0.04355 -0.17366 -0.12073 -0.16133 -0.10928 -0.29556 -0.05067 
TOUCH GROUP PLC  -0.24663 -0.38089 -0.14046 -0.28796 -0.73941 -0.20588 -0.12403 -0.29223 -0.5178 -0.17889 
TRINITY MIRROR PLC  0.00673 0.0433 -0.0059 0.0231 0.00431 0.01128 0.036 0.02368 0.0266 0.04895 
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UNITED BUSINESS  -0.05492 0.28357 0.14115 -0.13843 -0.10964 -0.11898 0.01501 -0.18692 0.0363 -0.08521 
WETHERSPOON (J.D.)  -0.15322 -0.28109 0.01008 0.00741 0.00976 0.03696 0.02737 0.02601 0.01996 -0.03926 
WHITBREAD PLC  -0.07706 -0.08476 -0.08576 -0.0963 -0.17682 -0.07714 -0.05025 -0.0659 -0.23384 -0.17132 
WILMINGTON GROUP PLC  0.01103 0.01299 0.00402 -0.00529 -0.06116 -0.00835 -0.04067 -0.01239 0.02867 0.01421 
WM. MORRISON SUPERMT  -0.06987 -0.06384 -0.05279 -0.05875 -0.03365 -0.05339 -0.04217 -0.04843 -0.12706 -0.02608 
WORKS Consumer Services 
GROUP  -0.06255 -0.17538 -0.23513 -0.16458 -0.00485 -0.28598 0.23041 -0.22733 -0.23298 -0.05345 
WPP PLC  0.02943 0.023 0.00964 0.01231 0.00588 0.01684 0.01621 0.00797 0.00993 0.01648 
YOUNG & CO'S BREWERY  -0.33865 -0.43602 -0.54246 -0.87644 -0.78333 -0.55861 -0.31283 -0.27723 -0.05394 -0.17056 
YOUNG & CO'S BREWERY 
CAPI -0.20018 -0.30588 -0.37909 -0.63688 -0.45231 -0.39234 -0.21847 -0.24436 -0.10871 -0.32707 
Consumer Services -0.09946 -0.12581 -0.09711 -0.10965 -0.12341 -0.18251 -0.11542 -0.10173 -0.10454 -0.06839 
                      
ADL PLC  -0.03593 -0.08707 -0.15983 -0.06075 -0.07201 0.09631 -0.42348 -0.00609 -0.00108 0.01188 
ADVANCED MEDICAL  -0.1262 -0.27206 -0.1737 -0.24513 -0.2006 -0.22872 -0.07206 -0.08613 -0.0109 0.04609 
ALIZYME PLC  -0.77041 -0.40658 -0.24228 -0.07325 -0.2398 -0.39081 -0.02073 -0.0788 -0.08346 -0.18557 
AORTECH INT'L  -0.04771 -0.04862 -0.01365 -0.03371 -0.24152 -4.24474 -0.04748 -0.28425 -0.11145 -0.1608 
AUKETT FITZROY  0.07408 0.1017 0.00927 -0.04326 -0.32381 0.31529 -0.29386 0.08688 0.06804 0.04197 
BAE SYSTEMS  -0.04191 -0.00134 -0.07925 -0.04729 -0.07184 -0.21016 -0.15818 -0.04642 -0.04763 -0.01516 
BIRMINGHAM CITY PLC  -0.0001 -0.41115 -0.2198 -0.17176 -0.44959 0.2797 0.43582 -0.22148 -0.42702 -0.75113 
BISICHI Basic Materials PLC  -0.27293 -0.68904 -0.21911 -0.08367 -1.1079 -0.29288 -0.09599 0.05688 -0.07983 0.0016 
BTG PLC  -0.0298 -0.03135 -0.00727 -0.01209 -0.04345 -0.31086 -0.17205 -0.21938 -0.01305 0 
CARE UK PLC  -0.05582 -0.05518 -0.06178 -0.08473 -0.11956 -0.10839 -0.04596 -0.10418 -0.04654 -0.03194 
CELSIS INTERNATIONAL  -0.02953 0.02093 0.03541 0.0012 -0.03458 0.19706 0.06555 0.06135 0.0156 0.04542 
CONSORT MEDICAL PLC  -0.07038 -0.05653 -0.0065 -0.03948 -0.00415 -0.22017 -0.01198 0.00296 -0.0039 -0.00428 
ECO ANIMAL  0.01647 0.01062 0.02653 0.04332 0.04524 0.04149 0.00274 -0.0125 -0.01403 -0.04488 
GOLDSHIELD GROUP PLC  0.00874 0.01372 0.02207 0.0219 0.04486 0.01835 -0.02032 0.01464 0.04647 0.02125 
IS PHARMA PLC  -0.08224 -0.14861 -0.12299 -0.07906 -0.09739 -0.35854 -0.15434 -0.13926 -0.26375 -0.03799 
JOURDAN PLC  0.02862 -0.15077 -0.239 -0.13909 -0.014 -0.04629 0.0033 -0.04877 0.06247 0.01207 
NESTOR HEALTHCARE  -0.00876 -0.00937 0.00819 0.00831 0.00831 -0.03291 -0.0218 0.06197 0.05538 0.00422 
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OSMETECH PLC  -0.37199 -1.11023 -0.09308 -0.1306 -0.0915 -0.1921 -0.0748 -0.35118 -0.37254 -0.26295 
OXFORD BIOMEDICA  -0.3424 -0.34252 -0.13158 -0.11096 -0.16151 -0.80753 -0.1476 -0.16135 -0.1378 -0.08472 
PHYTOPHARM PLC  -0.27031 -0.06059 -0.01681 -0.01072 -0.0187 -0.13634 -0.08182 -0.03069 -0.22387 -0.23685 
PROTEOME SCIENCES  -0.06101 -0.16018 -0.16996 -0.02599 -0.11821 -0.09447 -0.01902 -0.07813 -0.06468 -0.06849 
RANSOM & SON PLC  -0.02889 -0.04873 -0.04802 -0.06133 -0.17103 -0.06298 -0.07908 -0.25605 -0.01597 -0.01961 
SHIRE PLC  0.00812 0.03848 0.02921 0.00816 0.00242 0.02114 0.02526 0.05247 0.00949 0.01687 
SILENCE THERA  -0.1081 -0.08758 -0.03147 -0.02433 -0.18548 -0.57306 -0.58377 -0.51501 -0.20152 -0.10807 
SKYEPHARMA PLC  -0.13479 -0.09215 -0.13521 -0.07185 -0.0535 -0.17642 -0.05946 -0.09294 -0.0832 -0.1452 
SMITH & NEPHEW PLC  -0.01843 -0.02771 -0.19029 -0.01493 -0.0111 -0.00652 0.00336 0.006 0.00246 0.00207 
SOURCE BIOSCIENCE  -0.48905 -1.15397 -0.01347 -0.02469 -0.38704 -0.37616 -0.14391 -0.27649 -0.17086 -0.12617 
SURGICAL INNOVATION  -0.33867 -0.24297 -0.02119 0.01287 -0.0256 -0.00299 0.03732 0.06553 0.09167 0.00958 
VERNALIS PLC  -0.09918 -0.19453 -0.15857 -0.20555 -0.21853 -1.34669 -0.29995 -0.19719 -0.20275 -0.0707 
Health Care -0.12753 -0.19667 -0.08359 -0.05857 -0.1504 -0.31898 -0.08463 -0.09647 -0.0767 -0.07384 
                      
A.G. BARR PLC  -0.00593 -0.03259 0.0018 -0.01933 -0.05331 -0.01787 0.0092 0.01055 -0.03163 -0.02644 
ACAL PLC  -0.02271 -0.01013 -0.01414 0.01005 -0.03137 -0.02772 -0.0347 -0.05346 -0.03851 -0.01368 
ADVANCED POWER  -0.00677 0.00166 -0.00592 -0.01673 -0.09614 -0.45631 -0.20574 -0.20835 0.04788 0.10154 
AEA TECHNOLOGY PLC  -0.00988 -0.01407 -0.01617 -0.11356 -0.12129 -0.59405 -0.04474 -0.24287 -0.088 -0.01294 
AGGREKO PLC  -0.10992 -0.12433 -0.05325 -0.06718 -0.04329 -0.13314 -0.09499 -0.13476 -0.12765 -0.10529 
ALUMASC GROUP PLC  -0.02648 -0.05242 -0.00245 -0.12445 -0.05334 0.00298 -0.00258 -0.02991 -0.044 -0.01418 
ANDREWS SYKES GROUP  -0.01844 0.00126 -0.0089 0.03113 0.02448 0.01191 0.01887 -0.0412 0.04695 0.03678 
ARKO HOLDINGS PLC  -0.08764 -0.30479 -0.15689 -0.02807 -0.04406 -0.02471 -0.00273 -0.03885 -0.13244 -0.40168 
ASSOCIATED BRITISH  -0.03946 -0.12099 -0.02765 -0.02385 -0.00599 -0.00927 -0.01906 -0.0374 -0.03323 -0.03278 
ASTRAZENECA PLC  -0.00914 -0.00099 -0.00337 -0.0003 0.00337 0.0038 0.00905 0.03316 0.02644 0.01995 
AUTOLOGIC HOLDINGS  -0.01889 -0.03376 -0.03791 -0.0414 -0.04131 -0.21068 -0.13998 -0.1038 0.03919 -0.10316 
AVESCO GROUP PLC  -0.10506 -0.19078 -0.08395 -0.10613 -0.27393 -1.58869 -0.46887 -0.07004 -0.07345 -0.48875 
AVEVA GROUP PLC  0.01419 -0.00676 0.01029 0.01429 0.01016 0.01438 0.01374 0.01879 0.02408 0.02936 
AVIVA  0.36933 0.22645 -0.39718 -0.31016 -0.19607 0.53769 0.1669 0.08358 0.02611 -0.03826 
BABCOCK INT'L GROUP  0.01668 0.04921 0.0012 -0.02932 -0.0381 0.0078 0.05213 0.02205 0.03061 0.02829 
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BAILEY (C.H.) PLC  -0.56393 -0.44592 -0.3686 -0.52574 -0.65773 -0.3865 -0.42952 -0.34367 -0.28036 -0.26937 
BALFOUR BEATTY PLC  -0.2008 -0.28257 0.00524 -0.07947 -0.07391 -0.07537 -0.13498 -0.06522 -0.05393 -0.00691 
BELGRAVIUM TECH  -0.04652 -0.01291 -0.00034 0.13475 0.10274 0.02018 0.0172 0.01579 0.00966 0.05921 
BIOQUELL  -0.13657 -0.21717 -0.5615 -0.038 -0.049 -0.07329 -0.0212 -0.02363 0.00616 0.04233 
BPP HOLDINGS PLC  -0.04362 -0.02359 -0.19646 -0.18908 -0.11474 -0.08813 -0.14935 -0.03051 -0.0148 -0.00281 
BRAMMER PLC  -0.14603 -0.34781 -0.36792 -0.51125 -0.22181 -0.70081 -0.08146 0.0459 0.01407 0.02279 
BREWIN DOLPHIN HLDGS  -0.21834 -0.15257 0.005 -0.02137 -0.0425 -0.13 -0.02426 -0.01777 -0.01519 0.00041 
BRITISH POLYTHENE  -0.04236 -0.1205 -0.11758 -0.03464 -0.09457 -0.13964 -0.13956 -0.05439 -0.05725 -0.11159 
BSS GROUP PLC (THE)  -0.0008 0.0193 -0.00117 -0.04406 0.03507 0.0447 0.03121 0.04149 0.03347 0.02124 
BUNZL PLC  0.01371 -0.00201 0.00901 0.01816 0.01451 0.00873 0.01 0.02059 0.0236 0.02098 
BUSINESS POST GROUP  -0.02152 -0.01799 -0.00931 -0.032 -0.0095 -0.01058 -0.01385 -0.0126 -0.04486 -0.0488 
CAPE PLC  -0.11826 -0.15678 -0.2917 -1.00739 -0.44244 -0.52971 -0.07398 -0.00825 -0.00425 -0.00385 
CAPITA GROUP PLC  0.0052 0.00186 0.00039 -0.00492 -0.00994 -0.00111 0.00089 0.01297 0.01069 -0.03281 
CASTINGS PLC  -0.01358 0.0014 0.01209 -0.03354 -0.1597 -0.05655 -0.02522 -0.06808 -0.00525 -0.04931 
CEPS PLC  -0.20081 -0.27928 -0.25835 -0.64443 -1.48837 -0.94889 0.13612 0.00155 0.09373 0.36802 
CHAMBERLIN PLC  -0.03589 0.00615 0.02288 -0.0497 -0.04602 -0.12443 -0.1065 -0.03208 -0.0415 -0.11767 
CHEMRING GROUP PLC  -0.05484 0.03903 0.02227 -0.03112 -0.08919 0.01331 0.0367 0.01996 0.0408 0.02711 
CHLORIDE GROUP PLC  0.02028 -0.00399 -0.00486 -0.02651 -0.04034 -0.07177 -0.08077 -0.04745 0.01605 0.01523 
CHRISTIE GROUP PLC  0.034 0.03321 -0.04433 -0.05896 -0.10234 -0.08245 -0.00019 0.03641 0.0499 0.0583 
CINPART PLC  -0.98399 -0.44707 -0.75966 -0.14575 -0.00609 -1.02896 -0.68525 -1.86909 -0.6003 -0.0581 
CLARKSON PLC  -0.06621 -0.13178 0.09009 0.05079 -0.26153 0.14167 0.07837 -0.0865 0.00421 0.03619 
COBHAM PLC  -0.00856 0.00432 -0.01255 0.00625 0.01177 0.01173 0.00332 0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0051 
COE GROUP PLC  -0.1289 -0.17221 -0.05775 -0.11688 -0.55215 -0.57551 -1.63943 -1.78537 -2.26376 -0.22552 
COMMUNISIS PLC  -0.05845 -0.09397 -0.46235 0.0103 -0.03277 -0.04944 -0.08743 -0.00761 -0.01561 -0.0054 
CONNAUGHT PLC  0.04494 0.04884 0.00537 0.01572 0.02405 0.0056 -0.1085 -0.00846 0.01411 0.00684 
COOKSON GROUP PLC  -0.02844 -0.05453 -0.02898 -0.1369 -0.10885 -0.1748 -0.01469 0.01531 0.02529 0.01621 
CORAL PRODUCTS PLC  -0.26254 -0.13611 -0.15716 -0.19888 -0.25122 -0.26825 -0.14418 -0.22133 -0.6485 -0.59536 
COSALT PLC  0.0137 0.02531 0.04537 0.01067 -0.07216 0.00814 -0.01608 -0.09644 -0.08199 -0.06435 
COSTAIN GROUP PLC  -0.12839 -0.06261 -0.10162 -0.10307 -0.09179 0.03048 0.05035 0.02939 -0.34415 0.02513 
DART GROUP PLC  -0.30414 -0.27288 -0.1392 -0.09125 -0.35123 -0.56091 -0.54453 -0.32786 -0.36266 -0.36469 
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DATACASH  0.0113 -0.0465 -0.57273 -0.18712 -0.19565 -0.04346 -0.0265 -0.01456 -0.02762 0.02236 
DAVIS SERVICE GROUP  -0.17027 -0.13065 -0.12876 -0.21151 -0.23595 -0.29106 -0.18161 -0.14495 -0.14916 -0.17212 
DAWSON HOLDINGS PLC  -0.01574 -0.02117 -0.01372 -0.10158 -0.01544 -0.05505 -0.01179 0.01255 -0.06299 -0.09342 
DE LA RUE PLC  -0.0677 -0.0393 -0.02562 0.0139 0.00685 -0.03699 -0.04046 -0.01509 -0.08996 0.00126 
DELTA PLC  -0.1631 -0.27679 -0.20528 -0.1916 -0.14424 -0.09105 0.04331 -0.06894 -0.03413 -0.00865 
DENSITRON TECH PLC  -0.07688 -0.65977 0.00658 -0.07637 -0.32779 -0.25905 0.00919 -0.18421 -0.26253 -0.12567 
DEWHURST PLC  -0.0487 0.06617 0.10976 0.12082 0.02608 0.08844 0.12717 0.1746 0.12182 0.14385 
DIALIGHT PLC  0.03117 -0.09266 0.02449 -0.01363 -0.03311 -0.03291 0.01505 -0.02287 0.00497 -0.0168 
DIMENSION RESOURCES  0.01576 -0.03607 -0.22435 -0.25102 -0.57869 -0.60769 -0.0268 -0.05443 -0.08519 -0.18667 
DIPLOMA PLC  -0.03434 -0.12391 -0.03126 0.02301 0.01833 0.03129 0.02607 0.03246 0.03449 0.03327 
DOMINO PRINTING  -0.00595 0.02216 0.03297 -0.01536 0.02426 0.04689 0.0395 0.02674 0.03024 0.02256 
DS SMITH PLC  -0.09288 -0.16579 -0.05377 -0.08897 -0.11596 -0.08886 -0.0577 -0.07727 -0.09181 -0.06566 
ELECO PLC  0.01163 0.01413 -0.18451 -0.00634 -0.01435 -0.07269 -0.03986 0.00557 0.03049 0.0317 
ELECTROCOMPONENTS  0.00812 0.00758 0.00243 0.0007 -0.02024 -0.0373 -0.02436 -0.03527 -0.04976 -0.06188 
ELEKTRON PLC  0.05575 -0.39478 -0.05388 -0.02883 -0.26241 -0.89076 0.24173 0.19869 0.03376 0.06237 
ENERGY TECHNIQUE PLC  -0.08814 0.01738 -0.13181 -0.10757 0.07516 0.00944 -0.17014 -0.55317 -0.51744 0.06559 
ENSOR HOLDINGS PLC  0.03714 0.00283 -0.10358 0.00179 -0.12138 -0.10726 -0.00676 0.01151 0.01603 0.02032 
FALKLAND ISLANDS  0.01 0.04426 -0.00027 -0.03929 -0.00751 -0.02181 -0.04701 -0.02673 -0.0105 -0.00754 
FEEDBACK PLC  0.05505 0.00851 0.00859 0.09188 -0.31113 0.01562 -0.28056 0.08682 0.29003 0.38419 
FENNER PLC  -0.06606 -0.05625 -0.1172 -0.05208 -0.02724 -0.06018 -0.07004 -0.0342 -0.016 -0.05542 
FORTH PORTS PLC  -0.04452 -0.05297 -0.06715 -0.01322 -0.02777 0.00243 -0.0623 -0.06172 -0.04059 -0.01936 
FOUNTAINS PLC  -0.00751 0.00091 0.02641 0.04807 0.02183 -0.03398 -0.09363 -0.06632 -0.15038 0.01364 
GALIFORM PLC  -0.15114 -0.19688 -0.15249 -0.08787 -0.06938 -0.11114 -0.06574 -0.09507 0.00743 0.07389 
GALLIFORD TRY PLC  0.05345 0.02945 0.03946 0.14218 0.08174 0.12772 0.10215 0.09605 0.08514 0.03846 
GARNER PLC  -0.19959 -0.35807 -0.11702 -0.12734 -0.13824 -0.00147 -0.05014 0.05227 0.41476 0.71451 
GOOCH & HOUSEGO  -0.01193 0.00498 0.06269 0.02276 0.00173 -0.01087 0.01851 0.01227 0.01746 -0.01483 
GOODWIN PLC  -0.03034 0.0134 -0.36683 -0.04544 -0.05721 0.06353 -0.11633 -0.02531 0.01898 0.01115 
H.C. SLINGSBY PLC  -0.14162 -0.09274 0.00318 0.00288 -0.01272 0.03644 0.03137 -0.52178 -0.1261 0.00403 
HALMA PLC  0.02742 0.02031 0.01648 0.01422 0.00759 -0.01132 -0.00228 -0.00804 0.00422 0.00828 
HAMPSON INDUSTRIES  0.00753 -0.03072 0.08238 -0.02297 0.03797 -0.06028 0.02992 -0.0383 -0.03945 0.00791 
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HARVEY NASH GRP PLC  0.02991 0.03527 0.02877 0.00396 -0.09744 -0.08051 -0.04124 -0.00528 0.08282 0.05898 
HAYS PLC  0.00566 0.0051 0.00369 -0.00387 -0.00634 -0.05522 -0.0343 0.01498 0.03175 0.02894 
HEATH (SAMUEL) & SON  0.02318 0.10401 0.01749 -0.00694 -0.02045 -0.02121 -0.01264 0.00499 -0.01543 0.00867 
HENRY BOOT PLC  -0.00317 -0.00313 -0.00899 0.08511 0.01207 0.01183 0.00083 -0.05955 -0.08539 -0.20619 
HEYWOOD WILLIAMS GRP  -0.01648 0.01184 -0.0707 -0.09368 -0.14074 -0.31301 0.04532 0.07273 0.06408 0.03898 
HIGHAMS SYSTEMS  0.05448 0.03956 -0.05357 -0.1747 -0.11188 -0.17258 -0.21916 -0.19263 -0.05479 -0.21957 
HILL & SMITH HOLDING  -0.15568 0.00011 -0.02424 -0.22243 -0.09606 -0.08943 -0.04564 -0.02471 -0.11017 -0.01473 
HOLDERS TECHNOLOGY  0.00535 -0.08712 0.07528 -0.02576 -0.12258 -0.23169 -0.04337 0.04792 0.01038 0.00686 
HOMESERVE PLC  -0.06427 -0.05788 -0.048 -0.06047 -0.06279 -0.10108 -0.09569 0.0061 0.01069 0.01174 
HYDER CONSULTING PLC  0.00076 -0.42758 -0.06743 -0.03547 -0.10386 0.13868 0.0806 0.07024 0.03854 0.01039 
HYDRO INTERNATIONAL  -0.00858 0.01477 0.00591 0.03559 0.08951 0.06188 0.02145 0.03869 0.04626 0.04497 
IMAGELINX PLC  0.00764 -0.2972 -0.11496 -0.16864 -0.34184 -0.39204 -0.05405 -0.05234 -0.13942 -0.11246 
IMI PLC  -0.01038 -0.03205 -0.04484 -0.04395 -0.01802 -0.04266 -0.02606 -0.00434 -0.00473 0.0058 
INTERIOR SERVICES  0.00877 0.0266 -0.00256 0.00135 0.00644 0.02936 -0.01901 -0.02129 -0.00622 -0.04582 
INTERSERVE PLC  -0.09345 -0.10535 -0.05411 -0.03086 -0.04848 -0.13472 -0.12856 -0.0761 -0.06472 -0.08505 
JAMES FISHER & SONS  -0.17578 0.34521 -0.90272 -0.44254 0.10667 0.03723 0.01478 -0.01833 -0.00519 -0.05227 
JAMES HALSTEAD PLC  0.00477 -0.03759 -0.01843 0.01068 0.02733 0.03345 0.0151 -0.09331 -0.04996 -0.04245 
JARVIS PLC  0.04154 0.02356 -0.04224 -0.02545 -0.01681 0.02657 -0.08738 -2.95905 -0.46546 -0.04414 
JOHN MENZIES PLC  -0.08919 -0.04142 -0.03653 -0.12294 -0.07727 -0.1052 -0.05675 -0.04392 -0.06817 -0.08628 
JOHNSON SERVICE GRP  -0.04751 -0.02601 -0.16696 -0.1915 -0.16381 -0.1201 -0.12176 -0.20802 -0.12127 -0.10821 
JOURNEY GROUP PLC  0.04175 0.084 -0.02042 0.06484 0.09542 0.04178 -0.10818 0.06222 -0.05812 -0.58383 
KELLER GROUP PLC  0.00229 -0.01206 -0.02515 -0.03261 -0.03682 -0.05694 -0.0393 0.03442 0.06331 0.01075 
KIER GROUP PLC  -0.11067 -0.09498 0.0054 -0.1425 0.01227 0.05172 -0.01859 9.2E-05 0.01106 0.02645 
LAIRD PLC  -0.08342 -0.15701 -0.17518 -0.08895 -0.0497 0.01455 -0.01349 0.01895 0.00764 -0.12265 
LATCHWAYS PLC  0.04609 -0.01651 0.00147 0.01391 -0.02012 0.01658 0.02213 0.02653 0.03968 -0.00209 
LATHAM (JAMES) PLC  0.03232 0.0169 -0.04693 0.08275 -0.10857 -0.34115 -0.00506 -0.1532 -0.01054 0.03538 
LAVENDON GROUP PLC  -0.19671 -0.06284 -0.45645 -0.44235 -0.25594 -0.15268 -0.05567 -0.027 -0.06103 -0.05356 
LINCAT GROUP PLC  -0.07225 0.05982 0.03128 -0.02592 0.00273 0.05553 0.02876 -0.00056 -0.00487 -0.01847 
LITHO SUPPLIES PLC  0.03433 0.01617 -0.00269 -0.04636 0.09364 0.14357 0.00316 -0.0393 -0.01971 -0.04812 
LONDON SECURITY PLC  -0.0507 -0.06316 0.04412 0.0137 0.00201 0.01313 -0.02657 0.01151 0.00286 0.01373 
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LOW & BONAR PLC  -0.04757 -0.10175 -0.19765 -0.13683 -0.10978 -0.00985 -0.04555 -0.01836 -0.06556 -0.05133 
LPA GROUP PLC  -0.04069 0.03438 -0.05623 -0.10913 -0.22379 -0.21382 -0.0583 -0.06229 -0.2351 -0.04586 
LUPUS CAPITAL PLC  -0.00418 -0.22358 -0.04333 -0.0543 -0.00541 0.00816 0.03775 0.02045 0.12055 0.04512 
M.J. GLEESON GROUP  -0.07173 -0.09265 -0.16954 -0.11443 -0.25354 -0.22351 -0.10435 -0.34356 -0.07836 -0.03371 
MACFARLANE GROUP PLC  -0.0412 -0.00044 -0.00582 -0.10178 -0.15147 -0.55595 -0.25365 0.0084 -0.01261 0.00896 
MANAGEMENT CON  0.06803 -0.14519 -0.71256 -0.04822 0.02669 -0.07832 0.06223 0.08187 0.07081 0.07777 
MANGANESE BRONZE  -0.04768 -0.09241 -0.08163 -0.28368 -0.45481 -0.51176 -0.35304 -0.05394 -0.15065 -0.02391 
MARSHALLS PLC  -0.06982 0.40539 0.21339 -0.03762 -0.04929 -0.06701 -0.0325 -0.02929 -0.02548 -0.04212 
MEARS  0.07127 -0.31916 -0.05447 0.04777 0.03174 0.04312 0.02047 0.02255 0.04078 0.0218 
MEGGITT PLC  0.00833 0.00963 0.00211 -0.00186 -0.00081 0.0209 0.01795 0.02205 0.02075 -0.00864 
METALRAX GROUP PLC  -0.00339 0.00666 -0.00821 -0.02855 -0.01702 -0.0206 -0.01856 -0.05017 -0.05749 -0.0946 
MID-STATES PLC  -0.16909 -0.18126 -0.604 -0.00899 -0.02633 -0.02276 -0.03553 -0.0325 -0.03484 -0.26749 
MINORPLANET SYSTEMS  -0.0924 -0.04398 -0.01455 -0.02457 -0.0325 -0.24347 -0.56263 -1.34497 -0.08667 -0.02477 
MITIE GROUP PLC  -0.02558 -0.04764 -0.02286 -0.01379 0.0069 -0.00921 -0.00236 0.00902 0.01245 0.0021 
MOLINS PLC  -0.06339 -2.5E-05 0.06568 0.07669 0.12187 -0.00733 -0.07238 0.08222 0.18616 0.06151 
MORGAN CRUCIBLE CO  -0.03388 0.0565 0.07076 -0.11545 -0.1044 -0.16856 -0.02751 -0.02973 0.0151 0.00299 
MORGAN SINDALL PLC  0.01362 0.04535 0.02695 0.02824 -0.01715 0.02395 0.02218 0.05037 0.03972 0.01233 
MS INTERNATIONAL PLC  -0.00256 -0.0077 0.00781 -0.11954 -0.09953 -0.10147 -0.02258 0.0314 -0.00245 -0.05964 
NEWMARK SECURITY PLC  -0.03102 0.01237 -0.02608 -0.14863 -0.7565 -1.68194 -0.37191 -0.07828 -0.08304 0.24576 
NORTH MIDLAND CONSTR  -0.15888 -0.09906 0.01606 -0.09022 0.06455 -0.03694 -0.05604 0.09268 -0.02578 -0.04686 
NORTHGATE PLC  -0.2727 -0.78257 -0.80649 -0.72616 -1.18564 -1.73819 -1.32712 -1.0154 -0.46884 -0.48376 
NWF GROUP PLC  -0.02605 -0.0642 -0.02474 -0.24597 0.04017 0.00257 -0.02973 -0.02425 -0.01034 -0.23143 
OCEAN WILSONS  -0.77895 -1.75694 -1.31501 -1.3793 -0.24583 -1.79743 -1.02758 -0.77118 -0.3586 -0.81476 
OPD GROUP PLC  0.03143 0.06394 0.03546 -0.0178 -0.02767 -0.06766 -0.02026 -0.00364 0.06607 0.04557 
OPSEC SECURITY GROUP  -0.00898 -0.05024 -0.02822 -0.16077 -0.16858 -0.43235 -0.20313 -0.32895 -0.02513 -0.07116 
OXFORD INSTRUMENTS  -0.04342 -0.0689 -0.1741 -0.14564 -0.06516 -0.04397 -0.01486 -0.14581 -0.04969 -0.04121 
PARKWOOD HOLDINGS  -0.02908 -0.10622 -0.41347 -0.1636 -0.05818 -0.10858 -0.57306 -0.43399 -1.41648 -0.42476 
PENNA CONSULTING PLC  0.10856 0.0754 0.04868 0.04413 0.00176 -0.0154 -0.10296 -0.09837 -0.03383 0.00549 
PETARDS GROUP PLC  -0.21878 0.03769 -0.01791 0.00645 -0.14679 -0.23996 -0.79137 -0.72168 -0.03526 -0.25653 
POCHIN'S PLC  -0.19493 -0.23583 -0.27162 -0.1599 -0.24522 -0.10731 -0.23082 -0.12093 -0.10665 -0.03752 
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PREMIER FARNELL PLC  0.01328 0.02177 -0.00458 -0.00543 -0.03119 -0.02599 -0.02522 -0.01028 0.00896 0.01238 
QUADNETICS GROUP PLC  -1.24198 -0.70023 -0.25399 -0.08436 -0.09729 0.1552 0.04991 0.03088 0.04656 0.01769 
REDHALL GROUP  -0.01947 -0.02907 -0.0999 -0.03332 -0.29841 -0.51092 -0.34427 -0.27561 0.13672 0.03807 
RENEW HOLDINGS PLC  -0.52118 -0.16253 0.08914 -0.01203 0.03145 -0.15303 -0.01621 0.34232 -0.01031 0.05024 
RENISHAW PLC  -0.00309 -0.01309 -0.00466 -0.00017 -0.03615 -0.05041 -0.03451 -0.01764 0.00023 -0.01594 
RENOLD PLC  -0.00117 -0.11151 -0.18897 -0.2145 -0.30451 -0.19242 -0.16606 -0.18002 -0.11142 -0.00646 
RENTOKIL INITIAL PLC  -0.00046 -0.00176 -0.01253 -0.01586 -0.00669 -0.00768 -0.02482 -0.05712 -0.06052 -0.08482 
REXAM PLC  -0.0504 -0.31969 -0.16087 -0.2465 -0.11977 -0.06448 -0.05891 -0.02848 -0.03481 -0.08968 
RICARDO PLC  -0.08342 -0.09417 -0.04525 -0.02884 0.00734 -0.00953 -0.14562 -0.04032 -0.03006 0.00056 
ROK PLC  0.06114 0.08159 0.02647 0.13469 0.00989 0.04123 0.04206 0.0528 0.0409 0.0233 
ROLLS-ROYCE  -0.12693 -0.10356 -0.1422 -0.09194 -0.19115 -0.15897 -0.04272 0.07479 -0.02882 -0.01606 
ROSS GROUP PLC  -0.07629 -0.07783 -0.3033 -0.25104 -0.47089 0.02919 -0.00213 -0.30749 -0.38106 -0.2733 
ROTORK PLC  0.011 0.01192 -0.01084 0.01732 0.00313 0.0102 -0.00745 0.02646 0.00624 0.01334 
RPC GROUP PLC  -0.08677 -0.10243 -0.0921 -0.231 -0.14768 -0.18384 -0.16018 -0.12623 -0.14318 -0.0872 
RPS GROUP PLC  0.02748 0.0244 0.00298 -0.00644 0.01206 0.02564 0.01863 0.03027 0.04415 0.02748 
RTC GROUP PLC  0.00337 -0.01795 -0.07795 -0.03581 -0.10791 -0.04694 -0.00508 -0.03293 -0.18359 -0.05559 
SAINT IVES PLC  -0.01639 -0.00166 -0.01082 -0.03453 -0.06842 -0.056 -0.0234 -0.05747 -0.12068 -0.04392 
SAVILE GROUP PLC  0.08447 0.02989 -0.02485 -0.06181 -0.03201 -0.00531 -0.24935 -0.14301 -0.52354 0.02707 
SENIOR PLC  -0.0415 -0.07812 -0.01621 -0.11639 -0.05701 -0.13265 -0.08137 -0.08179 -0.17792 0.00274 
SERCO GROUP PLC  0.00126 -0.00841 -0.00333 -0.00787 -0.01219 -0.0453 -0.05496 -0.00945 -0.00155 0.01405 
SEVERFIELD ROWEN PLC  -0.00999 0.04704 -0.00113 -0.16015 -0.11588 -0.05154 -0.0214 0.03484 -0.01174 -0.0729 
SHANKS GROUP PLC  -0.043 -0.01684 -0.0432 -0.07217 -0.12201 -0.24601 -0.26733 -0.19863 -0.08262 -0.07583 
SIG PLC  0.00076 0.01562 0.00534 -0.0056 -0.01677 0.01342 0.00152 0.00858 0.00166 -0.0082 
SIX HUNDRED GROUP  -0.00703 -0.14856 -0.00882 -0.07157 -0.12387 -0.29075 -0.1339 -0.11908 -0.1993 -0.04691 
SMART (J) & CO CONTR  -0.09901 -0.10833 -0.11035 -0.1668 -0.10755 -0.11137 -0.07564 -0.06611 0.00884 -0.03818 
SMITHS INDUSTRIES  0.02552 0.02602 0.02439 -0.02791 0.00101 -0.00268 -0.00857 -0.00865 0.00965 -0.02152 
SOLID STATE PLC  -0.03802 0.00711 0.0098 0.05207 -0.14279 -0.06235 -0.0611 -0.04955 -0.07048 0.02102 
SPECTRIS PLC  -0.02644 0.0637 0.02094 -0.01375 -0.01803 -0.01546 -0.01216 0.02794 0.02461 0.028 
SPEEDY HIRE PLC  0.00534 0.00446 -0.14923 -0.25086 -0.07903 -0.06679 -0.27746 -0.21573 -0.18036 -0.14585 
SPIRAX-SARCO ENGIN.  0.00543 -0.00558 -0.00654 -0.02656 0.00163 0.00403 0.00499 0.01327 0.00464 0.01251 
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SPRING GROUP PLC  -0.00422 -0.01549 0.00923 -0.11407 -0.071 -0.03512 0.04902 -0.01689 0.02939 0.03285 
STADIUM GROUP PLC  0.02501 0.0317 -0.0475 -0.37487 -0.05206 -0.04362 -0.01405 -0.01373 -0.08058 0.00088 
STANELCO PLC  -0.0075 0.04922 0.00333 0.02266 0.00372 -0.02791 -0.02836 -0.06724 -0.05618 -0.13918 
SUTTON HARBOUR  -0.0463 -0.06696 -0.00504 0.0203 0.00587 -0.01515 -0.02572 -0.10027 -0.21057 -0.06714 
SWP GROUP PLC  -0.06212 -0.03784 -0.10458 -0.05462 -0.2242 -0.17036 -0.80203 -0.33034 0.00987 -0.03033 
T. CLARKE PLC  0.09672 -0.02901 0.02957 0.04625 0.06343 -0.01707 -0.02638 -0.01352 -0.00319 0.00419 
TEX HOLDINGS PLC  -0.09304 -0.25872 0.04219 -0.0928 -0.21477 0.01746 -0.06795 -0.1308 -0.02599 -0.12127 
TG21 PLC  0.16567 0.08983 0.07205 -0.01258 0.03396 0.14473 0.04363 0.08074 -0.03376 0.21756 
THORPE (F.W.) PLC  0.0137 -0.12046 -0.0257 -0.10503 -0.04817 0.06171 0.03315 0.04954 0.05097 0.02531 
TITON HOLDINGS PLC  -0.02803 -0.16388 -0.07517 -0.03757 -0.02566 -0.10857 -0.07009 -0.05529 -0.12969 -0.0665 
TOMKINS PLC  -0.04331 -0.06545 -0.08898 -0.16433 -0.00122 0.01299 -0.03258 -0.0103 -0.01952 -0.03836 
TRAVIS PERKINS PLC  0.03025 0.0605 0.00997 0.0332 0.03582 0.03343 0.02305 0.01586 0.03184 -0.00064 
TRIFAST PLC  0.01675 0.02434 0.00779 0.0219 -0.02657 -0.00088 0.00909 0.01725 0.03149 0.0523 
TT ELECTRONICS PLC  -0.03361 -0.07176 -0.14818 -0.17583 -0.15926 -0.17446 -0.10469 -0.05055 -0.07467 -0.05621 
ULTRA ELECTRONICS  0.02255 0.0224 0.02352 0.01893 0.02676 0.01865 0.02797 0.02498 0.02818 0.01907 
UMECO  0.02443 0.01533 -0.01252 0.01471 0.01318 -0.00129 0.00204 -0.04142 -0.00543 -0.01804 
UNIVERSE GROUP PLC  -0.01434 -0.0452 -0.03204 -0.17502 0.03674 0.10714 0.03152 0.04359 -0.00038 0.03074 
VITEC GROUP PLC  -0.02952 -0.03279 0 -0.12908 -0.1482 -0.23014 -0.08376 -0.06817 -0.03572 -0.0344 
VOLEX GROUP PLC  -0.05163 -0.01657 -0.01611 -0.00189 -0.18497 -0.12149 -0.11872 -0.45919 -0.05822 0.01248 
VP PLC  -0.67573 -0.60653 -0.4017 -0.84325 -0.30093 -0.31168 -0.15355 -0.14062 -0.10776 -0.15356 
VT GROUP PLC  0.00927 -0.00105 -0.03934 -0.02393 -0.07493 -0.20184 -0.14286 -0.02453 -0.0019 -0.00608 
WATER HALL GROUP PLC  -0.25624 -0.34401 -0.22443 -0.19657 -0.21016 -0.00222 -0.09962 -0.01121 0.19766 0.02116 
WATERMAN GROUP PLC  -0.11028 -0.00787 0.01778 -0.39164 -0.02344 -0.07915 -0.07517 -0.04463 0.009 0.01672 
WEIR GROUP PLC (THE)  -0.01516 -0.02158 -0.03166 -0.014 -0.02782 -0.03117 -0.04871 -0.02581 -0.01747 -0.00813 
WHITE YOUNG GREEN  0.11406 -0.02029 0.04222 0.02237 0.03046 0.04057 0.03477 0.00259 0.02931 0.02078 
WOLSELEY PLC  -0.00889 -0.01902 -0.01042 -0.00649 -0.00091 0.00499 0.01411 0.00457 -0.00546 -0.01979 
WSP GROUP PLC  -0.00484 -0.01107 0.00371 -0.01412 -0.0293 -0.19301 -0.03654 0.00336 0.01961 0.01126 
XAAR PLC  -0.13986 -0.02352 0.00701 -0.00597 -0.00738 -0.01918 0.10337 0.05123 -0.01773 -0.00592 
Industrials -0.05807 -0.07386 -0.08276 -0.0883 -0.09524 -0.1268 -0.08565 -0.09609 -0.06041 -0.0342 
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HARDY UNDERWRITING 0.12265 -0.04236 -0.00017 0.09086 0.11075 0.09477 -0.03242 -0.00492 0.15935 0.08169 
AMLIN PLC  -0.17016 -0.09948 -0.08162 -0.02578 0.25833 0.1558 0.14591 0.14507 0.18773 0.13455 
ARM HOLDINGS PLC  -0.0102 0.01396 0.0018 0.00252 0.00395 0.01585 0.0079 0.00587 0.00727 0.0045 
AVON RUBBER PLC  -0.05005 -0.206 -0.23603 -0.18628 -0.06652 -0.12507 -0.09775 -0.17272 -0.49002 -0.16951 
HISCOX PLC 0.00979 -0.01848 -0.01101 -0.12503 0.0363 0.11757 0.11656 -0.05308 0.18997 0.12607 
CHAUCER HOLDINGS -0.1504 -0.12404 -0.13048 -0.92147 0.08816 0.38398 0.21374 -0.04051 0.35053 0.18434 
JARDINE LLOYD  -0.03978 -0.02588 -0.02159 -0.00946 -0.00122 0.00605 -0.00562 -0.03772 -0.02942 -0.03204 
LEGAL & GENERAL- 0.02479 0.20061 -0.15862 -0.2621 -0.21663 0.17478 0.16978 0.23196 0.28221 0.05592 
PRUDENTIAL- 0.13617 0.37279 -0.16643 -0.39283 -0.40734 0.47553 0.36055 0.04619 0.04134 0.07539 
RSA INSURANCE GROUP  -0.01177 0.02021 -0.21903 -0.28389 -0.27425 0.03278 -0.02203 0.11298 0.11523 0.13038 
SAINT JAMES'S PLACE  0.04732 0.01133 0.05486 0.03171 -0.00609 -0.0137 0.00733 0.03629 0.05496 0.01539 
Insurance -0.00833 0.00933 -0.08803 -0.18925 -0.04314 0.11985 0.07854 0.02449 0.07901 0.05515 
                      
AMEC PLC  -0.04384 -0.03555 -0.06507 -0.05148 -0.02568 -0.14699 -0.08348 -0.02632 -0.01776 0.00983 
BILLINGTON HOLDINGS  -0.10825 -0.28588 -0.12655 -0.04493 -0.22306 -0.7687 0.2761 0.24415 -0.12341 0.02053 
CAIRN ENERGY PLC  -0.1299 -0.08651 -0.01237 -0.26947 -0.12635 -0.05919 -0.1586 -0.01131 -0.0205 -0.05521 
DANA PETROLEUM PLC  -0.0573 -0.4151 -0.03888 -0.11326 -0.51746 -0.03228 -0.04217 -0.0765 -0.07462 -0.15069 
EMERALD ENERGY PLC  -0.15202 -0.31058 -0.11211 -0.32899 -0.1392 -0.53188 -0.037 0.02685 0.0477 0.01607 
FORTUNE OIL PLC  -0.00214 -0.05303 0.00753 0.09238 0.01775 0.04722 0.02961 -0.02819 -0.00784 -0.02622 
GTL RESOURCES PLC  -0.73159 -0.24286 -0.01746 -0.05035 -0.08187 -0.08453 -0.11166 -0.169 -0.06124 -0.51446 
HUNTING PLC  -0.04175 -0.09527 -0.19044 -0.24358 -0.19299 -0.27935 -0.11544 -0.11644 -0.0447 -0.01677 
JKX OIL & GAS PLC  -0.06064 0.01507 0.05149 -0.23194 -0.23532 -0.02622 -0.05603 -0.00728 0.0099 -0.0176 
KBC ADVANCED TECH  0.01625 -0.00642 -0.00137 -0.08333 -0.02033 -0.06697 -0.2191 -0.14355 0.0421 0.01362 
NORTHERN PETROLEUM  -0.00584 -0.39565 -0.20175 -2.12671 -0.15412 -0.40061 -0.11208 -0.13943 -0.23601 -0.14642 
PAN ANDEAN RESOURCES  -0.02718 -0.02194 -0.0094 -0.10338 -0.17667 -0.01508 -0.04632 -0.07517 -0.0831 -0.03977 
PORVAIR PLC  -0.037 -0.13783 -0.06424 -0.03227 -0.0838 -0.0285 -0.06548 -0.06087 0.01071 -0.00494 
PREMIER OIL PLC  -0.35224 -0.80275 -0.6525 -0.20937 -0.0652 0.04854 -0.1087 -0.12687 -0.05776 -0.07991 
RAMCO ENERGY PLC  -0.02651 -0.08197 -0.59794 -0.23869 -0.04791 -1.04492 -0.18396 -0.24979 -0.2877 -0.38238 
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL  -0.22521 -0.09163 -0.01608 -0.12997 -0.15808 -0.11575 -0.10367 -0.09928 -0.13432 -0.12201 
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SOCO INT'L PLC  -0.1255 -0.1087 -0.14493 -0.07175 -0.02062 -0.00391 0.01212 0.0128 -0.01388 -0.02655 
STERLING ENERGY PLC  -0.18129 -0.14764 -0.14105 -0.38231 -0.08468 -0.1534 -0.12 -0.19232 -0.07784 -0.18834 
TULLOW OIL PLC  -0.01645 -0.08223 -0.16611 -0.53091 -0.18915 -0.11606 -0.24159 -0.2446 -0.08212 -0.05858 
Oil & Gas -0.1215 -0.17824 -0.13154 -0.27107 -0.13288 -0.19887 -0.07829 -0.07806 -0.06381 -0.09315 
                      
ALPHAMERIC PLC  0.0151 -0.01952 -0.02176 -0.01928 -0.02003 -0.16833 -0.11142 0.00805 -0.03823 -0.10013 
AMBERLEY GROUP PLC  -0.01047 -0.03795 -0.04474 -0.13125 -0.29094 -0.53948 -1.40479 -0.03037 -0.02296 -0.02829 
ANITE PLC  -0.08799 -0.04053 -0.01121 -0.01423 -0.01891 -1.16375 -0.03941 -0.0452 -0.01076 0.04285 
ARMOUR GROUP PLC  -0.09678 0.01761 -0.26249 -0.00213 0.02405 0.02814 0.02191 0.02822 0.01192 0.02253 
BERKELEY GROUP  0.05132 0.09435 0.07253 0.07668 0.1086 0.14194 0.1063 0.10636 0.06581 0.05821 
BUSINESS CONTROL  -2.60067 -2.7068 -6.38541 -0.11093 -0.16754 -0.3113 -0.19827 -0.6514 -0.0285 -0.03935 
CLINICAL COMPUTING  -0.00123 0.0093 -0.03949 -0.2373 -0.13628 -0.14334 -0.06177 -0.11208 -0.29684 -0.38435 
CML MICROSYSTEMS PLC  -0.0402 -0.37246 -0.00306 0.0057 -0.01483 -0.14165 -0.04202 -0.02246 -0.02506 -0.27907 
CONCURRENT TECHNOLOG  -0.07988 0.00274 0.01882 -0.00683 0.01406 -0.04123 -0.02307 0.02879 0.03579 0.02664 
CORERO PLC  -0.12235 -0.11055 -0.06367 -0.19575 -0.31528 -0.39889 -0.18122 -0.42534 -0.0907 -0.22307 
CRIMSON TIDE PLC  -1.00748 -3.17918 -1.23622 -1.57917 -0.3529 -0.57476 -0.27917 -0.14912 -1.31739 -0.05279 
DELCAM PLC  -0.14938 0.06343 0.0084 -0.05226 -0.06769 0.03588 0.00362 0.02223 0.02693 -0.04166 
ELECTRONIC DP PLC  0.00171 -0.0384 -0.02285 -0.18802 -0.11611 0.04609 -0.08032 -0.12276 -0.03318 -0.03586 
EMBLAZE LTD  -0.4693 -1.69144 -0.01909 -0.20739 -1.25845 -2.00177 -0.72593 -0.11075 -0.71089 -0.30624 
FIDESSA GROUP  -0.00584 0.00246 -0.02304 0.00086 0.00997 0.00817 -0.05765 -0.0103 -0.00556 -0.00975 
FILTRONIC PLC  -0.01458 -0.01824 -0.04519 -0.14428 -0.07154 -0.20478 -0.06703 -0.10653 -0.13655 -0.07495 
GB GROUP PLC  -0.17123 -0.17242 -0.03849 -0.08566 -0.03625 0.03379 -0.02787 -0.03488 -0.03799 -0.08004 
GLADSTONE PLC  -0.20453 -0.11296 -0.16078 -0.27855 -0.34368 0.14747 -0.06414 0.0145 0.05675 0.02377 
GRESHAM COMPUTING  0.10386 -0.05832 -0.11233 -0.29253 -0.30547 -0.08083 -0.00818 -0.01074 -0.02035 -0.03123 
IMAGINATION TECH GRP  -0.04319 -0.00347 0.00364 -0.00224 -0.05209 -0.19848 -0.04531 -0.07379 -0.05666 -0.01405 
INSPECTRON  0.04437 0.0189 -0.15816 -0.28665 -0.205 -0.0749 -0.47294 0.09723 -0.10438 -0.92127 
INTELEK PLC  -0.11305 -0.01142 -0.02577 -0.00217 -0.02134 -0.14868 -0.02767 -0.0827 0.07809 0.32551 
INTELLEGENT  -0.22649 -0.25832 -0.03396 -0.32232 -0.71475 -0.05637 -0.0419 -0.05322 0.07766 0.08132 
INVENSYS PLC  -0.00555 -0.10721 -0.02432 -0.00258 -0.04958 -0.10186 -0.08152 -0.0589 -0.01611 0.03973 
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IS SOLUTIONS PLC  0.04209 0.01066 -0.02723 -0.01563 -0.18644 -0.61964 -0.22444 -0.03707 -0.0075 0.03177 
K3 BUSINESS  -0.07795 -0.56185 -1.3685 -0.09943 0.06506 0.05459 -0.0456 -0.02 -0.0345 0.11906 
KEWILL PLC  0.01653 0.00818 -0.00264 -0.03592 -0.39914 -0.20903 0.02657 0.02546 0.02277 0.01635 
KOFAX PLC  -0.07366 0.02313 0.27451 0.44569 0.02559 0.0219 0.01364 0.00647 0.02132 0.02895 
LOGICA PLC  0.00762 0.00412 0.00196 0.00152 -0.00177 -0.00403 -0.01611 -0.00847 0.00816 -0.00906 
MICROGEN PLC  -0.55086 -0.03595 -0.00611 -0.00209 -0.03466 -0.02666 0.01081 -0.01447 0.03046 0.01667 
MISYS PLC  0.02167 0.02485 0.00678 0.00727 0.00081 0.00254 -0.01229 -0.01738 0.00775 0.03298 
NETCALL  -0.14054 -0.24944 -0.04039 -0.12414 -0.30169 -0.07253 -0.05476 0.00326 0.03653 0.05283 
NETWORK TECHNOLOGY  -0.03483 -0.49927 -0.12517 -0.22244 -1.58575 -0.52214 -0.13874 0.01059 -0.03165 0.00278 
NORTHAMBER PLC  0.03023 0.01376 0.05412 -0.11196 -0.1474 -0.05582 -0.00292 -0.02201 -0.07249 -0.0289 
ON-LINE PLC  -0.29466 -0.78784 -0.06939 -0.75041 -1.03003 -0.59765 -0.02917 -0.01809 -0.00552 -0.00352 
PACE PLC  -0.2183 -0.0121 0.00706 0.01706 -0.0092 -0.53854 0.05337 0.08678 -0.19569 0.1413 
PARITY GROUP PLC  0.0263 0.02659 0.00304 -0.02939 -0.09139 0.0326 -0.11977 -0.1064 5.2E-05 -0.01931 
PORTRAIT SOFTWARE  0.02664 0.02239 0.00518 0.00594 -0.04283 -1.97589 0.0669 0.06661 -0.02275 -0.0279 
PSION PLC  -0.00255 -0.00951 -0.01012 -0.03153 -0.04536 -0.06891 -0.0579 -0.00902 -0.00541 -0.01445 
PUBLISHING TECH  -0.08012 0.00449 -0.58434 -0.13695 -0.14415 -0.38948 -0.24242 -0.08208 -0.18789 -0.90057 
RM PLC  -0.01611 -0.02641 -0.00076 -0.00259 -0.02311 -0.0659 -0.10437 -0.11713 -0.00733 -0.0097 
SAGE GROUP PLC (THE)  0.01949 0.01922 0.00521 0.01658 0.02173 0.02271 0.02437 0.03323 0.02543 0.02313 
SCISYS PLC  -0.06592 -0.13685 -0.02404 0.00085 0.01441 0.01979 -0.03644 0.04372 -0.06375 -0.15856 
SOPHEON PLC  -0.03767 -0.07564 -0.13776 -0.45741 -0.69774 -0.86067 -0.12767 -0.0484 -0.01523 -0.01966 
SPIRENT COMM  -0.02326 -0.05379 -0.00861 -0.02281 -0.0769 -0.01183 0.03346 -0.03814 -0.01526 0.05811 
TELSPEC PLC  -0.11057 -0.0043 -0.20881 -0.09308 0.01997 -0.15554 -0.37569 -0.46181 -0.32451 -0.13078 
TOTAL SYSTEMS PLC  0.04567 -0.00095 -0.05634 0.02749 0.04123 0.01271 0.00492 -0.02884 -0.09692 -0.26116 
TRAFFICMASTER PLC  -0.07074 -0.04023 -0.02982 -0.06672 -0.18981 -0.15976 0.0208 -0.03344 0.08173 0.02422 
TRIAD GROUP PLC  0.03023 0.01743 -0.0082 0.0397 -0.05135 -0.56741 -0.15721 -0.0703 -0.12719 -0.17741 
ULTIMA NETWORKS PLC  -0.3588 -0.16298 -0.08591 -0.07304 -0.04839 -0.08496 0.07149 -0.15273 -0.04776 0.11899 
ULTRASIS PLC  -0.1383 -0.17735 -0.08562 -0.21796 -0.29772 -1.12182 -0.04684 -0.18 -0.01257 -0.01339 
Technology -0.1424 -0.22333 -0.21864 -0.11784 -0.18859 -0.27157 -0.10541 -0.05853 -0.07135 -0.06096 
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BT GROUP PLC  -0.16343 -0.04029 -0.02821 -0.1456 -0.15987 -0.12423 -0.14139 -0.15739 -0.15172 -0.08926 
CABLE & WIRELESS  -0.06863 -0.08432 -0.1298 -0.18259 -0.42549 -1.36107 -0.0578 -0.07552 -0.16617 -0.09177 
PNC TELECOM PLC  -0.06192 -0.04486 -0.01367 -0.10022 -0.51864 0 -1.07576 -0.70455 0.05649 -0.81463 
VODAFONE GROUP PLC  -0.01714 -0.01128 -0.02233 -0.08312 -0.10965 -0.19609 -0.15928 -0.16312 -0.04171 -0.0943 
Telecommunications -0.07778 -0.04519 -0.0485 -0.12788 -0.30341 -0.42035 -0.35856 -0.27514 -0.07578 -0.27249 
                      
CENTRICA PLC  -0.00101 -0.07857 0.00443 -0.01033 -0.01708 0.00224 -0.11127 -0.06021 0.00582 -0.00253 
DEE VALLEY GROUP PLC  0.07453 0.03231 0.10848 -0.84747 -0.84719 -1.27348 -1.76476 -1.28144 -1.02892 -2.3684 
INTL POWER PLC  -0.04394 -0.06573 -0.20218 -0.1747 -0.11486 -0.18128 -0.22383 -0.15116 -0.05209 -0.00614 
NATIONAL GRID PLC  -0.18785 -0.05084 -0.06011 -0.01337 -0.07328 -0.0871 -0.08253 -0.06705 -0.0886 -0.09099 
PENNON GROUP PLC  -0.19578 -0.04691 -0.03289 -0.16925 -0.21873 -0.38126 -0.20492 -0.12718 -0.10558 -0.11417 
SCOTTISH & SOUTHERN  -0.04147 -0.05927 -0.05767 -0.03345 -0.0396 -0.0308 -0.03943 -0.0394 -0.05307 -0.0265 
SEVERN TRENT PLC  -0.04948 -0.11065 -0.2674 -0.14828 -0.15756 -0.22003 -0.20506 -0.16382 -0.09864 -0.29591 
UNITED UTILITIES PLC  -0.08485 -0.04036 -0.17706 -0.17183 -0.1733 -0.21547 -0.35583 -0.26334 -0.11444 -0.10838 
Utilities -0.06623 -0.0525 -0.08555 -0.19609 -0.2052 -0.2984 -0.37346 -0.2692 -0.19194 -0.37663 
                      
CALEDONIAN TRUST  -0.16498 -0.24269 -0.07446 -0.27856 -0.0598 -0.31032 -0.30118 -0.24209 -0.08795 -0.05678 
CAPITAL & REGIONAL  -1.30083 -1.89854 -0.55947 -0.3217 -0.20759 -0.29786 -0.08829 -0.2307 -0.44264 -0.14934 
CARDIFF PROPERTY PLC  -0.1724 -0.09627 0.12385 0.05345 -0.02398 -0.04278 -0.03276 -0.07319 0.02109 -0.00278 
CLS HOLDINGS PLC  -0.47014 -0.57957 -0.2257 -0.26798 -0.50047 -0.21031 -0.38461 -0.13964 -0.56182 -0.13681 
DAEJAN HOLDINGS PLC  -0.06197 -0.22875 -0.13801 -0.0657 -0.01029 -0.00564 0.00283 -0.06627 -0.09079 -0.06058 
DEV'T SECURITIES PLC  0.02069 -0.32263 -0.29572 -0.47474 -0.24502 -0.44674 -0.67575 -0.21425 -0.10802 -0.09501 
DTZ HOLDINGS PLC  0.05963 0.0098 0.01136 0.04685 0.00918 -0.04391 -0.02308 -0.00167 0.02419 0.0125 
FIRST PROPERTY  -0.03014 0.12037 -0.05776 -0.11345 -1.94807 -0.72621 0.05347 0.04471 0.00306 0.0257 
FLETCHER KING PLC  -0.04571 -0.06627 -0.027 -0.04562 -0.09316 -0.03605 0.01385 -0.03402 -0.05307 0.00045 
GRAINGER PLC  -0.20556 -0.31844 -0.06741 -0.04685 -0.03285 0.00851 -0.11883 -0.11565 -0.29942 -0.20918 
HELICAL BAR PLC  -0.78721 -0.94114 -0.89807 -0.21543 -0.18278 -0.37566 -0.13186 -0.57825 -0.17823 -0.08367 
LONDON & ASSOCIATED  -0.17155 -1.18589 -0.24549 -0.19102 -0.22202 -0.25173 -0.35857 -0.18165 -0.14419 -0.24791 
MINERVA PLC  -0.75513 -0.27013 -0.555 -0.19788 -0.25687 -0.30793 -0.33917 -0.15706 -0.17875 -0.1282 
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MOUNTVIEW ESTATES  0.06379 0.05989 0.01698 0.07456 0.05653 0.082 0.09751 0.04396 0.03428 0.04848 
OAK HOLDINGS PLC  -0.3932 -0.30976 -1.44706 -0.38378 -0.09136 0 -0.0596 -0.09222 -0.04148 -0.05877 
PANTHER SECURITIES  -0.13103 -0.09842 -0.17576 -0.40372 -0.47177 -0.28475 -0.19539 -0.20709 -0.08678 -0.18902 
PATHFINDER  0.21125 -0.09402 -0.05211 -0.31997 -0.17879 -0.44774 -0.19705 -0.18562 0.34851 -0.21545 
QUINTAIN ESTATES  -0.59386 -0.34084 -0.28629 -0.43224 -0.18137 -0.34273 -0.19341 -0.20002 -0.19021 -0.16533 
RAM INVESTMENT  -0.44117 -0.22453 -0.06375 -0.07785 -0.11766 0 0.10638 -0.05464 -0.25974 -0.33765 
RUGBY ESTATES PLC  -0.08201 -0.1328 -0.11081 -0.09032 -0.0562 0.16901 0.06629 0.11066 0.04844 0.06806 
SAFELAND PLC  -0.35231 -0.81616 -0.06259 -0.47909 -0.42437 -0.56396 -0.40184 -0.3428 -0.27519 -0.23762 
SAVILLS PLC  -0.01188 -0.04246 -0.04026 -0.02478 0.06683 -0.03358 0.04021 0.01731 0.03643 0.02136 
ST. MODWEN PROPS.  -0.1442 -0.20592 -0.26729 -0.26215 -0.39708 -0.07606 -0.41176 -0.115 -0.25591 -0.2266 
WESTCITY PLC  -0.17617 -0.65552 -0.93078 -0.03902 0.02656 -0.07858 -0.07812 -0.07604 -0.04659 -0.06703 
WYNNSTAY PROPERTIES  -0.13638 -0.10798 -0.21902 -0.20926 -0.26804 -0.01954 -0.2838 -0.20563 -0.02704 0.00275 
Real Estate Investment & Servi -0.2509 -0.35955 -0.26591 -0.19065 -0.23242 -0.1857 -0.15578 -0.13187 -0.11247 -0.09954 
                      
BRITISH LAND COMPANY  -0.13897 -0.35293 -0.23168 -0.19069 -0.28388 -0.2766 -0.20576 -0.16032 -0.2266 0.00416 
BRIXTON PLC  -0.25924 -0.71967 -0.6647 -0.18044 -0.26474 -0.18197 -0.49049 -0.1568 0.07637 -0.21693 
DERWENT LONDON PLC  -0.58614 -0.52362 -0.49146 -0.27885 -0.17482 -0.32781 -0.33249 -0.18806 -0.16326 -0.03368 
GREAT PORTLAND  -0.1907 -0.18072 -0.27838 -0.12133 -0.10853 -0.01193 -0.10268 -0.13975 -0.28488 -0.16893 
HAMMERSON PLC  -0.28742 -0.52815 -0.42421 -0.35813 -0.46544 -0.34442 -0.23695 -0.31915 -0.08635 -0.11222 
LAND SECURITIES  -0.06617 -0.08965 -0.12744 -0.15623 -0.16544 -0.20822 -0.20317 -0.1064 -0.3326 -0.00939 
LIBERTY INT'L PLC  -0.21907 -0.21891 -0.17722 -0.20952 -0.5096 -0.16202 -0.13684 -0.44692 -0.04158 -0.16401 
MCKAY SECURITIES PLC  -0.31913 -0.24149 -0.24064 -0.45095 -0.24951 -0.1964 -0.03445 -0.03511 -0.37031 -0.04822 
MUCKLOW (A & J)  -0.13967 -0.10132 -0.08755 -0.08952 -0.05915 -0.02586 -0.01572 -0.01427 -0.08534 0.01154 
PRIMARY HEALTH PROP.  -0.56198 -0.54106 -0.67215 -0.54486 -0.62835 -0.44108 -0.61758 -0.36209 -0.36915 -0.37667 
SEGRO PLC  -0.1765 -0.23499 -0.22535 -0.21792 -0.20218 -0.13919 -0.1183 -0.24951 -0.12228 -0.26669 
SHAFTESBURY PLC  -0.1582 -0.43274 -0.40145 -0.21603 -0.25975 -0.17991 -0.13401 -0.13711 -0.30396 0.06937 
TOWN CENTRE SECS  -0.19729 -0.56165 -0.34566 -0.36477 -0.59707 -0.15976 -0.21078 -0.18189 -0.30968 -0.14464 
WORKSPACE GROUP PLC  -0.5778 -0.26674 -0.79066 -0.36527 -0.38904 -0.50627 -0.39508 -0.19315 -0.40678 -0.04053 
Real Estate Investment Trusts -0.27702 -0.35669 -0.36847 -0.26747 -0.31125 -0.22582 -0.23102 -0.19218 -0.21617 -0.10692 
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ABERDEEN ASSET MGMT  -0.00944 -0.00106 0.0108 -0.0148 -0.04502 -0.37527 -0.10448 -0.0859 -0.00729 0.00725 
ALBERMARLE & BOND  0.03877 0.00292 -0.01836 -0.0027 0.0357 0.01815 0.01859 0.01941 0.01505 0.01123 
BG GROUP PLC  -0.08152 -0.0447 -0.0597 -0.05873 -0.06608 -0.02916 -0.01601 -0.00735 -0.01499 -0.01316 
BOND INTERNATIONAL  -0.13393 -0.12643 0.03405 0.05074 -0.19518 0.01852 0.15504 0.07208 0.08666 0.05715 
BRITISH AIRWAYS PLC  -0.31996 -0.38886 -0.35501 -0.31704 -0.57582 -0.18397 -0.04571 -0.03882 0.01905 -0.00316 
CAMELLIA PLC  -0.09005 -0.1186 -0.12909 -0.1533 -0.17309 -0.24674 -0.11825 -0.08289 -0.0497 -0.0295 
SCHRODERS PLC 0.12668 0.2284 0.18496 -0.07409 -0.06533 -0.08576 0.02936 0.18525 0.19319 0.2592 
CHARLES STANLEY  -0.00609 0.04653 0.03037 0.01908 -0.00399 -0.09665 -0.0102 -0.02451 0.01481 0.02369 
CHARLES TAYLOR  -0.0077 -0.04627 -0.02345 -0.02891 -0.01114 0.03994 0.05704 0.0602 0.03705 0.03308 
CITY OF LONDON GR  -0.07756 -0.112 -0.04639 -0.05 -0.04464 -0.19425 -0.08616 -0.03647 -0.02105 -0.01616 
EVOLUTION GROUP PLC  -0.02218 -0.041 -0.09072 -0.4102 -0.04676 0.01749 0.04331 0.02246 -0.01896 0.00883 
F&C ASSET MGMT  0.06008 0.00827 -0.01213 -0.01362 -0.0628 -0.14089 -0.10747 -0.01064 -0.04326 -0.05963 
G.R. (HOLDINGS) PLC  -0.01776 -0.0915 -0.10394 -0.22762 -0.17921 -0.11909 -0.14146 -0.23521 -0.96047 -0.12781 
GUINNESS PEAT GROUP  -0.871 -1.38708 -1.1961 -1.55353 -1.66979 -0.11724 -0.18982 -0.12891 -0.11695 -0.12669 
HELPHIRE GROUP PLC  -0.00399 0.00844 0.00391 -0.18993 -0.02762 -0.02323 -0.00349 0.03584 -0.00646 0.00478 
IMPAX GROUP PLC  -0.09439 -0.13077 -0.10584 -0.22767 -0.13921 -0.3138 -0.35431 -0.41943 0.08141 0.04358 
INTEGRATED ASSET  -0.62524 -0.07946 -0.11989 -0.37926 -0.56771 -0.41662 -0.16048 -0.14772 -0.11999 -0.0083 
INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL  -0.04441 -0.03759 -0.00204 0.00162 -0.0325 -0.01334 -0.00468 0.01368 0.03312 0.02832 
LEEDS GROUP PLC  -0.08018 -0.16444 -0.02501 -0.18179 -0.01144 -0.00398 -0.16452 0.07911 0.01783 0.01498 
LONDON FINANCE & INV  -0.01036 0.00812 -0.01453 -0.01821 -0.06672 -0.05921 -0.02544 -0.02834 -0.02051 0.05801 
LONRHO PLC  -0.40811 -0.48276 -0.36833 -0.31177 -0.01774 -0.13896 -0.07502 -0.14435 -0.16151 -0.54152 
NUMIS CORP PLC  -0.11274 -0.01306 0.0587 -0.03212 0.05453 0.10793 0.05506 0.10304 0.05935 0.05154 
PANMURE GORDON  0.0043 0.0798 0.0043 -0.05821 -0.21728 -1.65163 -0.30242 0.20642 0.06821 0.06772 
PARAGON GROUP  -0.52226 -0.51755 -0.41445 -0.44007 -0.40239 -0.62103 -0.59337 -0.60199 -0.46748 -0.71639 
PROVIDENT FINANCIAL  -0.04347 0.00073 -0.00061 -0.00986 -0.01707 -0.02432 -0.02565 -0.03492 -0.0607 -0.03968 
QUAYLE MUNRO HOLDING  -0.06626 -0.08068 -0.11588 -0.23325 -0.04824 -0.11873 -0.1718 -0.08883 -0.01441 0.01354 
RATHBONE BROTHERS  -0.00792 0.00592 -0.01405 -0.04317 -0.03875 -0.05386 -0.03682 -0.00928 -0.02025 -0.04204 
S & U PLC  0.02457 0.02481 0.02717 0.01687 0.03394 0.04174 0.01019 0.01688 0.01398 0.00502 
SCHRODERS  0.03514 0.05905 0.04822 -0.01986 -0.01922 -0.02554 0.00826 0.05444 0.05672 0.07251 
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WALKER CRIPS GROUP  0.03669 -0.06542 0.02534 -0.02234 -0.08118 -0.1246 -0.00744 -0.00059 0.02467 0.00252 
Financial Services (Sector) -0.11101 -0.11521 -0.09292 -0.16612 -0.15672 -0.16447 -0.07894 -0.04191 -0.0461 -0.03204 
Market -0.10604 -0.15159 -0.11742 -0.11988 -0.12395 -0.16005 -0.10053 -0.09158 -0.07531 -0.05709 
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Appendix 5-1 
The Questionnaire for the Third Model 
 
Durham University 
Durham Business School 
 
Dear Finance Manager / Director  
 
My name is Alaa Al Saedi, a PhD student at the University of Durham. The 
survey attached is designed to extract specific information relating to the factors 
affecting management when setting dividend policy. 
 
The results of this survey will be anonymous and responses will only be used in 
aggregate in the research. The research findings will contribute to a thesis for the 
purpose of individual assessment. 
 
It would be greatly appreciated if you could assist me in my research and fill in 
the questionnaire found at the following link: 
www.survey.bris.ac.uk/durham/dividend.  The survey is estimated to take about 
10 minutes to complete. 
 
If you have any further questions regarding completing this survey please do not 
hesitate to contact me on the e-mail address provided.  
 
Please be so kind and redirect this questionnaire where appropriate if it has not 
reached the relevant contact. 
 
Thanks for your time and attention 
 
The researcher 
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Section I 
Where appropriate please tick the answer that best applies: 
 
1- In which economic sector does your company work?   
 
[      ] 
 
 
2- Which type of dividend do you think is most important to shareholders? 
 Cash dividend    [ ] 
 Share dividend    [ ] 
 Repurchasing share    [ ] 
 Dividend type not important  [ ] 
 
 
3- Which type of dividend do you prefer? 
 Cash dividend     [  ]  
 Share dividend     [ ]  
 Repurchasing share    [      ] 
 Cash & share dividend                           [      ] 
 All of the above    [      ] 
 No preference     [ ] 
 
 Why do you use the above dividend type? 
 Easy to implement     [  ] 
 More flexible     [      ] 
 Avoid changing previous method      [      ] 
 Requirement of main shareholders   [ ] 
 Other: __________________________________ 
 
 
4- Do you conduct (as a management) any studies about your shareholders‘ dividend 
preferences? 
 Yes      [  ] 
 No       [  ] 
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Section II 
Please tick the following statements depending on degree of factor importance to 
your company when setting dividend policy:  
Statement Strongly 
unimportant 
Unimportant Neutral Important strongly 
important 
The company develops its dividend 
policy in light of shareholders‘ needs 
in order to maximize the company‘s 
market value  
The company 
value  
    
Dividend policy contributes to 
company market value  
The company 
value 
    
Dividend policy is the main factor 
affecting company market value 
The company 
value 
    
There is no link between dividend 
and investment decisions 
Investment 
policy  
    
The dividend decision is a residual 
decision after the investment 
decision has been made 
Investment 
policy 
    
Dividend policy is less important 
than investment policy 
Investment 
policy 
    
The company prefers funding from 
retained earnings before resorting to 
external financing 
Finance      
Cash dividends are considered a 
fixed cost  
Finance      
Cash dividends will weaken the 
company‘s financial flexibility 
Finance      
Dividends are the most important 
tools used by the company to send 
information to shareholders about 
company performance  
Signaling 
 
    
A dividend decrease always refers to 
a reduction in future company 
earnings 
Signaling 
 
    
Distributed dividends reflect the 
company‘s inability to use the 
available funds in profitable projects 
Signaling 
 
    
The company takes a dividend 
decision, despite being under the 
control of external financiers 
Agency  
 
    
Investors monitor the company, if 
funding of a new investment comes 
from retained earnings rather than 
external financing 
Agency  
 
    
Increasing dividends will reduce 
shareholders‘ control over 
management 
Agency  
 
    
The company develops its dividend 
policy based on the requirements of 
the main shareholders 
Shareholders     
The company develops its dividend Shareholders     
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policy based on the dividend tax 
effect on shareholders 
The company uses cash dividends 
because of investor preference for 
certainty.  
Shareholders     
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Appendix 5-2 
Total Variance Explained 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 4.541 25.225 25.225 4.541 25.225 25.225 
2 1.416 7.866 33.091 1.416 7.866 33.091 
3 1.361 7.560 40.651 1.361 7.560 40.651 
4 1.326 7.367 48.019 1.326 7.367 48.019 
5 1.056 5.866 53.885 1.056 5.866 53.885 
6 .957 5.315 59.200 .957 5.315 59.200 
7 .881 4.895 64.095    
8 .797 4.426 68.521    
9 .777 4.315 72.836    
10 .726 4.034 76.870    
11 .671 3.726 80.595    
12 .657 3.652 84.247    
13 .585 3.248 87.495    
14 .554 3.075 90.570    
15 .502 2.786 93.357    
16 .490 2.721 96.078    
17 .384 2.135 98.213    
18 .322 1.787 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
